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
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AN ANALYSIS

OF

Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding,

IN THE

FORM OF QUESTION AND ANSWER.

WITH NOTES, APPENDIX, AND A COLLECTION OF QUESTIONS
PROPOSED AT UNDERGRADUATE EXAMINATIONS
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN.

BY THE

REV. ROBERT CLEARY, A.B.,

Trinity College, Dublin.

SECOND EDITION, REVISED AND ENLARGED.



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P R E F A C E

TO THE SECOND EDITION.

THE favourable reception, and rapid sale, which the First Edition has met with, have induced me to publish a Second Edition.

While keeping the pages of the Analysis within reasonable limits, I have made some slight changes in the body of the work, considerably enlarged the notes, and added a few questions proposed in more recent years.

I am glad that the readers of the Essay have found my book to answer the purpose for which it was designed; and hope that those who, to a greater or less extent, are desirous of investigating the force and value of Locke's conclusions in Mental Philosophy, will derive some assistance from the new references, quotations, and explanations, which I have given.

CAPPOQUIN,

September, 1878.

PREFACE

TO THE FIRST EDITION.

THE want of a Systematic Analysis of Locke's Essay has long been felt by the undergraduates of our University. From time to time various contractions have appeared, but they were all more or less incapable of supplying the deficiency which they were manifestly intended to do. It is true that some valuable abridgments have been published, foremost among which may be mentioned that of Dr. Murray; but unfortunately they were, from the nature of the case, too voluminous to suit either the taste or inclination of ordinary students, who, failing to procure some other Contraction of the Essay, were obliged to have recourse to it in its original form. Having undertaken the present work at the request of some of the Fellows of Trinity College, I began it with a determination to proceed on quite a different plan from that adopted in any of the previous Analyses, all of which, I am informed, are now out of print. My design has been to give Locke's arguments in a concise and regular form without any unnecessary abbreviation—to append notes which would show the

opinions of eminent philosophers of ancient and modern times on the questions discussed by Locke—to indicate where Locke has been misrepresented by succeeding critics—to correct Locke's over-fondness for repetition, by prefixing references to the different portions of the Essay where similar observations of his recur—and, lastly, to point out where Locke, in my opinion, has fallen into inconsistency and error. Originality has not been my design. In the majority of cases, I have merely inserted the opinions of some of the most distinguished philosophers, and have left the student to draw his own conclusions.

When first studying the Essay, I felt the serious disadvantage arising from not being acquainted with the different views which great thinkers had expressed on questions connected with it; and, in consequence, was afterwards compelled to acquire that knowledge by a more extensive course of Psychological reading. My belief is, that this disadvantage is likely to be experienced in a greater degree by those who have neither time nor opportunity to inquire further into these matters, and who would either regard Locke as an infallible guide, or would sceptically disdain all Psychological inquiries on account of some absurdity or error which they had detected, or fancied they had detected, in the writings of the Great Philosopher.

An objection may be made to my employing the catechetical form; but I think that a glance at the work itself will immediately satisfy anyone, that by so doing I have not mutilated Locke's arguments, or disturbed the logical nexus of his Essay, but rather

simplified and made it more intelligible to the class of readers for whom it is chiefly intended.

Many of the questions are couched in the identical terms in which they have been proposed at the various Undergraduate Honor and Ordinary Examinations; and I trust that by adopting this precaution I shall materially assist the student.

I am indebted to my numerous friends for the valuable assistance which they have so kindly given me, both in correcting the proof sheets, and otherwise preparing this work for publication.

My thanks are especially due to the Rev. Dr. Stubbs, F.T.C.D., for the kind interest he has manifested in the progress of this volume.

12 TRINITY COLLEGE,
July, 1873.

NOTICE TO THE READER.

THE following remarks may serve for the guidance of candidates preparing for Ordinary Undergraduate Examinations.

The questions to which asterisks are prefixed are, generally speaking, not intended for Ordinary Examinations; they have been inserted either to preserve the connexion, or because they have been proposed in regular course for Honors.

The notes, likewise, are not intended for ordinary students, except where they explain some phrase in the text, or otherwise help to elucidate the Plan of the Essay.

It is needless to say that to any reader, although he be not a candidate for Honors, but who is nevertheless desirous of becoming master of Locke's opinions, it is hoped the entire work will prove useful.

The parts of the Essay, which are treated of in the following Analysis, are those prescribed for Undergraduate Examinations, according to the new arrangement in the College Calendar; viz.—

INTRODUCTION.

BOOK II., (omitting sects. 10-20 of chap. i.; sect. 10 to end of chap. xiii.; chap. xv.; sects. 11-71 of chap. xxi., and chap. xxvii. to end.)

BOOK III. (omitting chaps. vi. to ix.)

BOOK IV.; chaps. i. to xi., inclusive, (omitting chap. vii.)

INTRODUCTION.

FOR two reasons, the understanding is a subject worthy of our inquiry?—Because, 1°. It is that which sets man above the rest of sensible beings, and 2°. gives him all the advantage and dominion he has over them. (Sect. 1.)

What inducements are there to an inquiry into the understanding?—Three :—1°. the nobleness of the subject ; 2°. the pleasure of the inquiry ; 3°. the advantage it will be in directing our thoughts in the search of other things.

How does Locke illustrate the difficulty of the inquiry ?—By comparing the understanding to the eye,* which, whilst it makes us see and perceive all things, requires art and pains to set it at a distance, and make itself its own object.†

How does Locke illustrate the pleasure derivable from the inquiry ?—By comparing it to the delight which light gives to the eye.‡

What is Locke's DESIGN in this essay ?—To inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent. (Sect. 2.)

* This illustration had previously been employed by Cicero.

† "The first difficulty in psychological observation arises from this, that the conscious mind is at once the observing subject and the object observed."—Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Vol. I., p. 375.

‡ Cf. Epistle to the Reader.

What question does Locke propose to omit?—"The physical consideration of the mind";* this includes, 1°. wherein the essence of the mind consists; 2°. by what motions of our spirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings; and 3°. whether these ideas do, in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter or not.

What is Locke's opinion regarding these questions?—He allows them to be curious and entertaining, but nevertheless considers them as lying out of the way of his present design, which he limits to "the discerning faculties of a man, as they are employed about the objects with which they have to do."†

What does Locke call his method?—A historical plain method.

What consideration, does Locke think, ought to impress us with the necessity of discovering the ways whereby we receive notions of things, and of determining accurately the extent of our knowledge, and the grounds of our beliefs?—The fact that so many various and contradictory opinions are extant amongst mankind.

What mischievous consequences have resulted from these opinions?—They have tempted men who have observed them to become sceptical in either of two ways—1°. To suspect there was no such thing as truth at all, or 2°. To suppose

* Thus we see that Locke's design is not Ontological, or Physiological, but Psychological.

† We shall see, as we proceed, that Locke does not always strictly adhere to the determination expressed in the text; on the above passage Dugald Stewart remarks: "It is much to be wished that Mr. Locke had adhered invariably to this wise resolution." (Phil. Essays, Prel. Dissert.)

that mankind had no sufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it.*

What METHOD does Locke propose to pursue?—1°. To inquire into the original of our ideas, and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them. 2°. To show what knowledge the understanding has by these ideas, and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it. 3°. To inquire into the nature and grounds of faith or opinion.† (Sect. 3.)

Define Faith or Opinion?—That assent which we give to any proposition as true, of whose truth we have no certain knowledge.‡

What practical advantage is to be derived from a knowledge of the nature, extent, and limits of the powers of the understanding?—It would teach the mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things beyond its comprehension, to stop when it reaches the utmost extent of its tether, and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things which, when examined, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities. (Sect. 4.)

Why have men reason to be satisfied with their present faculties for acquiring knowledge?—Since God has given

* Cf. Bacon, *De Aug. Scient.*, Book V., chap. ii.

† Cf. Book I., chap. ii., sect. 23. The first of these considerations is treated of in the Second Book of the Essay, and the two latter conjointly in the Fourth. The Third Book was a kind of after-thought, and was written by Locke upon his discovering that a preliminary treatise on the nature, use, and signification of language was necessary before proceeding to make inquiries respecting our knowledge. The First Book is devoted to the refutation of the theory of innate ideas, a doctrine attributed to Descartes, which Locke represents as an "established opinion" and "received doctrine" in his day.

‡ Cf. Book IV., chap. xv., sect. 3.

them (as St. Peter says*) *πάντα πρὸς ζῶην καὶ εὐσέβειαν*, "Whatsoever is necessary for the conveniences of life and information of virtue." (Sect. 5.)

What are men's greatest concernments?—A knowledge of their Maker, and their duty towards Him.†

How does Locke illustrate the folly of indolence arising from scepticism?—By comparing the man who neglects to improve his knowledge to a servant who would not attend to his business by candle-light, because he had not broad sunshine.

How does Locke illustrate the folly of the sceptic who disbelieves everything, because he does not certainly know all things?—By comparing him to a man who sits still and perishes, because he has not wings to fly.‡

When shall we use our understandings aright?—When we entertain all objects in that way and proportion in which they are suited to our faculties, and upon the grounds that they are capable of being proposed to us; and not peremptorily or intemperately require demonstration, and demand certainty where probability only is to be had, and which is sufficient to govern all our concernments.§

What two evils would a knowledge of our capacity remedy, and how?—Scepticism and idleness:—1°. By teaching us that some things were attainable by us, and suited to our capacities, it would prevent us despairing of

* 2 Peter i. 3.

† Cf. Book II., chap. vii., sect. 6; chap. xxiii., sect. 12; Conduct of the Understanding, sect. 23.

‡ Cf. Book IV., chap. xi., sect. 10.

§ Cf. Bacon, De Aug. Scient., Book V., chap. iv.; Butler, Analogy, (Introduction.)—Later on in the Essay, Locke defines "Probability" as "The appearance of agreement upon fallible proofs"—"Likelihood to be true." (Book IV., chap. xv., sects. 1 and 3.)

any knowledge whatever. 2°. When we have surveyed the powers of our minds, and know what may be expected from them, we shall not be inclined to let our thoughts lie dormant.* (Sect. 6.)

To what does Locke compare the extent of man's capacity?—To a mariner's sounding line,† which, though it be useless to fathom all the depths of the ocean, yet will assist him in directing his voyage, and will warn him against shoals and quicksands.

Is it our business in this life to know all things?—No; only those which concern our conduct.

What does Locke say was the occasion of writing this essay?—His suspicion that all our inquiries begin at the wrong end, when we let loose our thoughts on the vast ocean of being, as if everything were suited to our comprehension, before we take a view of our own understandings, examine our own powers, and see to what things they are adapted.‡ (Sect. 7.)

A neglect of this consideration (*i.e.*, extending our inquiries beyond our faculties) led men into a serious error?—Scepticism.

To what does Locke compare the bounds between

* These two considerations, Locke thinks, are the Ultimate Object of Knowledge.

† He again, when treating of infinity (chap. xvii., sect. 15,) uses this illustration of the mariner's sounding line.

‡ Professor Webb remarks, that, in this passage, Locke anticipated the revolution effected in Metaphysics by Kant, who ascribed the failures of his predecessors in Philosophy to the fact that they had occupied themselves with the objects of knowledge before they had examined into the capabilities of the subject. Kant compares the revolution effected by himself in Philosophy to that effected by Copernicus in Astronomy.

knowledge and ignorance?—To the sensible horizon which separates the visible and invisible parts of the globe.

What is Locke's POSTULATE?—He assumes the existence of ideas in the mind. (Sect. 8.)

Locke thinks himself warranted in this assumption for two reasons?—1°. Every man is conscious that ideas exist in his mind. 2°. Men's words and actions will satisfy him that they exist in the minds of others.

How does Locke define idea?—He gives two definitions : —1°. "Whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks."* (Intro., sect. 8.) 2°. Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding." (Book II., chap. viii., sect. 8.)

What is Locke's first inquiry?—How ideas come into the mind.

* Locke, in his Introduction, apologizes for his frequent use of the word "idea," but justifies himself on the grounds that it is the term which best stands for "Whatsoever is the object of the understanding, when a man thinks;" and he uses it to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking. Cf. his Second Letter to the Bishop of Worcester.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

Of Ideas in General, and their Original.*

Locke devotes the first book of his Essay to the refutation of a doctrine, which, if admitted, would overthrow his own at the outset?—The doctrine that ideas were innate; *i.e.*, (as Locke explains it,) *κοινὰί ἐννοιαί*, primary notions stamped upon the mind at its very first being.

How does Locke endeavour to do this in his First Book?—By showing that the grounds on which they have been supposed innate are invalid.

In refutation of the doctrine of innate ideas Locke adopts a new line of argument in the beginning of his Second Book?—Since it is unphilosophical to multiply principles without necessity,† it would be useless to suppose ideas

* Professor Webb asserts (*Intellectualism of Locke*, p. 67,) that Locke employs the term "*Original*" in the sense of "*Exordium*," or "*Chronological Condition*."

† The great argument employed by the Nominalists, who held that there were no existences in nature, corresponding to general terms, against the Realists, who held the contrary opinion, was the one here used by Locke—" *Entia non sunt multiplicanda prater necessitatem*." Cf. Book I., chap. ii., sects. 1 and 3; chap. iv., sect. 2. This argument was called "*Le Razoir des Nominaux*," and "*The Razor of Occam*" (from William Occam, a great advocate of Nominalism in mediæval times.) Sir William Hamilton uses this argument for a different purpose under the designation of "*The Law of Parcimony*."—"That no

innate, after he has shown whence the mind may get all the ideas it has, and by what ways and degrees they come into the mind. (Sect. 1.)

To what does Locke compare the mind at the first moment of its creation?—To “WHITE PAPER,”* void of all characters. (Sect. 2, and Book I., chap. iii., sect. 22.)

What is the SOURCE OF ALL OUR IDEAS according to Locke?—EXPERIENCE; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself.†

This experience is two-fold?—SENSATION and REFLECTION.

What are the definitions of Sensation given by Locke?—
I. As a source of Ideas—“The great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding.” (Book II., chap. i., sect. 3.) II. As an organic affection—“Such an im-

fact be assumed as a fact of consciousness, but what is ultimate and simple.” (Metaphysics, Lect. xv., *et passim*.) With Berkeley, too, this principle possessed great force in his denial of the existence of matter, or “The support of accidents or qualities without the mind.” (Principles of Human Knowledge, xxxv., xxxvii.)

* Cf. Book I., chap. ii., sect. 15 :—“The senses, at first, let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet “EMPTY CABINET;” and the mind, by degrees, growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the memory, and names got to them.”

† The Student will now understand what is meant by the phrase, “The Empiricism of Locke,” since the fundamental principle of his system is that all our knowledge is derived from Experience (*ἐμπειρία*.)

“There can be no doubt,” says Kant, “that our knowledge begins chronologically with experience. But though all knowledge begins *with* experience, it does not follow that it originates *from* experience.” This I believe to be a true statement of the fact; Locke, however, probably contemplated the chronological order of our ideas only; we have seen that Locke speaks of his “plain *historical* method.” (Introd., sect. 2; *vide* Webb, Intellectualism of Locke, chap. iv.)

pression or motion made in some part of the body, as produces some perception in the understanding." (Book II., chap. i., sect. 23.) III. As a simple mode of thinking, a mental act—"The actual entrance of an Idea into the understanding by the senses."* (Book II., chap. xix., sect. 1.)

What are the definitions of Reflection given by Locke?—

I. "That notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them; by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding."

II. "Internal sense."† (Sect 4; *cf.* chap. xi., sect. 17.)

Locke uses the term "Operations" in a large sense?—Comprehending not only the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of passions arising sometimes from them, such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought.

Give examples of ideas of Sensation?—Yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities.

Give examples of ideas of Reflection?—Perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own minds.

Whence do we receive the ideas of Sensation?—From the impressions made upon our senses by external sensible objects.

Whence do we receive the ideas of Reflection?—From the operations of the mind in thinking, which, when perceived by the mind, furnish those ideas. (Sect. 4; *cf.* sect 8.)

* For a fourth definition, *vide* Book II., chap. i., sect. 24, and my note, page 18.

† A third definition may be obtained from sect. 24, viz.—"That capacity of human intellect by which the Mind is fitted to receive the impressions made on it by its own operations when it reflects upon them."

From what facts does it appear that our ideas are from Sensation and Reflection?—1°. From examination of ourselves, which shows that we have no ideas apart from these two sources ; and 2°. From the absence of ideas in a new-born infant. (Sects. 5 and 6.)

What leads us to imagine that some ideas have existed in the mind from its first formation?—The fact that the ideas of obvious and familiar qualities (*e.g.*, light and colours) imprint themselves before the memory begins to keep a register of time or order. (Sect. 6.)

How come men to be furnished with a greater or less number of ideas 1°. of Sensation ; and 2°. of Reflection?—1°. According as the objects they are conversant with afford greater or less variety. 2°. According as they reflect more or less on the operations of their minds within them. (Sect. 7.)

How does Locke illustrate the necessity of attention in order to receive ideas?—By comparing the understanding to a clock or landscape, of whose parts we can have but imperfect ideas, unless we pay due attention to them.

Why are ideas of Reflection later than those of Sensation? And what facts will this account for?—Because the ideas of Reflection need attention ; and hence it is that children get ideas of the operations of their own minds late, because at first they are attracted by the novelty of external objects ; and some men never give any attention at all to them, but let them pass like floating visions, without leaving any lasting impression, and so never get clear, distinct ideas of these operations. (Sect. 8.)

When does the soul first begin to have any ideas?—When it first begins to perceive, or first has any sensations. (Sects. 9 and 23.)

Define Perception?—"Having ideas." (Sect. 9.)

What opinion of Descartes regarding the soul does Locke refute, and why?—That the soul thinks always (*i.e.*, that thinking is the essence of the soul, not one of its operations.) Locke denied it because it wanted proofs, and therefore, making such a hypothesis would be begging the question.* (Sects. 10-23.) He refers to this opinion again, and refutes it. (Chap. xix., sect. 4, *q. v.*)

What effect would Descartes' theory have, if true, on Locke's doctrine of the origin of our ideas?—It would refute his theory, that all our ideas are derived from Sensation and Reflection, since the soul was thinking at the first moment of its creation.†

What was the Cartesian analogy of thinking being the essence of the soul?—That actual thinking was as inseparable from the soul as actual extension from the body.‡ (Sect. 9.)

What instance does Locke adduce to show that the soul does not think before the senses have furnished it with ideas to think on?—Children and new-born infants never

* The full discussion of this subject is here omitted, because the sections of this chapter which contain Locke's refutation of the Cartesian doctrine are excluded from the prescribed course. The subject will be taken up again when we come to consider the nineteenth chapter.

† Descartes held that there were three substances existent. 1°. Infinite substance, or that which requires for its existence the existence of nothing else; in this sense God alone was substance. 2°. Thinking substance or mind. 3°. Bodily substance or matter; these latter were created finite substances, and might be defined as things requiring for their existence only the co-operation of God. Extension was the attribute and being of matter, thought the attribute and being of spirit. (*Cf.* Stirling's Translation of Schwegler's History of Philosophy, p. 161.) Locke, himself, tells us (chap. xxvii., sect. 2)—“We have the idea but of three sorts of substances: 1. God; 2. Finite Intelligences; 3. Bodies.”

‡ *Cf.* Book III., chap. x., sect. 6.

fashion in the mind any simple idea not derived from sensation or reflection, nor can we destroy any that are there.*

To what is the power of the understanding over its simple ideas limited?—To compounding, comparing, and abstracting them.

What important consideration does Locke deduce from the fact of our inability to form any simple idea in the understanding not received from sensation or reflection?—The impossibility of imagining any other qualities in bodies, whereby they can be taken notice of, besides sounds, tastes, smells, visible and tangible qualities.† (Sect. 3.)

To what does Locke compare 'man's knowledge respecting creatures in other worlds?—To the knowledge that a worm, shut up in a drawer of a cabinet, has of the understanding of man.

* He makes remarks to the same purpose in chap. xii., sect. i., *q. v.* Dean Mansel, in criticising the above passage, remarks:—"It is true, in so far as it asserts that nothing can be represented in thought which has not, separately or in conjunction with other phenomena, been presented in intuition; but it is incorrect, in so far as it overlooks the fact that intuition has a necessary element, derived from the constitution of the mind, as well as a contingent element, derived from the phenomena of sensation and reflection."—*Metaphysics*, p. 277, Second Edition; *cf.* *Metaphysics*, p. 233; *Prolegomena Logica*, pp. 40, 41, Second Edition.

† *Cf.* chap. xxiii., sect. 13.

CHAPTERS III.—VII. (INCLUSIVE.)

Simple Ideas divided into Four Classes with respect to their manner of approach to the mind, together with a Particular Examination of an Idea contained under the first of these classes, viz., Solidity.

INTO what four classes does Locke divide our simple ideas,* with respect to the different ways whereby they make their approaches to the mind?—1°. The ideas which enter by one sense only. 2°. The ideas which enter by more than one sense. 3°. The ideas that are had from reflection only. 4°. The ideas that are suggested to the mind both by sensation and reflection. (Chap. iii., sect. 1.)

What are the chief ideas received from one sense only?—LIGHT and COLOURS, with their several degrees and mixtures—by the eyes. NOISES, SOUNDS, and TONES—by the ears. TASTES and SMELLS—by the nose and palate. HEAT COLD, SOLIDITY, etc.,—by the touch.

How are these ideas conveyed from their respective organs to the brain?—They are conveyed by the nerves to the brain, which Locke calls the “Mind’s presence room.”†

Why does not Locke enumerate all the simple ideas peculiar to each sense?—1°. Because it is needless. 2°. Because it is impossible ; for they have not all names :—*e. g.*, the varieties of smells, tastes, colours, and sounds.

* In the original, Locke proposes to consider the simple ideas *received from sensation*, relatively to the ways in which they make their approaches to our minds. But this is evidently erroneous (or at least an unintentional mistake), as he, immediately afterwards, includes in this classification the simple ideas derived from *reflection*.

† Locke here displays a tendency towards Materialism.

What simple ideas of one sense does Locke propose to consider?—1°. Those most material to his present purpose. 2°. Those less apt to be taken notice of, although frequently the ingredients of our complex ideas.

What idea does he reckon foremost amongst these?—SOLIDITY, which is the most constantly received idea of sensation.

How do we get the idea of solidity, and whence does it arise?—We receive the idea of solidity from our touch; and it arises from the resistance which we find in body to the entrance of any other body into the place it possesses till it has left it.* (Chap. iv., sect. 1).

What does Locke mean by solidity?—"That which hinders the approach of two bodies when they are moved one towards another."

For three reasons Locke prefers the term "SOLIDITY" to "IMPENETRABILITY"?—1°. Solidity is the term in most common use. 2°. "Solidity" is a positive, "Impenetrability," a negative term. 3°. Impenetrability is rather a consequence of solidity, than solidity itself.

What connection has solidity with matter?—It is the idea most intimately connected with, and essential to body, so as nowhere else to be found or imagined but only in matter.†

Where only do our senses take notice of it?—In masses of matter large enough to cause a sensation in us.

Whence is it then that we attribute solidity to the smallest particle of matter?—The mind having once got

* "When Locke tells us that 'the idea of solidity we receive by our touch, and it *arises from* the resistance which we find in body,' it is plain he regards resistance as an idea furnished by sensation, and solidity as an idea suggested by resistance."—Webb, *Intellectualism of Locke*, p. 78.

† Cf. chap. xiii., sect. 11.

the idea from such grosser masses of matter, traces it further, and considers both it and figure in the minutest particle of matter that can exist; and finds it inseparably inherent in body wherever, or however modified.* (Chap. iv., sect. 1; cf. chap. viii., sect. 9.)

What is the connection between solidity and space?—We conceive it to fill space, that is, when we imagine any space taken up by a solid substance, we conceive it to possess that space to the utter exclusion of all other solid substances.

How does our idea of solidity differ from that of pure space?—The resistance whereby it keeps other bodies out of the place it possesses, till it has left it, distinguishes our idea of solidity from that of pure space, which is capable neither of resistance nor motion.

By three arguments† Locke shows that we have the idea of space, without body or solidity?—1°. A man may conceive two bodies at a distance, so as they may approach one another without touching or displacing any solid thing, till their superficies come to meet. Whereby he may have a clear idea of space without solidity. (Chap. iv., sect. 3.) 2°. That men have ideas of space without body, their disputes about a vacuum plainly demonstrate. (Chap. iv., sect. 3; cf. chap. xiii. sect. 22.) 3°. The idea of the distance between the opposite parts of a concave superficies is as

* In this sense solidity is a Rational Idea, or Idea of the Intellect.

† Again in chap. xiii., sects. 21-23, Locke shows that the idea of space may exist without body, by demonstrating that three absurdities would ensue if men denied it, viz.—1°. The infinitude of matter. 2°. The impotency of God. 3°. The annihilation of motion. In sect. 24 of the same chapter he remarks, that if men had not the idea of space without body, they could not make a question about its existence. In sect. 11 we read :—"I appeal to every man's own thoughts, whether the idea of space be not as distinct from that of solidity as it is from the idea of *scarlet colour*."

equally clear without as with the idea of any solid parts between.* (Chap. iv., sect. 5).

Does Locke think a man can have the idea of the motion of one single body alone, without any other succeeding immediately into its place?—He thinks it evident he can; the idea of motion in one body, no more including the idea of motion in another than the idea of a square figure in one body, includes the idea of a square figure in another.

* From what does Locke say the necessity of such motion is derived?—From the supposition that the world is full,† and not from the distinct ideas of space and solidity.

How is SOLIDITY distinguished from HARDNESS?—Solidity consists in repletion, and so an utter exclusion of other bodies out of the space it possesses; but hardness in a firm cohesion of the parts of matter making up masses of a sensible bulk, so that the whole does not easily change its figure.

Hard and soft are relative terms?—Things are called either hard or soft only in relation to the constitution of our own bodies; things being called hard, whose figure costs us pain to change; those, on the contrary, soft which we can change without pain to ourselves.‡

What is the “Florentine Experiment,” mentioned by Locke?—A golden globe was filled with water and tightly closed; it was then pressed together by screws, and the water made its way through the pores and got on the out-

* He says again in chap. xvii., sect. 20—“It seems as easy to me to have the idea of space empty of body, as to think of the capacity of a bushel without corn, or the hollow of a nutshell without a kernel in it.”

† Cf. Book III., chap. x., sec. 14, and my note at that place.

‡ Locke seems to place three distinctions between solidity and hardness, viz.—1°. Solidity is an absolute term; hardness, a relative one. (chap. iv., sect. 4.) 2°. Solidity admits of no degrees, hardness does. 3°. Solidity is a primary quality; hardness, a secondary one.

side, where it rose like dew, and then fell in drops before the sides of the globe could be made to yield to the pressure of the machine that squeezed it.

For what purpose does Locke narrate this experiment?—In order to show that the difficulty of changing the situation of the sensible parts among themselves, or of the figure of the whole, gives no more solidity to the hardest body in the world than to the softest;—adamant, for instance, not being one jot more solid than water.*

What qualities of body depend on solidity?—Their mutual impulse, resistance, and protrusion.

How is the extension of body distinguished from the extension of space?—By solidity.

What is the extension of body and space respectively?—Extension of body is the cohesion or continuity of solid, separable, movable parts: extension of space, the cohesion or continuity of unsolid, inseparable, immovable parts.

What answer does Locke propose to give the man who asks him what solidity is?—To send him to his senses for information on the subject; *e.g.*, let him put a foot-ball or flint between his hands, and try to join them, and he will know what solidity is. If this does not satisfy him, let him first tell what other simple ideas, such as thinking, extension, and motion are, and wherein they consist.

Why does Locke propose to deal thus with the inquiry?—Because simple ideas are such as experience teaches them to us, and cannot be defined. Locke afterwards shows why

* Dr. Lardner thinks that Locke certainly implies, if not directly affirms, that the Florentine experiment was intended to be a criterion to establish the *solidity* of water. An experiment, such as Locke describes, was instituted at the Academy del Cimento to try the *compressibility* of water. (Lectures on Locke, pp. 30, 31)

simple ideas are incapable of definition. (Book III., chap. iv., sects. 5, 7, and 11.)

How does Locke illustrate the absurdity of making simple ideas clearer than they are given in experience?—By comparing it to the attempt to reason a blind man into the ideas of light and colours.

The ideas got by more than one sense are four?—
1°. SPACE OR EXTENSION.* 2°. FIGURE. 3°. REST.
4°. MOTION.† We get these ideas from sight and touch.
(Chap. v.; cf. chap. xiii., sect. 2.)

Locke mentions two simple ideas of Reflection?—Perception or Thinking,‡ and Volition or Willing; these he calls “the two great and principal actions of the mind.” (Chapter vi., sect. 2.)

Define “understanding”?—The power of thinking.§

Define the “will.”—The power of volition.||

These two powers or abilities in the mind are denominated by a common name?—Faculties.¶

* Mr. Lewes (History of Philosophy, vol. ii., p. 267) thinks that no honest inquirer would ever suppose Locke meant to say that space was a *sensation*; but he would understand that Locke meant to say—“The idea of space is an abstraction: the primary materials are obtained through our touch and sight.”

† A question might be raised as to whether motion is, strictly speaking, a simple idea, since space, time, and memory are requisite in order to arrive at the idea of motion in our own bodies, or in things external to us. See the reasons assigned by Locke why “swift” and “slow” are complex ideas (chap. xviii., sect. 2); and also chap. xiii., sect. 11; chap. xiv., sect. 22.

‡ Cf. chap. ix., sect. 1.

§ Cf. chap. xxi., sect. 5; Second Letter to the Bishop of Worcester.

|| Cf. chap. xxi., sect. 71.

¶ Cf. chap. xxi., sects. 6, 17, 18, and 20. Faculty is a term applied to self-active forces; powers, to both active and passive. When employed in the latter sense, power is usually denominated “Capacity.” (Vide Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, Lect. x., vol. I., p. 178, Fifth Edition.)

What are the simple ideas which convey themselves into the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection?—

1°. PLEASURE OR DELIGHT.—2°. PAIN OR UNEASINESS.
3°. POWER.—4°. EXISTENCE.—5°. UNITY.* (Chap. vii., sect. 1.)

What is Locke's opinion respecting the connection of pleasure and pain with our other ideas?—"Delight or uneasiness, one or other of them, join themselves to almost all our ideas of sensation and reflection." (Chap. vii., sect. 2.)

What does Locke mean by "pleasure and pain"?—Whatsoever delights or molests us most, whether it arises from the thoughts of our minds, or anything operating on our bodies.†

What are the USES OF PLEASURE according to Locke?—1°. That the faculties we are endowed with might not remain wholly idle and unemployed by us; this is a proof of design on the part of the Creator. (Chap. vii., sect. 3.) 2°. To fix ideas in the memory. (Chap. x., sect. 3.)

What are the USES OF PAIN?—Four. It has the two uses pleasure has, and also: 3°. It preserves every part and organ in its perfection. (Chap. vii., sect. 4.) 4°. It leads us to seek perfection, satisfaction, and complete happiness in another world. (Chap. vii., sect. 5.)

* He afterwards adds, 6°. SUCCESSION (Chap. vii., sect. 9; chap. xiv. sect. 3), and 7°. FINITE. (Chap. xvii., sect. 2.) Locke's enumeration of this class of ideas is both erroneous and inconsistent; he admits (chap. xxi., sect. 3; chap. xxiii., sect. 7) that power is not a simple idea; again, he asserts that ideas of active powers (the more proper signification of the word power) are derived from reflection. (Chap. xxi., sects. 4 and 5.) Pleasure, Pain, and Succession are simple ideas of reflection. (Chap. i., sect. 4; chap. vii., sect. 2; chap. xiv., sect. 3.) All our ideas are, when attentively considered, relations (Chap. xxi., sect. 3.) Cf. Webb, *Intellectualism of Locke*, p. 79.

† He says afterwards (chap. xx., sect. 1) that pleasure and pain cannot be described, nor their names defined; cf. sect. 6, of the present chapter.

Locke assigns two reasons to account for the fact of the Creator having so closely conjoined pleasure and pain in our ideas?—1°. Because God has designed not our preservation only, but the preservation of every part and organ in its perfection. 2°. In order that we, finding imperfection, dissatisfaction, and want of complete happiness, in all the enjoyments the creature can afford us, might be led to seek it in the enjoyment of Him, with whom there is fulness of joy, and at whose right hand there are pleasures for evermore.

What is the chief end of all our thoughts, and the proper business of all understandings?—The knowledge and veneration of God.* (Chap. vii., sect. 6.)

Whence do we get the idea of EXISTENCE?—When ideas are in our minds, we consider them as being actually there, as well as we consider things to be actually without us ; which is that they exist, or have Existence.

Whence do we get the idea of UNITY OR NUMBER?—Whatever we can consider as one thing, whether a real being or idea, suggests to the understanding the idea of Unity.† (Chap. vii., sect. 7.)

Whence do we get the idea of POWER?—Both from observing in ourselves that we can at pleasure move several parts of our bodies which were at rest, and also from the occurrence to our senses every moment, of the effects which natural bodies are able to produce in one another. (Chap. vii., sect. 8.)

Whence do we get the idea of SUCCESSION?—Though

* Cf. *Introduct.*, sect. 5 ; chap. xxiii., sect. 12 ; *Conduct of the Understanding*, sect. 23.

† The sixteenth chapter of the second Book of the *Essay* is devoted to a fuller examination of our idea of Unity, and the twenty-first chapter to our idea of Power : in the last-named chapter Locke discusses the origin of this latter idea at greater length.

this idea is suggested by our senses, we have it more constantly offered to us by contemplating the train of ideas in the mind during our waking moments. (Chap. vii., sect. 9; *cf.* chap. xiv., sect. 3.)

Locke holds that the mind has no ideas but those it receives from sensation and reflection. How does he answer the objector, who asserts that these are too narrow bounds for the capacious mind of man?—By two arguments.—1°. *Argumentum ad ignorantiam*.^{*}—Locke requests the objector to assign any simple idea not received from these inlets, or any complex idea not made out of those simple ones. 2°. Argument from Analogy. The objector will not be averse to receive Locke's theory, when he considers—(a) How many words can be formed from the various compositions of twenty-four letters;—(b) The variety of combinations that can be made with the idea of number;—(c) The immense field afforded to mathematicians by extension alone. (Chap. vii., sect. 10; *cf.* chap. xxii., sect. 9.)

CHAPTER VIII.

Some further Considerations concerning our Simple Ideas.

LOCKE notices a consideration concerning our simple ideas of sensation, relatively to their exciting causes?—Whatever is so constituted in nature as to be able, by affecting our senses, to cause any perception in the mind, doth thereby produce in the understanding a simple idea, which, whatever be the external cause of it, when it comes to be taken notice

^{*} *I.e.*, requiring an opponent to admit your principles, or assign better.—*Cf.* Book IV., chap. xvii., sect. 20.

of by our discerning faculty, is by the mind looked on and considered to be a real positive idea, although the cause of it be but a privation in the subject. (Sect. 1.)

In discoursing thus, there are two things carefully to be distinguished?—Between an idea as it exists in the understanding, and the nature of the idea as it exists without us.* (Sect. 2.)

* Does Locke think it necessary to have a perfect knowledge of the cause in order to have a clear perception of the idea?—No. For a painter or dyer has as clear, and perhaps a clearer idea of colours than a philosopher, although the former never inquired into their causes, while the latter has studied their nature and causes. (Sect. 3.)

Locke suggests a physiological reason, why a privative cause might, in some cases, produce a positive idea?—All sensation being produced in us only by different degrees and modes of motion in our animal spirits, variously agitated by external objects, the abatement of any former motion must as necessarily produce a new sensation as the variation or increase of it, and so introduce a new idea, which depends only on a different motion of the animal spirits in that organ. (Sect. 4.)

Why does not Locke pursue this question further?—Because it lies out of the way of his present undertaking “to inquire into the natural causes and manner of perception.” (Sect. 4; *cf.* *Intro.*, sect. 2.)

Locke mentions some negative names that stand for positive ideas?—Inspid, silence, nihil, ignorance, and barrenness. (Sect. 5; *cf.* *Book III.*, chap. i., sect. 4.)

What instances from experience does Locke quote to show that we have positive ideas, although their causes

* *Cf.* sect. 7; *Book III.*, chap. iv., sect. 10.

may be privative?—1°. The shadow of a man produces as clear an idea as a man himself, although the former consists in the absence of light. 2°. A dark hole, or its picture, produces a positive idea in the mind.* (Sects. 5 and 6.)

Does Locke maintain that any causes are actually privative?—No; but it is the common opinion. (Sect. 6.)

What question does Locke think must first be decided before we can be certain that there are actually any privative causes?—Whether rest be any more a privation than motion.

In order the better to discover the nature of our ideas, and to discourse of them intelligibly, one important distinction must be made?—Between ideas as they are 1°. “Ideas or perceptions in our minds,” and 2°. “Modifications of matter in the bodies that cause such perceptions in us.”† (Sect. 7.)

In this connection, what error does Locke caution us against?—To beware lest we should consider the ideas in the mind (as perhaps usually is done) to be exactly images and resemblances of something inherent in the subject; the truth being that most of those of sensation have no more likeness than the names that stand for them have to the ideas themselves.

What does Locke mean by a quality?—He says:—“The power to produce any idea in our mind, I call ‘quality’ of the subject, wherein that power is.” (Sect. 8.)

When Locke speaks of ideas as in the things themselves, how does he wish the statement to be understood?—As meaning the qualities in the objects which produce them in us.

* Thus a man may be said to see darkness.

† Cf. sect. 2; Book III., chap. iv., sect. 10. This distinction had been previously made by Descartes.

According to Locke, there are THREE SORTS OF QUALITIES in bodies?—1°. Such as are utterly inseparable from the body, in what state soever it be; such as in all the alterations and changes that it suffers, all the force that can be used upon it, it constantly keeps; and such as “sense” constantly finds in every particle of matter, which has bulk enough to be perceived, and the “mind” finds inseparable from every particle of matter, though less than to make itself singly to be perceived by our senses.* (Sect. 9.) These he calls REAL, ORIGINAL, or PRIMARY Qualities of body. 2°. Such qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities. (Sect. 10.) These he calls SECONDARY QUALITIES; they are usually called SENSIBLE Qualities. 3°. The POWER that is in any body, by reason of the particular constitution of its primary qualities, to make such a change in the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of another body, as to make it operate on our senses differently from what it did before.† (Sect. 23.)

* Cf. chap. iv., sect. 1.

† Cf. chap. xxiii., sect. 9. Dean Mansel, while noticing that the distinction between Primary and Secondary Qualities has played an important part in various systems of philosophy, remarks, that this distinction has, amongst moderns, been based, sometimes on a psychological, sometimes on a physical principle. In the former point of view, the primary qualities have been distinguished as those which cannot by any act of thought be separated from the conception of body, being essential to that conception itself, in whatever relation it may be viewed; while the secondary qualities are mere modifications of the primary, by which the bodies are enabled to produce certain sensations in us. In the latter point of view, the primary qualities are considered to be such as really exist in the bodies themselves, in the same manner in which they are perceived by us; whereas the secondary qualities are but the occult causes of certain sensations which, as experienced, bear no resemblance to the powers by which they are

What are the primary qualities of body?—Solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number.

Give some examples of secondary qualities?—Colours, sounds, tastes, etc.

Give some examples of “Powers”?—The sun has a power to make wax white, and fire to make lead fluid.

How do bodies produce ideas of original qualities in us?—By impulse—the only way which we can conceive bodies to operate in.* (Sect. 11.)

How are the ideas of secondary qualities produced?—“After the same manner that the ideas of original qualities are produced in us, we may conceive that the ideas of secondary qualities are also produced, viz., by the operations of insensible particles on our senses.” (Sect. 13.)

By what example does Locke show that primary qualities are inseparable from bodies even in our thoughts?—“Take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts, each part has still solidity, extension, figure, and mobility; divide it again,

produced. (Metaphysics, pp. 105, 106.) For a history of this distinction see Hamilton, Reid’s Works, and Lectures on Metaphysics, Lect. xxiv.

* Dr. Stillingfleet, Bishop of Worcester, upon reading this passage, asked Locke, “How could the idea of liberty agree with the idea that bodies can only operate by motion and impulse?” To which Locke replied, “By the omnipotency of God, who can make all things agree that involve not a contradiction.” On a subsequent occasion, however, he wrote to the Bishop as follows:—“I have said that bodies only operate by impulse; and so I thought when I wrote it, and can yet conceive no other way of their operation. But *I am since convinced*, by the judicious Mr. Newton’s incomparable book, *that it is too bold a presumption to limit God’s power in this point by my narrow conceptions.*

. And therefore in the next edition of my book, I will take care to have that passage rectified.”—See also Book IV., chap. x., sect. 19. Professor Webb thinks that Locke’s “Impulse” corresponds to Reid’s “Impression,” and is merely a name for the physical antecedents of Perception. (Intellectualism of Locke, pp. 28, 29.)

and it retains still the same qualities; and so divide it on till the parts become insensible, they must retain still, each of them, all those qualities." (Sect. 9.)

* Locke argues from analogy that it is not unreasonable to suppose that the different motions, figure, bulk, and number of insensible particles affecting the several organs of our senses, should produce in us those different sensations which we have from the colours and smells of bodies?—It is no more impossible to conceive that God should annex such ideas to such motions, etc., with which they have no similitude, than that He should annex the idea of pain to the motion of a piece of steel dividing our flesh, with which that idea has no resemblance. (Sect. 13.)

What does Locke mean by saying that "ideas of primary qualities are resemblances; * of secondary, not"?—The patterns of primary qualities really exist in the bodies themselves, but the ideas produced in us by secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas existing in the bodies themselves. (Sect. 15.)

* By six arguments Locke shows the ideas of secondary qualities are not resemblances?—1°. Fire, that at one distance produces in us the sensation of warmth, at a nearer distance produces in us the far different sensation of pain. What consistency is there in saying that the idea of warmth is actually in the fire, and the idea of pain not? (Sect. 16.) 2°. That they are not resemblances appears from the fact, that if we take away the sensations of them, and not suffer the eye to see light or colours, or the ear to hear sounds, let

* Professor Webb observes (*Intellectualism of Locke*, p. 30) that Locke, in stating our ideas of the primary qualities to be exact resemblances, merely meant to assert that those qualities exist in nature exactly as in thought we conceive them to exist.

the palate not taste, nor the nose smell, then all the ideas of colours, tastes, odours, and sounds vanish and cease, and are reduced to their causes, *i.e.*, bulk, figure, and motion of parts. (Sect. 17.) 3°. Everyone will allow that when manna produces in us the sensation of sickness or pain, these ideas are not in the manna, but are effects of its operations in us; and yet men hold that whiteness and sweetness are in manna, while really they are nothing more than the effects of the operations of manna on our eyes and palate. (Sect. 18.) 4°. If we hinder light striking on porphyry, its colours vanish, while they re-appear when the light shines on it again; this would be manifestly impossible if these colours were really in the porphyry. (Sect. 19.) 5°. Pound an almond, and the clear white colour will be altered into a dirty one, and the sweet taste into an oily one: what real alteration can the beating of a pestle make in any body, but an alteration in the texture of it? (Sect. 20.) 6°. Water may, at the same time, produce the idea of cold by one hand and of heat by the other; it is impossible, if these ideas were really in it, that the same water should be at the same time both hot and cold. (Sect. 21.)

In regard to these three qualities of bodies how far does Locke agree with the common opinion of men concerning them?—He agrees in regarding primary qualities as resemblances, *i.e.*, that their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; and powers as not resemblances, *i.e.*, that there is nothing like these ideas in the bodies themselves. He considers, however, that the common opinion is erroneous, by which secondary qualities are made resemblances. (Sect. 24.)

Towards the conclusion of his discussion of the qualities of bodies, Locke makes a slight emendation on his former division of them?—He divides them: 1°. Primary qualities,

viz., the bulk, figure, extension, number, and motion of their solid parts. 2°. Secondary qualities, (1.) immediately perceivable: (2.) mediately perceivable. (Sect. 26.)

What are secondary qualities immediately perceivable?—Powers in bodies depending on their primary qualities, whereby they are fitted, by operating on our own bodies, to produce several different ideas in us.

What are secondary qualities mediately perceivable?—Powers in bodies depending on their primary qualities, whereby they are fitted, by operating on other bodies, so to change their primary qualities as to render them capable of producing ideas in us different from what they did before.

What is the reason that secondary qualities (or secondary qualities immediately perceivable) are taken for real qualities; and powers (or secondary qualities mediately perceivable) for only bare powers?—Because the ideas we have of secondary qualities containing nothing at all in them of primary qualities, we are not apt to think them effects of these primary qualities, which appear not to our senses to operate in their production, and with which they have no apparent congruity or conceivable connection; hence it is that we are forward to imagine, that these ideas are the resemblances of something existing in the bodies themselves, since sense can discover nothing of the primary qualities in their production, nor can reason show why bodies, by means of their primary qualities, should produce in the mind the ideas of secondary. But, in the second case, we plainly discover that the quality produced has commonly no resemblance with any thing in the thing producing it: wherefore, we look upon it as the bare effect of power. (Sect. 25.)

CHAPTER IX.

Of Perception.

WHAT is the first simple idea of Reflection? and what are its peculiarities?—PERCEPTION; as it is the first faculty of the mind exercised about its ideas, so also it is the first step and degree towards knowledge, and the inlet of all the materials of it. (Sects. 1 and 15.)

Some have called perception “thinking in general;” why is this improper?—Thinking signifies “that sort of operation in the mind about its ideas, wherein the mind is active;” while in bare naked perception the mind is, for the most part, only passive; and what it perceives, it cannot avoid perceiving.*

Whence do we get the idea of perception?—By reflecting on what we do ourselves when we see, hear, feel, etc. (Sect. 2.)

Locke enumerates three requisites for perception—two bodily, and one mental?—1°. That the organ should be perfect, in order to receive the impressions made on it. 2°. That sufficient impulse or impression should be made on the organ. 3°. That the mind should take notice of these impressions and attend to them. (Sect. 3.)

* What is Locke’s opinion regarding children having ideas in the womb?—He thinks they may have ideas while there, caused either (1) by the bodies that environ them, or (2) by the wants or diseases they suffer; amongst which he con-

* Cf. chap. vi., sect. 2. Perception is generally in Locke synonymous with what we term “consciousness;” perception, in its present acception, is used to denote, “The knowledge we acquire of objects by means of the senses.” Sometimes, however, in the course of the Essay it is employed in the modern sense.

jectures hunger and warmth to be the first.* These, however, are not to be confounded with innate ideas (or original characters impressed on the mind from the very first moment of its being and constitution), since they are derived from sensation, and differ from our other ideas of sense only in precedency of time. (Sects. 5 and 6.)

What ideas does he think children have first after birth, and what are his reasons for so concluding?—Whatever sensible qualities first occur to them; amongst which he supposes light to be one of the first, since a child newly-born always turns its eyes to the light. (Sect. 7.)

What example does Locke give of the ideas received by sensation being often, in adults, altered by the judgment, without any notice being taken of it?—When we set before us a round globe of any uniform colour, it is certain that the idea thereby imprinted in our mind is of a flat circle, variously shadowed, with several degrees of light and brightness coming to our eyes; gradually, however, the judgment, by an habitual custom, alters the appearances of *flatness and variety of colour* into their causes, and frames to itself the perception of a *convex figure* and *an uniform colour*.† (Sect. 8.)

What determines the judgment thus to alter the ideas of sensation?—We have, by use, been accustomed to perceive what kind of appearance convex bodies are wont to make in us, and what alterations are made in the reflection of light by the difference of the sensible figures of bodies.

What problem, proposed by Molyneux, regarding this subject, does Locke mention?—Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, could, by his touch, distinguish between a cube and sphere of the same metal, and nearly of the same

* Cf. Book I., chap. iv., sect. 2.

† This passage was, to a great extent, the foundation of Berkeley's "Theory of Vision."

size ; if the blind man should now receive his sight, and the cube and sphere placed on a table before him, *quare?* Could he, by his sight, before he touched them, distinguish the cube from the sphere?

How did Molyneux answer the question, and what is Locke's opinion on the subject?—Locke agrees with Molyneux, who answers it in the negative ; for, although a blind man knows, from experience, how a globe and a cube severally affect his touch, yet he has not obtained from experience that what affects his touch so and so, must also affect his sight so and so.*

Why does Locke mention this problem?—In order to allow his reader to consider how much he may be beholden to experience, improvement, and acquired notions, where he may think he has not the least use of, or help from them, and this the rather, because many learned men answered this question in the affirmative, when first proposed to them, till by hearing Molyneux's reasons they were convinced.

Why is this alteration of ideas by the judgment alone peculiar to those received by sight?—Sight is the most comprehensive of all our senses, conveying to our minds the ideas of light and colours, which are peculiar only to itself ; and also the far different ideas of space, figure, and motion ; the several varieties of these latter ideas change the appearances of light and colours, so that we bring ourselves, by use, to judge of the one by the other. (Sect. 9.)

What are the reasons we mistake these ideas for the perceptions of our sensation, and overlook the alteration by the

* I may here notice that several philosophers have since disputed the conclusion arrived at by Locke and Molyneux ; as similar experiments that have been made prove the exact contrary. Cf. Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Vol. II., pp. 176, 177, Fifth Edition ; Mansel, *Metaphysics*, p. 127. *Note.* Second Edition.

judgment?—We overlook it—1°. Because of its frequency; and 2°. Because of its quickness.

Locke quotes two parallel cases, in order to show us that we need not be surprised that this operation is performed with so little notice?—1°. The quickness with which mental actions are performed; *e.g.*, our minds grasp, as it were in an instant, all the parts of a lengthened demonstration. 2°. The facility which we get of doing things, by a custom of doing, makes them often pass in us unnoticed; *e.g.*, (*a*) we very frequently, in a day, cover our eyes with our eyelids, without perceiving we are in the dark; (*b*) we often make use of a by-word without observing that we do so.* (Sect. 10.)

What, according to Locke, distinguishes the animal kingdom from the inferior parts of nature?†—The faculty of perception. (Sect. 11.)

An apparent objection to this statement may be formed from the consideration of “sensitive plants;”—how does Locke answer this?—He attributes the degrees of motion in them to bare mechanism, and compares these motions to the turning of a wild oat beard, by the insinuation of particles of moisture, or the shortening of a rope by the affusion of water; all of which is done without any sensation in the subject, or the having or receiving any ideas.

Locke considers perception in some degree necessary to all animals; what instances does he give of animals in whom the degrees of perception are very dull, and whence does this arise?—A cockle or an oyster: from the avenues provided by nature for the reception of sensations being so few, and the perceptions they are received with so dull.

* *Cf.* chap. xxxiii.; Book III., chap. ii., sect. 6.

† Locke, afterwards, apparently denies that there is any *essential* difference between animals and vegetables.—Chap. xxvii., sects. 4 and 5; *cf.* Book III., chap. vi., sect. 12; Book IV., chap. xvi., sect. 12.

Locke sees in this dulness of perception, in some animals, a proof of the wisdom and goodness of the Creator?—In adapting their powers to their condition : as quickness of sensation would be of no service to a creature which had not the power of moving to and from objects in which it saw good or harm, and would be an inconvenience to an animal which must remain where chance has once placed it.

Locke mentions an instance observable amongst men of great dulness of perception?—One in whom old age has blotted out the memory of his past knowledge, wiped away all the ideas his mind was formerly stored with, and stopped up almost all the passages for new ones to enter, by destroying, altogether, his sight, hearing, smell, and his taste to a great degree. (Sect. 14.)

In what proportion are the degrees of knowledge in men and other animals?—In proportion—1°. to the number of senses—2°. to the number and vividness of impressions—3°. to the clearness of the faculties occupied about the impressions. (Sect. 15.)

What fact makes the degrees of knowledge in various animals difficult to be ascertained?—The difference of the degrees of perception.

CHAPTER X.

Of Retention.

WHAT mental faculty does Locke next consider, and how does he define it?—RETENTION ; “The keeping of those simple ideas which from sensation or reflection the mind has received.” (Sect. 1.)

Retention is twofold?—1°. CONTEMPLATION ; keeping the idea which is brought into the mind, for some time actually in view.* (Sect. 1.) 2°. MEMORY ; the power to revive again in our minds those ideas, which after imprinting have disappeared, or have been, as it were, laid aside out of sight.† (Sect. 2.)

What figurative definition of memory does Locke give?—"The store-house of our ideas."‡

Explain accurately what Locke means by "laying up ideas in the repository of the memory?"—Our ideas being nothing but actual perceptions in the mind, which cease to be anything when there is no perception of them,§ this laying up of them in the repository of the memory signifies nothing but that the mind has a power in many cases to revive perceptions which it has once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had them before. And in this sense it is that our ideas are said to be in our memories, when indeed they are *actually nowhere*, but only there is an *ability in the mind*, when it will, to revive them again, and, as it were, to paint them anew on itself. (Sect. 2; cf. sect. 7.)

* Cf. chap. xix., sect. 1.

† In sect. 7, he defines Remembering as "Secondary Perception," or "Viewing again the ideas that are lodged in the memory;" and again in sect. 10, as "The faculty of laying up and retaining the ideas that are brought into the mind."

‡ This description is borrowed from Cicero, "*Thesaurus omnium rerum*."—De Oratore, i. 5.

§ This passage goes far to prove that Locke held the same theory as Arnauld, Kant, and Brown, etc., viz., "That an idea is a modification of the mental energy non-existent out of consciousness." With this conclusion, however, as regards Locke's opinion, Sir William Hamilton and Dean Mansel disagree. For further remarks on this interesting subject the student is referred to Webb, *Intellectualism of Locke*, chap. ii.; Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Lects. xvi., xxii.; Mill on Hamilton, chap. x. See also my Appendix.

Four things help to the fixing ideas in the memory?—ATTENTION, REPETITION, PLEASURE, and PAIN;* those ideas which make most lasting impressions are those accompanied by pleasure and pain. (Sect. 3.)

The wisdom of God is manifest in causing pain to accompany the reception of simple ideas?—Pain, supplying the place of consideration and reasoning in children, and acting quicker than consideration in adults, makes both old and young avoid painful objects with that haste which is necessary for their preservation, and in both settles in the memory a caution for the future.

In three cases ideas fade quickly in the mind?—1°. When produced by an object affecting the senses once only, and no more than once. 2°. When they have been but little taken notice of, although more than once offered to the senses. 3°. When, although they are set on with care and repeated impressions, the memory is weak either through the temper of the body or some other fault. (Sect. 4.)

How does Locke illustrate the rapid fading of ideas in the mind in these three cases?—By comparing them to the shadows flying over a field of corn.

What ideas does he think most liable to be lost from want of repetition, and what instances does he give?—Those which were produced in the minds of children either before their birth or during their infancy. This may be observed in persons who, having lost their sight when young, have, in after life, no more notion or memory of colours than those born blind. (Sect. 5.)

* He mentions a fifth aid to the memory, Book IV., chap. xii., sect. 13.—“HYPOTHESES, if they are well made, are at least great helps to the memory, and often direct us to new discoveries;” compare with this, “*Prudens interrogatio est dimidium scientiæ*”—Bacon, De Aug. Scient., Book V., chap. iii. See also Mill, Logic, Vol. II., p. 93, Seventh Edition.

Locke uses illustrations respecting the fading of ideas, and the permanency of the mind during the process?—The ideas, as well as the children, of our youth often die before us, and our minds represent to us those tombs to which we are approaching, where though the brass and marble remain, yet the inscriptions are effaced by time, and the imagery moulders away.*

He notices three causes as likely to contribute to the difference of powers of Retention amongst men?—1°. The constitution of our bodies. 2°. The make of our animal spirits. 3°. The temper of the brain may cause the difference amongst men, that the mind retains in some the characters drawn on it like marble, in others like freestone, while in others it does so little better than sand.† (Sect. 5.)

What fact shows that the constitution of the body sometimes influences the memory?—We oftentimes find a disease quite strip the mind of all its ideas, and the flames of a fever in a few days calcine all those images to dust and confusion, which seemed to be as lasting as though graved in marble.†

What ideas fix themselves best on the memory, and remain clearest and longest there?—Those which are oftenest refreshed by a frequent return of the objects or actions that produce them, amongst which are those that are conveyed into the mind by more ways than one. (Sect. 6.)

Of these ideas he enumerates three classes?—1°. The original qualities of bodies, viz.—solidity, extension, figure,

* Locke's style in this chapter displays that rhetorical and figurative tendency which he afterwards so strongly condemns. (Book III., chap. x., sect. 34.)

† In this, as well as in other passages, Locke touches on "The Physical Consideration of the Mind," notwithstanding what he has told us previously. (Intro., sect. 2.)

motion, and rest. 2°. Those that almost constantly affect our bodies, as heat and cold. 3°. Those which are the affections of all kinds of beings, as existence, duration, and number.* These and the like ideas, Locke thinks, are seldom quite lost, whilst the mind retains any ideas at all.

What is the state of the mind in remembering?—Often-times more than barely passive; as the re-appearance of ideas depends sometimes on the will. (Sect. 7.)

There are three ways in which ideas may be brought again into the memory?—1°. Sometimes the mind sets itself on work in search of some hidden idea, and turns, as it were, the eye of the soul upon it. 2°. Sometimes they start up of their own accord, and offer themselves to the understanding. 3°. Sometimes they are roused and tumbled out of their dark cells into open daylight, by turbulent and tempestuous passions.

Of what consequence is Memory to an intellectual creature?—It is necessary in the next degree to perception; where it is wanting, all the rest of our faculties are in a great degree useless, and we, in our thoughts, reasonings, and knowledge, cannot proceed beyond present objects. (Sect. 8.)

Locke enumerates two defects in the memories of men when compared one with another?—1°. *OBLIVION*, when the memory loses the idea altogether, and so far produces perfect ignorance. 2°. *SLOWNESS*, when the memory moves slowly, and retrieves not the ideas it has laid up in store quick enough to serve the mind when occasion requires;† this, if it exist to a great degree, is stupidity.

* Cf. chap. xxiii., sect. 18.

† Those acquainted with the terminology of Sir William Hamilton, will immediately see that *Oblivion* is a defect in the Conservative Faculty, and *Slowness* is one in the Reproductive.

What intellectual qualities depend on memory?—Invention, fancy, and quickness of parts.

Another defect exists in the memory of men, compared with superior created intellectual beings?—Men are capable of having great varieties of ideas only by succession, not all at once; superior beings may be conceived as having constantly in view the whole scene of all their former actions, wherein no one of the thoughts they have ever had may slip out of their sight. (Sect. 9.)

This conjecture of Locke's respecting the memory of superior beings is not inconceivable?—We cannot doubt that God, who is omniscient, may communicate to created beings His own perfections, in whatsoever proportion it pleases Him, as far as created finite beings are capable of receiving them.

What instance does Locke give of a very superior memory in a human being?—Monsieur Pascal, who is said to have forgotten nothing of what he had done, said, or thought, in any part of his rational life, till failing health impaired his memory.*

For what purpose does Locke cite the case of Pascal?—The consideration of it may help us to enlarge our thoughts towards greater perfection of memory in superior ranks of spirits.†

What circumstances confirm Locke in his opinion that brutes have memory?—We may observe that birds learn tunes, and endeavour to hit the notes aright. (Sect. 10.)

* For other instances of men endowed with great memories, *vide* Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, Lect. xxxi.

† Cf. Bacon, De Aug. Scient., Book III., chap. ii.: "An inquiry concerning the nature of spirits and angels, is not forbidden, nor is the subject unsearchable, being in a great part level to the human mind on account of their affinity." (In taking this passage from its original context, I have slightly altered it, but not so as to confuse its meaning.)

How does Locke prove that brutes have memory?—Although he allows that sounds may mechanically cause a certain motion of the animal spirits in the brains of birds, while the tune is actually playing, and that motion may be continued to the muscles of the wings, so that the bird may be driven away by certain noises, because this may tend to the bird's preservation : yet this can never be a sufficient reason why such a motion of the organs in the bird's voice should be caused mechanically, either while the tune is playing, much less after it has ceased, so as to imitate any sound which can be of no use for the bird's preservation. Further than this, it is altogether contrary to reason to suppose that birds, without sense and memory, can approach gradually nearer and nearer to a tune played yesterday.

CHAPTER XI.

Of Discerning, and other Mental Operations.

WHAT mental faculty does Locke next consider?—The faculty of DISCERNING AND DISTINGUISHING between the ideas which the mind possesses. (Sect. I.)

What error has resulted in consequence of men overlooking this faculty, and what was the cause of it?—Many general propositions,* whose evidence and certainty depend on this faculty of discerning, have been mistaken for native uniform impressions, in consequence of their obtaining universal assent.

* Called by Kant, "Analytical Judgments," *e.g.*, "Every man is an animal."

What was the true cause of their obtaining universal assent?—The clearness of the discerning faculty, whereby it perceives two ideas to be the same, or different.

Locke notices three possible causes which may account for imperfections in the discerning faculty. 1°. Dulness or faults in the organs of sense.* 2°. Want of acuteness, exercise, or attention in the understanding. 3°. Hastiness or precipitancy natural to some tempers. (Sect 2.)

The perfection of the discerning faculty is of great consequence to our other knowledge?—Defects in it produce confusion in our notions of things, and cause our reason and judgment to be disturbed or misled.

How does Locke account for the “common observation” that men who have a great deal of wit and prompt memories have not always the clearest judgment or the deepest reason?—He shows that these qualities respectively depend on the mental faculties of retention and discerning.†

What is the difference between WIT and JUDGMENT?—Wit consists mostly in the assemblage of ideas, and putting those together with ease and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity : Judgment, on the contrary, consists in carefully distinguishing ideas, one from another, wherein can be found the least difference.‡

Whence does it appear that wit consists in something not perfectly conformable to the rules of truth and good reason?—It is considered an affront to examine it by these tests.

* “By far the greatest impediment and aberration of the human understanding proceed from the dulness, incompetency, and errors of the senses ; since whatever strikes the senses preponderates over every thing, however superior, which does not immediately strike them.” → Bacon, Nov. Org. Book I., Aph. 50.

† Locke thus connects his distinction between Wit and Judgment with a distinction between two of our mental faculties.

‡ Briefly—Wit notices *resemblances*, and Judgment *differences*.

What chiefly contributes to the well-distinguishing of our ideas?—That they be clear and determinate * (Sect. 3.)

Supposing this last condition fulfilled, would any confusion arise in the mind from the senses conveying different ideas from the same object on different occasions?—No ; for though sugar may have at one time a bitter taste, and at another a sweet one (as may happen in the case of a man in fever,) yet the ideas of bitter and sweet would be perfectly distinct in the mind.

What mental faculty does Locke next consider?—COMPARISON of ideas one with another, in respect of extent, degrees, time, place, or any other circumstances. (Sect. 4.)

What class of ideas are comprehended under this faculty?—All ideas included under relation.*

Do brutes possess this faculty, and if so, how far?—The question is not easy to determine, but Locke thinks that brutes compare but imperfectly, and not further than some sensible circumstances annexed to the objects themselves. (Sect. 5.)

What exertion of this faculty may we conjecture beasts to be destitute of, which men possess?—The power of comparing, belonging to general ideas, and useful only to abstract reasonings.

What is the next mental faculty Locke mentions?—COMPOSITION, or that operation of the mind whereby it puts together several of those simple ideas it has received from sensation and reflection, and combines them into complex ones. (Sect. 6 ; cf. chap. xii., sect. 1.)

* “A clear idea is that whereof the mind has such a full and evident perception, as it receives from an external object operating duly on a well-disposed organ ; a distinct idea is that wherein the mind perceives a difference from all other.” (Chap. xxix., sect. 4.) See also Epistle to the Reader, near the conclusion.

What operation of the mind may be included under composition?—**ENLARGING**, or the putting together, by the mind, several simple ideas of the same kind; *e.g.*, By adding together several units, we make the idea of a dozen; and by putting together the repeated ideas of several perches, we frame that of a furlong.

What is Locke's opinion regarding the possession of the faculty of composition by brutes?—Although brutes take in, and retain together several combinations of simple ideas—as perhaps the shape, smell, and voice of his master, make up the complex idea which a dog has of him, or rather are so many distinct marks whereby he knows him—yet, Locke thinks, they do not of themselves ever compound them, and make complex ideas, and he supposes that even when we think animals have complex ideas, it is only one simple one that directs them in the knowledge of several things. (Sect. 7.)

He quotes instances in support of his view?—A bitch will nurse young foxes, when once her milk has gone through them; an animal with a numerous brood of young appears to have no knowledge of their number, for although she may be uneasy when one is removed in her sight or hearing, she does not appear to miss any that are taken away in her absence, or without noise.

When do children first use signs?—When they have got ideas fixed in their memories. (Sect. 8.)

When do children first make use of words to signify their ideas to others?—When they have got the skill to apply the organs of speech to the framing of articulate sounds.

Whence do children get the verbal signs for their ideas?—Sometimes they borrow them from others: sometimes they make them themselves, as appears from the new and unusual names they apply to objects in the first use of language.

If every particular idea had a name, names would become endless :—how is this to be prevented ?—By the mind making the particular ideas received from particular objects to become general—this is done by abstraction. (Sect. 9.)

Define Abstraction ?—“The considering ideas as they are in the mind, such appearances, separate from all other existences, and the circumstances of real existence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas :” *—this is called ABSTRACTION, whereby ideas taken from particular existences become “general representatives” of all of the same kind.

What is it that puts a perfect distinction between man and brutes according to Locke ?—The having of general ideas. (Sect. 10.)

Why does Locke think that brutes do not possess the faculty of Abstraction ?—We observe no traces of their making use of general signs for universal ideas, which are formed by means of this faculty. †

Some may attribute the fact of brutes having no use of general words to their want of fit organs to frame articulate sounds :—what is Locke’s answer to this ?—We should not attribute this defect to the want of fit organs, since we find many brutes which can pronounce words distinctly enough, but never with any general application ; and on the other hand, men who want words, fail not to express their universal ideas by signs which serve them instead of general words. (Sect. 11.)

How far does Locke think that brutes reason ?—They only reason about particular ideas received from sensation.

* For a second definition *vide* chap. xii., sect. 1. He gives a third definition, Book III., chap. iii., sect. 6.

† All philosophers agree in denying that brutes possess the faculty of Abstraction.

Locke notices an opposite opinion on this subject?—That of Descartes, who held that brutes were mere machines.*

Wherein does Locke think lies the difference between IDIOTS and MADMEN?—Madmen put wrong ideas together, and so make wrong propositions, but argue and reason aright from them;† while idiots make few or no propositions, and reason scarcely at all.‡ (Sects. 12 and 13.)

* For three reasons, Locke states he has subjoined an explanation of the mental faculties to that of simple ideas before he treats of complex ones?—1°. Because several of these faculties being at first principally occupied about simple ideas, we might, by following nature in its ordinary method, trace and discover them in their rise, progress, and gradual improvements. 2°. Since simple ideas are, in most minds, more clear, precise, and distinct than complex ones, we will better examine how the mental faculties operate about complex ideas, if we first observe how they operate about simple ones. 3°. Because these operations of the mind about simple ideas of sensation are themselves, when reflected on, ideas derived from reflection, and therefore fit to be considered next after simple ideas of sensation. (Sect. 14.)

What does Locke think the best way by which to arrive at truth?—To examine things as they really are, and not to

* *Vide* Dugald Stewart, Dissertation, Part I., chap. ii.

† *Cf.* Macaulay, Essay on Milton;—"Truth, indeed, is essential to poetry; but it is the truth of madness. The reasonings are just; but the premises are false."

‡ *Cf.* chap. xxxiii., sect. 4. We have now arrived at the conclusion of the discussion on Locke's Mental Faculties; as we have seen, they are six in number; viz., Perception, Retention, Discerning, Composition, Comparison, and Abstraction.

conclude they are, as we fancy of ourselves, or have been taught by others to imagine. (Sect. 15.)

How does Locke illustrate the perception by the understanding of external visible objects?—"Methinks the understanding is not much unlike a CLOSET WHOLLY SHUT FROM LIGHT, with only some little openings left, to let in external visible resemblances, or ideas of things without; would the pictures coming into such a dark room but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found upon occasion, it would very much resemble the understanding of a man in reference to all objects of sight, and the ideas of them."* (Sect. 17.)

CHAPTER XII.

Of Complex Ideas.

THE acts of the mind wherein it exerts its power over its simple ideas are chiefly three?—1°. COMBINING several simple ideas into one compound one: thus all complex ideas are made. 2°. COMPARING or bringing two ideas, whether simple or complex, together, and setting them by one another, so as to take a view of them at once without uniting them into one: by this way the mind gets all its ideas of relations.† 3°. ABSTRACTING, or separating our ideas from all other ideas that accompany them in their real existence; by abstraction all the mind's general ideas are made.‡ (Sect. 1.)

* This illustration has been strongly objected to by Reid, on the grounds that it teaches us that "The immediate objects of perception are only certain shadows of the external object." (Reid, *Essays on the Intellectual Powers*; Stewart, *Elements*, Vol. I., p. 94.)

† Cf. chap. xi., sect. 4.

‡ Cf. chap. xi., sect. 9.

This consideration shows man's power, and its way of operation, to be much the same in the material and intellectual world? For the materials in both being such as he has no power over either to make or destroy, all that man can do is either to unite them together, or to set them by one another, or wholly separate them.*

Define a Complex Idea?† And give examples.—An idea made up of several simple ones put together; *e.g.*, beauty, gratitude, a man, an army, the universe.

The mind has a power of considering ideas united together in a two-fold manner?—1°. As these ideas are united in external objects: 2°. As the mind has joined them together. (Sect. 2.)

Locke divides complex ideas into three classes?—MODES, SUBSTANCES, and RELATIONS. (Sect. 3.)

Define MODES?—Such complex ideas which, however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependencies on, or affections of substances: *e.g.*, the ideas signified by triangle, gratitude, murder. (Sect. 4.)

Locke justifies this unusual signification of the word "mode"?—It is unavoidable in discourses differing from ordinary notions, either to make new words, or to use old ones in a new signification; the latter proceeding, in the present case, he considers preferable.‡

* Cf. chap. ii., sect. 2; note, page 20.

† The "Concept" of Kant; *vide* Monck, Introduction to the Critical Philosophy, p. 4.

‡ We shall see, when we come to consider the Third Book, that Locke here offends against his own principles; he there states that one of the abuses of words is applying old words to new and unusual significations. (Chap. x., sect. 6.) He proposes as a remedy for the imperfection of words, that men should take care to apply their terms as nearly as possible to the ideas they are commonly annexed to. (Chap. xi., sect. 11.)

Modes are of two sorts?—1°. Simple Modes, which are only variations, or different combinations of the same simple idea; *e.g.*, a dozen, a score. 2. Mixed Modes, which are compounded of simple ideas of several kinds, put together to make one complex one; *e.g.*, beauty, theft.* (Sect. 5; *cf.* chap. xiii., sect. 1; chap. xxii., sect. 1.)

In making modes, two mental operations are employed?—Compounding in mixed, enlarging in simple modes.

Define SUBSTANCES?—Such combinations of simple ideas as are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves, in which the supposed or confused idea of substance, such as it is, is always the first and chief.† (Sect. 6.)

Of substances there are two sorts of ideas?—1°. Single substances as they exist separately: *e.g.*, a man, a sheep. 2°. Collective substances, or the ideas of several put together: *e.g.*, an army of men, a flock of sheep.

Define RELATION?—The consideration and comparing one idea with another. (Sect. 7.)

What does Locke mean by speaking of all ideas being derived from sensation and reflection?—He says that even large and abstract ideas are derived from these sources, since they are no other than what the mind, by the ordinary use of its own faculties, employed about ideas received from objects of sense, or from the operations it observes in itself about them, may, and does, attain unto.‡ (Sect. 8.)

How does Locke proceed to establish that all our ideas

* “Beauty” consists of “a certain composition of colour and figure, causing delight in the beholder”;—“theft” is “The concealed change of the possession of any thing without the consent of the proprietor.”

† He gives a more detailed examination of our ideas of Substances in chap. xxiii., and of Relations, in chap. xxv. *et seq.*

‡ This passage shows us that Locke recognised the Reason, or Intellect, as a Source of Ideas.

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are derived from sensation and reflection?—By an *a fortiori* induction ;*—he endeavours to show it in the ideas we have of space, time, and infinity, and some few others, which seem most remote from these originals.

CHAPTER XIII.

Of Simple Modes of Space.

WHAT instance does Locke adduce, in order to show that simple modes, or the modifications of any simple idea, are perfectly distinct and different ideas in the mind?—The idea of one is as distinct from that of two, as blueness from heat. (Sect. 1.)

Whence do we get the idea of space?—From sight and touch ; this Locke considers as self-evident.† (Sect 2.)

We may consider space in a three-fold point of view?—
1°. It is called DISTANCE when we consider it merely in length between any two beings. 2°. It is called CAPACITY when we consider it in length, breadth, and thickness.

* Locke employs this mode of proof twice in the course of his Essay : once as above ; and again, in order to show that all Relations terminate in simple ideas. (Chap. xxv., sect. 9.)

† The original runs thus.—“I have showed above, chapter iv., that we get the idea of space both by our sight and touch ; which I think is so evident,” etc.—Mr. Sandford, in his comments upon this passage, acknowledges his obligations to Dr. Shaw, F.T.C.D., for the observation that “Chapter iv” is evidently a clerical error for “Chapter v. ;” since in the former chapter, Locke gives an elaborate discussion on the idea of solidity, and a demonstration of the fact that we possess it distinct from that of space, while in the latter chapter, he simply enumerates the simple ideas of divers senses, to which class space belongs. *Vide* Sandford, Analysis of Cousin, pp. 18, 19.

3°. It is called **EXTENSION** in whatsoever manner considered.* (Sect. 3.)

Wherein do the modifications of space differ from its simple modes?—The former are the distances themselves; the latter the ideas of those distances. (Sect. 4.)

Locke discusses three simple modes of space in the thirteenth chapter of the Second Book?—**IMMENSITY, FIGURE, and PLACE.**

Whence do we get the idea of Immensity?—From the power we find in ourselves of repeating as often as we will any idea of space. (Sect. 4; chap. xvii., sect. 5.)

How does Locke define Figure?—"The relation which the parts of the termination of extension, or circumscribed space, have amongst themselves,"† (Sect. 5.)

By what senses do we obtain the ideas of figure?—By the touch, from sensible bodies whose extremities come within our reach; by the eye, from bodies and colours whose boundaries are within its view.

How does Locke define Place?—"Relative position," (sect. 10), "The relation of distance between anything, and any two or more points, which are considered as keeping the same distance one with another, and so considered as at rest."‡ (Sect. 7.)

* Cf. sect. 27; chap. xv., sect. 1; in the former of these sections he observes;—"To avoid confusion, . . . it were possibly to be wished that the name extension were applied only to matter, or the distance of the extremities of particular bodies, and the term expansion to space in general, with or without solid matter possessing it, so as to say 'space is expanded and body extended.'"

† Thus we see that Locke's division of our complex ideas into substances, modes, and relations (chap. xii.) is illogical, as he here admits that figure and place are ideas of relation.—Cf. chap. xxi., sect. 3.

‡ Cf. chap. xv., sect. 8.

Why do men make that modification of distance which we call "place"?—For common use ; in order to be able to designate the particular position of things, when occasion requires. (Sect. 9.)

Facts show that this is the true reason?—We find men determining and considering of this place, by reference to those adjacent things which best serve their present purpose.

What consideration ought to determine us that place is a relative idea?—That we have no idea of the place of the universe, though we can of all the parts of it, because we have no idea of any fixed distinct beings, in reference to which we can imagine the universe to have any relation of distance, but this does not happen in the case of the parts.

What is meant by saying that "The world is somewhere," and why is this?—All that is meant by this phrase is, that the world exists ; *i.e.*, it merely signifies its *existence*, not *location*. (Sect. 10.)*

If a man could find out, and frame in his mind, clearly and distinctly, the place of the universe, what question would he be capable of answering?—He would be able to tell whether the universe moved, or stood still in the "undistinguishable inane of infinite space."

The word "place" is sometimes used in another and more confused sense?—It stands for that space which any body takes up, and in this sense the universe may be said to be in a place.†

* In connection with this section, *vide* Henry's Translation of Cousin's Psychology, p. 143 ; Webb, Intellectualism of Locke, pp. 131, 132.

† Cf. chap. xv., sect. 6.

CHAPTER XIV.

Of Duration, and its Simple Modes.

WHAT are Locke's definitions of DURATION?—1°. "Fleeting Extension." 2°. "That other sort of distance the idea whereof we get, not from the permanent parts of space, but from the fleeting and perpetually perishing parts of succession." (Sect. 1.) 3°. "The distance between any parts of the succession, or the appearance of any two ideas in the mind." (Sect. 3.)

He enumerates some simple modes of this idea?—Hours, days, years, etc., time, and eternity.

The answer of a great man, when asked what time was, might persuade one that time, which reveals all things, is itself not to be discovered?—That of St. Augustine, "*Si non rogas intelligo*," Locke thinks that this answer is equivalent to saying, "The more I set myself to think of it, the less I understand it."† (Sect. 2.)

How, according to Locke, do we get the idea of dura-

* By "Duration" Locke means what is commonly expressed by "Time;" he uses "Time" in an arbitrary and peculiar sense. (*Vide* sect. 17; *cf.* sect. 31.)

† *Cf.* Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Vol. II., p. 535.—"Now, does the present endure for an hour, a minute, a second, or for any part of a second? If you state what length of duration it contains, you are lost. So true is the observation of St. Augustine." Dr. Lardner asserts that St. Augustine's answer evidently signifies, "I know what it means, but cannot explain it." (*Lectures on Locke*, p. 85.) Dr. Murray, in his edition of the *Essay*, observes, that Locke has not quoted the words of St. Augustine accurately; the exact words are:—"Quid ergo est tempus? Si nemo ex me quærat, scio; si quærenti explicare velim, nescio."—*Confess.*, Book XI., chap. xiv., sect. 2.

tion?—1°. It is evident to any one who observes what passes in his own mind, that there is a train of ideas which succeed one another in his understanding as long as he is awake. 2°. Reflection on these appearances of several ideas one after another in our minds, furnishes us with the idea of succession; and the distance between any parts of that succession, or between the appearance of any two ideas in our minds, is that which we call duration.* (Sect. 3; cf. sects. 16 and 31.)

What proves that we thus get the idea of duration?—The fact that we have no perception of duration, but by considering the train of ideas that take their turns in our understandings. (Sect. 4.)

Locke gives three instances of this fact?—1° When a man sleeps soundly he has no sense, and accordingly has no train of ideas in his understanding; there seems to be no distance between the moment when he left off thinking, and the moment he begins to think again. 2°. If a man fix his thoughts intently on one thing, so as to take little notice of the succession of ideas in his mind, he thinks duration shorter than it really is. 3°. If a man dream during sleep, and a variety of ideas make themselves perceptible in his mind one after another, he has, during such dreaming, a sense of duration and the length of it.†

How does it come to pass that the idea of duration is applicable to things while we sleep?—When a man has once got the idea of duration, he can, on the supposition that the course of events proceed with the same uniformity

* Thus we see that Locke notices three steps necessary to pass through in order to get the simple idea of duration—1°. TRAIN OF IDEAS. 2°. SUCCESSION. 3°. DISTANCE BETWEEN PARTS OF SUCCESSION.

† Cf. chap. xix., sects. 3 and 4; chap. xxi., sect. 12.

while he is asleep as when awake, apply the idea of duration to events which happened while he was asleep. (Sect. 5.)

Some may think that the idea of succession is derived from our observation of motion by our senses. How does Locke refute this opinion?—He says that motion produces no idea of succession otherwise than it produces a continued train of distinguishable ideas.* (Sect. 6.)

Hence a reason may be assigned why motions very slow, though constant, are not perceived by us?—Because in their removal from one sensible part towards another, their change of distance is so slow that it causes no new ideas in us till a good while one after another, and so we cannot perceive the motion. (Sect. 7.)

We likewise do not perceive motion in bodies, when they move so quickly as not to affect the senses with several distinguishable ideas of their motion;—what instance does Locke give?—Anything moving in a circle is not perceived, when it does so in less time than our ideas are wont to succeed one another in our minds.† (Sect. 8.)

From these considerations Locke makes an “odd conjecture” concerning the quickness of the train of ideas in our minds; what illustration does he use?—He considers it probable that ideas, during our waking hours, succeed one another in our minds at certain distances, or have a certain degree of quickness, not much unlike the images

* *E.g.* “A man becalmed at sea, out of sight of land in a fair day, may look on the sun, or sea, or ship, a whole hour together, and perceive no motion at all in either, though it be certain that two, and perhaps all of them, have moved during that time a great way. But as soon as he perceives either of them to have changed distance with some other body, as soon as this motion produces any new idea in him, then he perceives that there has been motion.”

† It is probable, for like reasons, that sudden deaths are unaccompanied by pain.

in the inside of a lantern, turned round by the heat of a candle. (Sect. 9.)

What reasons has he for making this odd conjecture, and what instances does he give in proof?—From observing that in the impressions on our senses we can only to a certain degree perceive any succession; if these impressions are very quick, the sense of the succession is lost, even when there is a real succession, and if they are very slow, the same result follows.—As instances of this, he considers : 1°. A cannon ball passing through a room, and in its course taking with it a man's limb; it is perfectly clear that it must strike, successively, the two sides of the room, and also one part of the limb first, and another after, and so on in succession; and yet, no one who felt the pain, or heard the blows, could perceive any succession. (Sect. 10.) 2°. The hands of a clock and the shadows of a sun-dial; where, although after certain intervals we perceive motion from their change of distance, yet we do not perceive the slow motion itself. (Sect. 11.)

How does Locke define an instant?—"A part of duration wherein we perceive no succession." (Sect. 10.)

What does Locke consider to be the measure and standard of all successions?—The constant and regular succession of ideas in a waking man. (Sect. 12.)

Locke has only one reason to assign why the mind cannot fix long on one invariable idea?—Experience. (Sect. 13.)

It is manifest, for four reasons, that this can be the only proof offered?—We do not know : 1°. How the ideas in the mind are framed; 2°. Of what materials they are made; 3°. Whence they have their light; 4°. How they come to make their appearances.*

* This passage savours strongly of Materialism.

What is Locke's opinion as to the power of the mind over the train of our ideas?—A man may either 1°. mind and observe what the ideas are that take their turn in his understanding; or 2°. direct the sort, and call in those he has a desire to make use of; but he cannot hinder the constant succession of fresh ideas, although he may determine the degree of attention with which he will regard them.* (Sect. 15.)

Give Locke's definition of TIME?—"Time is duration, set out by certain periods, and marked by certain measures or epochs."† (Sect. 17.)

Why is duration more difficult to measure than extension?—Because no two different parts of duration can be put together to measure one another, since they are not co-existent, while in extension we need only apply the standard we use to the thing we wish to measure. (Sect. 18.)

Locke instances some expressions which show that we have notions of portions of duration that do not properly come under the notion of time?—"Before all time;" "when time shall be no more."

There are three requisites for a good measure of duration?—It must be : 1°. Constant; 2°. Regular; 3°. Universally observable by all mankind. (Sect. 19.)

What are the best measures of duration, and why?—The annual or diurnal revolutions of the sun and moon;—because they fulfil all the above conditions.

* Cf. chap. xxi., sect. 12. With this conclusion, however, Dugald Stewart dissents: "It has been justly observed, that we cannot, by an effort of will, call up any one thought, and that the train of our ideas depends on causes which operate in a manner inexplicable by us." Elements, Vol. I., chap. v., sect. 3.

† Cf. sect. 31; chap. xv., sect. 6; note, page 59.

What error has arisen from measuring duration by the revolution of the heavenly bodies?—It has been thought that motion and duration were the measures one of another.

What does Locke assign as the cause of this error?—After men had constantly been accustomed to measure parts of duration by minutes, hours, days, etc., which are all marked out by the motions of the heavenly bodies, they were apt to confound duration and motion, or at least to think they had a necessary connection.

Locke shows this opinion to be erroneous?—Any constant periodical appearance, or alteration of ideas in seemingly* equidistant spaces of duration, if constant and universally observable, would have as well distinguished the intervals of time as those that have been made use of;—*e.g.*, if the sun had been a fire, lighted up and quenched at regularly recurring periods, it would have served equally as a measure of duration, although it included no motion in its appearance.

* Give examples of any periodical appearances serving to reckon years, as well as the motion of the sun?—Some inhabitants of America reckon their years by the arrival and departure of certain birds; we see blind men reckon time by years, whose revolutions they cannot distinguish by motions that they do not perceive. (Sect. 20.)

* How does Locke answer the objection, that without a regular motion of some body, as the sun, it would be impossible to know whether two parts of duration were equal?—He says that the equality of periods, determined by any other recurring appearances, might be known by the same way as that of days was known, or presumed to be so at

* Locke introduces the word “seemingly” here and in other similar passages, because (as he himself tells us) “no two parts of duration can be certainly known to be equal.” (Sect. 21; *cf.* sect. 18.)

first ; viz., by judging of them by the train of ideas passing in men's minds. (Sect. 21.)

We must carefully distinguish between duration itself, and the measures we use to judge of its length ?—Duration, in itself, is to be considered as going on in one equal uniform course ; but no measure of it which we use can be known to be so ; nor can we ever demonstrate or know that any two of these parts are equal, since it is impossible to place them in juxtaposition.

Locke thinks it strange that while all men measured time by the motion of the great and visible bodies of the world, they nevertheless should define it as “the measure of motion” ?—It is manifest, upon reflection, that the space to be gone over, and the bulk of the body to be moved, is as necessary to be considered as time, in order to measure motion correctly. (Sect. 22.)

* Does Locke think that hours, days, etc., are necessary measures of duration ?—They are no more necessary to duration than inches, feet, etc., are to extension ; he conjectures that there may be other parts of the universe where they no more use our measures of duration than the Japanese do our measures of extension. (Sect. 23.)

* Are our measures of time applicable to duration before these measures existed ?—Yes ; for the mind having once got a measure of time, such as the annual revolution of the sun, can apply that measure to duration, wherein that measure itself did not exist, and with which, in the reality of its existence, it had nothing to do. (Sect. 24.)

* Locke gives an example of this ?—We can apply the measure of a year to duration before the creation, or beyond the duration of bodies or motion, just the same as we can the measure of a mile to space beyond the utmost bodies. (Sect. 25.)

* Locke anticipates and answers an objection to this method of explaining time?—He may be charged with assuming that the world is neither eternal nor infinite; he answers this by saying that it is not necessary for his present purpose to prove the world to be finite both in duration and extension, but since this is as conceivable as the contrary, he is justified in assuming it. (Sect. 26.)

How do we get the idea of ETERNITY, according to Locke?—From our being able to repeat any length of duration we have in our minds, with all the endless additions of numbers. (Sect. 27; chap. xvii., sect. 5.)

* Facts prove that, in order to measure the duration of anything by time, it is not necessary that that thing should be co-existent to the motion we measure by, or any other periodical revolution?—The various theories held by different nations regarding the age of the world, all of which are equally understood. (Sect. 29.)

CHAPTER XVI.

Of Number.

LOCKE notices some peculiarities respecting number or unity?—1°. (a) There is no idea suggested to the mind by more ways, than unity, or one.* (b) Nevertheless there is none more simple, as it has no shadow of variety or composition in it. (Sect. 1.) 2°. Its modes (or our ideas of

* Cf. chap. vii., sect. 7. At the close of sect. 1 of the present chapter he remarks:—"Number applies itself to men, angels, actions, thoughts—everything that either does exist, or can be imagined." See also chap. xiii., sect. 26;—"There is not any object of sensation or reflection which does not carry with it the idea of one."

numbers) are made by addition. (Sect. 2.) 3°. Each of the modes of number are distinct, and differ at least by one unit. (Sect. 3.) 4°. Number measures all things measurable, which principally are expansion and duration. (Sect. 8.) 5°. Number affords us the clearest idea of Infinity. (Sect. 8 ; chap. xvii., sect. 9.)

What are the differences between demonstrations in numbers and in extension?—Demonstrations in numbers, on account of the clearness and distinctness of each mode, are more general in their use, and more determinate in their application than those in extension, even if the former be not more evident and exact. (Sect. 4.)

What two mental operations are essentially necessary in order to number?—1°. Naming every series of numbers. 2°. Memory to retain the names of each series. (Sect. 5.)

What instances does Locke give of persons being unable to number in consequence of want of names?—Some Americans, who could not count to one thousand, as they had no word to stand for that idea, although they could reckon very well as far as twenty ; the Tououpinamboes, who had no names for numbers beyond five, and represented any number which exceeded that by showing their own fingers and those of others present. (Sect. 6.)

Locke assigns two reasons why children number not earlier?—Either 1°. From want of names to mark the several progressions of numbers ; or 2°. Not having yet the faculty to collect scattered ideas into complex ones, and range them in regular order, and so retain them in their memories. (Sect. 7.)

In order to reckon aright, two things are required? 1°. That the mind distinguish carefully two ideas which are different one from another only by the addition or subtrac-

tion of one unit. 2°. That it retain in memory the names or marks of the several combinations, from a unit to that number ; and that not confusedly and at random, but in the exact order in which the numbers follow one another.

CHAPTER XVII.

Of Infinity.

WHAT does Locke think would contribute most to our knowing what the idea of infinity really is?—Considering, 1°. To what infinity is more immediately applied by the mind, and 2°. How the mind comes to frame the idea. (Sect. 1.)

What is the character of the ideas of finite and infinite, and to what are they attributed?—They are modes of quantity, and are attributed primarily, in their first designation, only to those things which have parts, and are capable of increase or diminution by the addition or subtraction of any the least part ; such are the ideas of space, duration, and number.

Locke notices an apparent objection to this view?—Our attributing infinity to the Deity.

How does he answer this objection?—By showing that we attribute infinity to the first Supreme Being ; 1°. Primarily in respect to His duration and ubiquity, and 2°. More figuratively to His power, wisdom, goodness, and other attributes, which are properly inexhaustible and incomprehensible, etc. When we apply the term infinite to these moral attributes of the Creator, we do so in respect to the number and extent of their acts and objects, which never

can be supposed so great, as that these attributes cannot exceed them.*

How do we get the idea of Finite?—We easily get it from the obvious portions of extension that affect our senses, and from the ordinary periods of succession, whereby we measure time and duration.† (Sect. 2.)

How do we get the idea of Infinity?—From the power which each man observes in himself of repeating for ever,

* Cf. chap. xv., sect. 12; chap. xxiii., sects. 33-35; Book III., chap. vi., sect. 11. Compare also the following passage;—"Of the two last of these Divine attributes (viz., power and wisdom) we justly say that they are *infinite*; that is, that our imaginations can set no bounds to them, and that our conceptions of them always rise in proportion as our faculties are cultivated, and as our knowledge of the universe becomes more extensive."—M'Cosh's Edition of Dugald Stewart's Outlines of Moral Philosophy, p. 78.

† The original runs thus:—"The obvious portions of extension that affect our senses, *carry with them into the mind* the idea of finite." I fully agree with Professor Webb in his opinion that "Here we have the Understanding"—the Intellect, Reason—"unequivocally recognised as a Source of Simple Ideas." Intellectualism of Locke, p. 80. Cf. my note, page 66.

Descartes held that the idea of an infinite substance can only be produced in us by an actually infinite substance; hence we are not to imagine that the notion of the infinite is acquired by means of abstraction and negation, but rather that the infinite has more reality than the finite, and that therefore the notion of the infinite must, in a certain sense, be *earlier* in us than that of the finite. Vide Stirling's Translation of Schwegler's History of Philosophy, p. 159. Locke, in his Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion (sect. 34), observes:—"In the next section we are told that we have 'not only the idea of infinite, but before that of finite.' This being a thing of experience, everyone must examine himself; and it being my misfortune to find it otherwise in myself, this argument, of course, is like to have the less effect on me, And I cannot but believe many a child can tell twenty, have the idea of a square trencher, or a round plate, and have the distinct clear ideas of two and three, long before he has any idea of *infinite* at all."

if he will, the idea of any stated length, or portion of space, duration, or number.* (Sect. 3.)

Which of these simple modes of quantity does Locke think gives us the clearest idea of infinity?—Number, from its endless addibility; for even in space and duration, when the mind pursues the idea of infinity, it makes use of numbers; the clearest idea of infinity, he therefore concludes, is got from “the confused, incomprehensible remainder of endless addible numbers, which affords no prospect of stop or boundary.” (Sect. 9; *cf.* chap. xvi., sect. 8.)

What are Locke’s opinions regarding 1°. The real existence, and 2°. The bounds of space?—1°. He thinks that the necessary existence of space must be allowed from the consideration of motion in a body. 2°. He thinks that space in itself is actually boundless, since we cannot imagine any bounds to it either within, or without the confines of body. (Sect. 4.) The latter remark, he thinks, holds good of duration also.† (Sect. 5.)

* Professor Webb thinks that the idea of infinity is suggested to the understanding by its experienced incompetence to reconcile in thought the idea of any given finite space with the idea of an absolute termination; he is also of opinion that this is identical with Locke’s view as expressed in this chapter. (*Intellectualism of Locke*, p. 88.) According to Sir Wm. Hamilton, “The absolute and the infinite can each only be conceived as a negation of the thinkable. In other words, of the absolute and infinite we have no conception at all.”—*Lectures on Metaphysics*, I.lect. xxxviii., Vol. II., p. 374, Fifth Edition; *cf.* *Discussions*, p. 12. On this subject Dean Mansel remarks, “The infinite cannot be a subject of human consciousness at all; and it appears to be so only by mistaking the negation of consciousness for consciousness itself. The *infinite*, like the *inconceivable*, is a term which expresses only the negation of human thought;—nay, the two terms are, in fact, synonymous, for conception is limitation.”—*Metaphysics*, p. 278, Second Edition; *cf.* *Prolegomena Logica*, p. 121, Second Edition; *Bampton Lectures*, *passim*.

† *Cf.* chap. xiii., sect. 23; chap. xiv., sect. 27. The question whether space and time have any real existence, apart from that of the mind

Seeing that the idea of infinity is got from the power we observe in ourselves of repeating without end our own ideas, it may be asked, "Why do we not attribute infinite to other ideas as well as to those of space and duration, and speak of infinite sweetness, infinite whiteness, etc.?"—All our ideas that are considered as having parts, and are capable of increase by the addition of any equal or less part, afford us by repetition the idea of infinity; because by such repetition there is a constant enlargement, *ad infinitum*, of the idea; but in other ideas, which consist of degrees, this is not the case; for if we add two different degrees together, they embody, and, as it were, run into one, and so the idea is not at all increased; and if we add a less degree to a greater, the idea is diminished. Hence we attribute infinite to those ideas whose parts are *extensive*, but not to those whose parts are *intensive*.* (Sect. 6.)

As has been shown, we get the idea of the infinity of space from the repetition, *ad infinitum*, of any stated lengths of space; we must, however, carefully distinguish between the idea of the INFINITY OF SPACE, and the idea of A SPACE INFINITE?—The former is nothing but a supposed endless progression of the mind over what repeated ideas of space it pleases; this idea we have; but to have actually

which gives these forms to the objects of its consciousness, does not belong to Psychology (or the science which investigates the faculties, operations, and laws of the human mind,) but to Ontology (or the science of Being as Being.) Notwithstanding Locke's plain and explicit statement in the text, Cousin declares that "Locke destroyed the ontological questions concerning the nature of space." Psychology, Henry's Translation, p. 143. Professor Caird observes that Locke, in so far as he maintains the objective reality of the primary qualities of matter, teaches that space is at once empirically and transcendently real. (Philosophy of Kant, pp. 262, 263.)

* Cf. chap. xvi., sect. 3; Book IV., chap. ii., sects. 11-13.

in the mind the idea of a space infinite, is to suppose the mind already passed over, and actually to have a view of all those repeated ideas of space which an endless repetition can never totally represent to it;—this implies a plain contradiction. (Sect. 7.)

Locke employs three arguments, in the course of his seventeenth chapter, in order to show that we have no positive idea of infinite space?—1°. Having such an idea would involve a contradiction. (Sect. 7.) 2°. He has no positive clear idea of the largeness of any extension that has not a comprehensive idea of the dimensions of it. (Sect. 15.) (He uses virtually the same argument in the form of a question in Sect. 13, to which reference is made lower down.) 3°. If a man had a positive clear idea of either infinite space or infinite duration, he could add two infinities together—nay, could make one infinite infinitely bigger than another—absurdities which Locke thinks too gross to need confutation.* (Sect. 20.)

N.B.—He also uses an *a fortiori* argument in Sect. 18; he that thinks he has a positive idea of infinite space will, when he considers, find he can no more have a positive idea of the greatest, than he can of the least space, the latter of which seems to be the easier of the two.

* To the student conversant with mathematics, the above statement may appear rather startling, since it is part of the alphabet of mathematical science that one infinity *may* be greater than another. It may, however, be urged on the other hand, that Locke in this passage did not consider infinity from this point of view. (*Vide* sect. 22.) Cf. Bacon, Nov. Org. Book I. Aph. 48—"The usually received distinction of an infinite *a parte ante* and a *parte post* cannot hold good; for it would thence follow *that one infinity is greater than another*, and also that infinity is wasting away and tending to an end." See also Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, Vol. II., pp. 372, 527, 528, Fifth Edition.

Locke illustrates the absurdity of our supposing that we possess a positive idea of an infinite space by comparing it with another idea?—Could we possess such an idea it would not be much better than the idea of motion at rest. (Sect. 8.)

Locke thinks that a close examination of our idea of infinity would discover its true character?—We should then see that our idea of infinity is merely “the infinity of numbers applied to determinate parts, of which we have in our minds the distinct ideas.” (Sect. 10.)

What consideration will assist us in arriving at this conclusion?—That number is not generally thought by us infinite, whereas duration and expansion are apt to be so.

Whence arises it that we draw this distinction?—The infinity of number resembles a line, one end of which terminates with us, while the other is extended still forward beyond all that we can conceive. In duration, on the contrary, we suppose this line to be extended both ways to an inconceivable, indeterminate, and infinite length, as will appear evident when we consider that our idea of Eternity is nothing but the turning this infinity of numbers both ways, *a parte ante* and *a parte post*.^{*} In space we, conceiving ourselves at the centre, pursue on all sides those indeterminate lines of number. (Sects. 10 and 11.)

Locke points out a second way of arriving at the idea of infinity; wherein does it differ from the former method?—There is an apparent infinity to us in the infinite divisibility of numbers, which has also the infinity of number, but differs from the former method in this—that there we

^{*} *I.e.*, infinity applied to *past* and *future* duration respectively;—these are scholastic terms : *cf.* Bacon, *Nov. Org.* Book I. Aph. 48.

only use addition of numbers, whereas this is like the division of an unit into its fractions.* (Sect. 12.)

Though Locke thinks it would be hard to find any one so absurd as to say that he had a positive idea of an infinite actual number, yet there are some who imagine they have positive ideas of infinite duration and space: Locke would refute this error by proposing a simple question?—By asking them, could they add to their idea or not—this would immediately show them their mistake. (Sect. 13.)

Locke notices a “pleasant argument,” by which some men persuade themselves that they have a positive idea of infinity?—The argument referred to is founded on the principle of two negatives being equivalent to an affirmative; infinity is the “negation of an end,” therefore, since an end is negative, its negation is positive.

How does Locke refute this argument?—He refutes it in two ways.—1°. He denies the premiss that an end is negative, for (a) he who perceives the end of his pen to be either black or white, will find it difficult to imagine it a mere negative; (b) the end of duration is not the negation of existence, but the last moment of it—2°. *Argumentum ad hominem*.—If the end be the negation of existence, the beginning is the first instant of being, and therefore the idea of eternity, *a parte ante*, or of duration without a beginning, is but a negative idea. (Sect. 14.)

Locke considers that our idea of infinite has something of positive in all those things we apply to it, but of that which remains beyond the large positive ideas we amass by frequent, but finite repetition, we have no distinct positive

* Mathematicians, however, would consider this as identical with the former method, since the infinite *decrease* of a fraction depends upon the infinite *increase* of its integral denominator.

idea at all : how does he illustrate this?—A mariner* has no more positive idea of the depths of the sea lying beyond reach of his sounding-line, than we have of that which remains after our large positive ideas. (Sect. 15.)

To what does Locke compare the posture of the mind reaching after a positive and clear idea of infinity?—To a mariner, who always, in taking the sounding, lets out new line, and ever finds the plummet sink.

There are three elements in our idea of infinity?—
1°. The idea of so much, which is positive and clear. 2°. The idea of greater, which is also clear, but comparative. 3°. The idea of so much greater as cannot be comprehended, which is negative.

How does Locke illustrate the unreasonableness of saying that we have a positive clear idea of any quantity, without knowing how great it is?—By comparing the man who so asserts, to one who says he has a positive clear idea of the number of the sands on the sea shore, while he knows not how many there are, but only that there are more than twenty.

How does Locke endeavour to refute those who hold that they have a positive idea of Eternity†?—By a disjunctive argument ; our idea of duration either includes the idea of succession, or it does not ; (a) if it does not, Locke asserts the impossibility of distinguishing between duration applied to an Eternal Being, and to a finite, since we are forced to imagine, that whatever has duration is of longer continuance to-day than it was yesterday ; (b) if it does, (and Locke thinks that this is manifestly the case,) we can have no positive idea of it, as he has shown elsewhere. (Sect. 16.)

* Cf. Introd. Sect. 6. I may remark that the above seems a bad illustration ; the depths of the sea which are not sounded are not *infinite*, but *indefinite*.

† Cf. chap. xxix., sect. 15.

If men, in order to avoid succession in external existence, return to the *punctum stans** of the Schools, they will very little mend the matter?—To Locke's mind there is nothing more inconceivable than duration without succession. Besides, the *punctum stans*, if it signify anything, being not *quantum*, finite or infinite cannot belong to it.

For what purpose does Locke quote Horace—

*"Rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis; at ille
Labitur, et labetur in omne volubilis ævum."* † ?

Epist. I., ii., 42—43.

In order to show that our idea of infinity is essentially a crescent idea, and never positive. (Sect. 19.)

Locke notices an inconsistency in some men, whereby they put such a difference between infinite duration and infinite space, as to persuade themselves that they have a positive idea of the former and not of the latter: what does he assign as the source of this error?—Being compelled, by a due contemplation of causes and effects, to admit the existence of an Eternal Being, they consider this Being as commensurate with eternity; but, finding it unnecessary and even absurd to suppose matter infinite, they hastily conclude they have no idea of infinite space.‡ (Sect. 20.)

How does Locke refute this argument?—1°. The existence of matter is in no way more necessary to the existence of

* "The *Ever-Abiding Now*." Cf. Mansel, *Prolegomena Logica*, p. 121, *Note*, Second Edition.

† Cf. "Sed fugit interea, fugit irreparabile tempus."—Virg. *Georg.* iii. 284.

‡ Cf. chap. xv., sects. 3 and 4; see also sects. 5 and 17 of the present chapter.

space, than the existence of the sun, or of motion, is necessary to duration. 2°. *Argumentum ad hominem*.—If we allow infinite duration to be possessed by God's eternal existence, we must equally allow that infinite space is possessed by His infinite omnipresence.

* What does Locke think are "certain marks of a defect in our ideas of infinity, and the disproportion the nature thereof has to the comprehension of our narrow capacities"?—The great and inextricable difficulties which perpetually involve all discourses concerning infinity, whether of space, duration, or divisibility.* (Sect. 21.)

* The refutation of erroneous opinions, regarding positive ideas of infinity, would confer a great benefit on philosophy?—Because men are liable to be led into perplexities and contradictions, in consequence of the incomprehensible nature of the thing they discourse of.

* For two reasons Locke justifies his lengthened consideration of space, duration and number, and of infinity, which arises from the contemplation of them?—1°. Because there are few simple ideas whose modes give more exercise to the thoughts of men than these do.† 2°. In order to show that even infinity has its origin in sensation and reflection. (Sect. 22.)

* Cf. chap. xxix., sect. 15. From the way in which I have put the above, an answer may easily be obtained to the following question, proposed for Honors :—"What inference does Locke make from the fact that great and inextricable difficulties perpetually involve all discourses concerning infinity, whether of space, duration, or divisibility?" (College Examination Papers.)

† Cf. his remarks, chap. xv., sect. 1 :—"Though we have in the precedent chapters dwelt pretty long on the considerations of space and duration, yet *they being ideas of general concernment that have something very abstruse and peculiar in their nature*, the comparing them one with another may perhaps be of use for their illustration."

* In conclusion, Locke hints at a third way of getting the idea of infinity?—Mathematicians of advanced speculations may have other ways, besides Locke's, to introduce the idea of infinity into their minds; this does not however hinder them from getting the first ideas of it from sensation and reflection. *

CHAPTERS XVIII-XX.—(INCLUSIVE.)

Of other Simple Modes, including those of Thinking, Pleasure, and Pain.

BEFORE proceeding to mixed modes, Locke proposes to discuss other simple modes besides those of space, duration, and number; enumerate the classes of these which he treats of?—1°. Simple modes of the simple ideas of sensation: viz., modes of (1) motion, (2) sounds, (3) colours, (4) tastes and smells. 2°. Simple modes of thinking. 3°. Simple modes of ideas derived from both sensation and reflection: viz., modes of pleasure, pain, and power.

Give some examples of modes of motion?—To slide, roll, tumble, walk, creep, run, dance, leap, skip, etc. (Chap. xviii., sect. 2.)

What kind of ideas are *swift* and *slow*?—Complex ideas, comprehending time and space with motion.

What are the simple modes of sound?—The different modifications of sound, as articulate words, cries of beasts, etc. (Sect. 3.)

What are the simple modes of colour?—The different degrees or shades of colour. (Sect. 4.)

* *Vide* note, page 72.

Whence arises it that most of the modes of colour belong to mixed modes instead of simple ones?—Because we seldom make assemblages of colours, but that figure also is taken in, and has its part in it; *e.g.*, beauty, a rainbow.

What are the simple modes of tastes and smells?—All compounded tastes and smells. These Locke does not enumerate, since most of them have no names. (Sect. 5.)

What simple modes have usually no distinct names?—Those which are considered but as different degrees of the same simple idea, and have but small difference between them, although many of them are in themselves very distinct ideas. (Sect. 6.)

Locke assigns two reasons whence this defect in the naming of simple modes may have arisen?—1°. Men may want measures nicely to distinguish them. 2°. If they were distinguished by names, this knowledge would not be of general or necessary use. (Sect. 6; *cf.* sect. 7.)

Enumerate some of the simple modes of thinking*?—Sensation, remembrance, recollection, contemplation, reverie, attention, intention or study, dreaming, and ecstasy. Locke does not pretend to enumerate them all, as they are too numerous.†

How does Locke define these terms?—SENSATION, considered as a mode of thinking, is the perception which accompanies any impression made on the body by an external object;—the actual entrance of an idea into the

* By "Thinking," Locke evidently here means "consciousness in general."

† The few examples which he has given, he goes on to say, are sufficient for his present purpose, especially since he will have occasion hereafter to treat more at large of reasoning, judging, volition, and knowledge, which are some of the most considerable operations of the mind, and modes of thinking.

understanding by the senses. REMEMBRANCE is the subsequent recurrence of the same idea, without the operation of the like object on the external sensory. RECOLLECTION is the painful and earnest seeking after, and bringing again into view the same idea as before. CONTEMPLATION is the holding of the same idea under attentive consideration for a long time.* REVERIE is the floating of ideas in the mind without any reflection or regard of the understanding. ATTENTION is the taking notice of, and, as it were, registering in the memory the ideas that offer themselves. INTENTION OR STUDY is the selecting of one idea in the mind, and earnestly considering it on all sides, to the exclusion of every other idea. DREAMING is the having of ideas in the mind, not suggested by any external objects or known occasions, nor under any choice or conduct of the understanding at all. ECSTASY is probably dreaming with the eyes open. (Chap. xix., sect. 1.)

Whence does Locke infer that thinking is the action and not the essence of the soul?†—From the difference of intension and remission of the mind in thinking, which every one experiences in himself. This could not happen if thinking were the essence of the soul, since the operations of agents easily admit of intension and remission, but the essences of things cannot be conceived capable of any such variation. (Sect. 4.)

* Cf. chap. x., sect. 1.

† He has before treated of this subject in chap. i., sect. 10, *et seq.*, q. v. (Cf. my note, page 17.) He refers to it again here, since the discussion of the simple modes of thinking naturally suggests an examination of the different state of the mind in thinking. (Sect. 3.) References to the works of modern philosophers, respecting the Cartesian Doctrine in question, are given in the Appendix; I may, however, now remark that Descartes meant by "Essence,"—"The principal essential difference;" Cf. my note at Book III., chap. x., sect. 6.

Why cannot pleasure and pain be described?—Because they are simple ideas, which are indefinable, as Locke afterwards shows in his third book. (Book III., chap. iv., sects. 5, 7, and 11.)

What then is our only means of knowing them?—By experience. (Chap. xx., sect. 1.)

Good or evil in things are relative terms?—Things are good or evil only in reference to pleasure or pain. (Sect. 2.)

What is Good?—We call that good, which is apt to cause or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us; or else to procure or preserve for us the possession of any other good or absence of any evil.

What is Evil?—We call that evil which is apt to procure or increase any pain, or deprive us of any good;* in pleasure and pain Locke includes both mental and bodily pleasure and pain, as commonly distinguished.† (Sect. 2; cf. Sect. 15.)

What are the simple modes of Pleasure and Pain?—The Passions; the most important of these Locke enumerates as being of more concernment to us than any other simple modes of this class; there are, however, numerous other simple modes of pleasure and pain, which he omits to treat of, e.g., the pain of hunger and thirst, the pleasure of eating and drinking to remove them, the pleasure of music, etc. (Sect. 18.)

What relation do pleasure and pain bear towards our passions?—Pleasure and pain, and that which causes them, viz., good and evil, are the *hinges* on which our passions turn. (Sect. 3.)

* Cf. Hobbes, Hum. Nat., chap. vii., sect. 3.

† He observes further that the common distinction is groundless, since pleasure and pain are only different constitutions of the mind, sometimes occasioned by disorder in the body, sometimes by thoughts of the mind.

How may we form to ourselves the ideas of our passions?—By reflecting what modifications or tempers of mind, what internal sensations (if we may so call them) pleasure and pain, under various considerations, produce in us.

Enumerate the Passions as given by Locke?—Love, hatred, desire, joy, sorrow, hope, fear, despair, anger, envy, and shame.

Define LOVE?—The thought of the delight which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in us* (Sect. 4.)

Define HATRED?—The thought of the pain which anything present or absent is apt to produce in us. (Sect. 5.)

Distinguish between our Love or Hatred towards inanimate insensible beings, and beings capable of happiness or misery?—1°. Our love or hatred towards the former is commonly founded on the pleasure or pain which we receive from their use and application any way to our senses, even though such use may involve the destruction of the object. 2°. Our love or hatred towards the latter is often the delight or uneasiness which we find in ourselves arising from a consideration of their very being or happiness.

Define DESIRE?—The uneasiness a man finds in himself upon the absence of anything, the present enjoyment of which carries the idea of delight with it.† (Sect. 6.)

To what is Desire proportioned?—To the vehemency of the uneasiness.

Two causes tend to abate desire?—1°. If the good proposed cause no displeasure or pain by its absence, there is

* Mr. St. John observes that Locke here confounds Love with that weak feeling which we term *Liking*.

† Cf. chap. xxi., sects. 30, 31, and 39; in sect. 39 he observes that there is "scarce any of the passions to be found without desire joined with it."

no more than bare *velleity*, or "the lowest degree of desire."*
2°. If the good proposed be impossible to obtain.

What is the chief, if not only spur to human industry and action?—Uneasiness.†

Define JOY?—A delight of the mind arising from the consideration of the present or assured approaching possession of a good.‡ (Sect. 7.)

Define SORROW?—Sorrow is uneasiness in the mind upon the thought of a good lost, which might have been enjoyed longer; or the sense of a present evil. (Sect. 8.)

Define HOPE?—The pleasure in the mind, which every one finds in himself, upon the thought of a profitable future enjoyment of a thing which is apt to delight him. (Sect. 9.)

* Mr. St. John remarks on this passage, that Hobbes understood this term in a very different manner; viz., as a scholastic term signifying "some appetite distinct from all the rest." (Hum. Nat., chap. ix., sect. 1.)

† In chap. xxi., sect. 31, he declares that it is not the greater good in view, but some uneasiness a man is at present under, which determines the will in regard to our actions. (Cf. sects. 35, 36, 37, 38, and 44.)
• I may here observe that Locke's remarks in chap. xx., are intimately connected with his Theory of Liberty, as given in chap. xxi. In the latter chapter, he states that the Mind determines the Will (Sect. 29); that "the Uneasiness of Desire" determines the Mind (Sect. 33; cf. sects. 31 and 71); and, lastly, that Happiness (or "the utmost Pleasure of which we are capable") alone moves Desire. (Sects. 41 and 42.) The greatest and most pressing uneasiness generally determines the Will to the next action; but this is not always the case, since the Mind has "a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires." The Source of Liberty, therefore, consists in the Mind's possession of this power. (Sect. 47.) With Locke's statement in the text, cf. the following passage from the writings of Kant, quoted in Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, Vol. II., p. 473, Fifth Edition:—"Man finds himself in a never-ceasing pain; and this is the spur for the activity of human nature."

‡ Cf. Hobbes, Hum. Nat., chap. vii., sect. 8.

Define FEAR?—An uneasiness of the mind, upon the thought of a future evil likely to befall us. (Sect. 10.)

Define DESPAIR?—The thought of the unattainableness of any good. This works differently in men's minds; sometimes producing uneasiness or pain, sometimes rest and indolency.* (Sect. 11.)

Define ANGER?—Uneasiness or discomposure of the mind upon the receipt of any injury, with a present purpose of revenge. (Sect. 12.)

Define ENVY?—Uneasiness of the mind caused by the consideration of a good we desire, obtained by one we think should not have it before us. (Sect. 13.)

Wherein are Envy and Anger different from our other passions?—Envy and anger, not being caused by pain and pleasure simply *per se*, but having in them some mixed considerations of ourselves and others, are not to be found in all men;† all our other passions, on the contrary, terminating simply in pleasure and pain, are, Locke thinks, to be found in all men. (Sect. 14.)

Define SHAME?—An uneasiness of the mind upon the thought of having done something which is indecent, or will lessen the valued esteem which others have for us. (Sect. 17.)

Most of our passions have operations, and cause various changes in our bodies; Locke, however, quotes an instance in order to show that this is not essential to our idea of a passion?—Shame is not always accompanied by blushing.

Locke notices a further consideration respecting our

* Mr. St. John, in his Edition of the Essay, quotes from Hobbes, Human Nature, chap. ix., sect. 8—"Absolute privation of hope is despair; a degree whereof is diffidence."

† Mr. St. John questions this conclusion.

passions?—The removal or lessening of a pain is considered, and operates as a pleasure; and *vice versa*.* (Sect. 16.)

CHAPTER XXI.

Of Power.

How is the idea of Power got?—The mind being (*a*) daily informed by the senses of the alteration of those simple ideas it observes in things without, and taking notice how one comes to an end and ceases to be, and another begins to exist which was not before; (*b*) reflecting also on what passes within itself, and observing a constant change of its ideas, sometimes by the impression of external objects on the senses, and sometimes by the determination of its own choice; and (*c*) concluding, from what it has so constantly observed to have been, that the like changes will for the future be made in the same things by like agents, and by the like ways;† (*d*) considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple ideas changed, and in another the possibility of making that change; and so comes by the idea which we call Power.‡ (Sect. 1.)

Power, thus considered, is two-fold?—1°. Active power,

* Mr. Fox Bourne observes (Life of John Locke, Vol. II., p. 113) that in Locke's remarks on pleasure and pain, Hobbes was his immediate teacher, and Aristotle his more remote one. Cf. Mr. St. John's notes, appended in his Edition of the Essay, to the present chapter.

† Cf. Book IV., chap. iii., sect. 29.

‡ (*a*) SENSATION, (*b*) REFLECTION, (*c*) The INTELLECT or REASON; Locke has previously given a more concise account of the origin of the idea of power. (Chap. vii., sect. 8; *vide* page 28.)

as able to make any change. 2°. Passive power, as able to receive any change.* (Sect. 2.)

Locke hazards a conjecture as to the possession of active and passive powers, respectively, by different ranks of beings?—1°. God is truly above all passive power. 2°. Matter may be wholly destitute of active power. 3°. Intermediate created spirits may be capable of both active and passive power.†

Why is our idea of power an important one to be considered?—Because active powers make a greater part of our complex ideas of natural substances.‡

How far is our idea of power a simple idea, and how far is it a relation?—A simple idea so far as it is received from sensation and reflection, a relation so far as it includes a relation to action or change. (Sect. 3.)

Nevertheless, Locke justifies himself for placing power amongst our simple ideas?—1°. He does so from the consideration that all our ideas of what kind soever, when attentively considered, do include some kind of relation, *e.g.* (*a*) our ideas of existence, duration, and number, all contain a secret relation to the parts; (*b*) figure and motion

* Dr. Reid objects strongly to this phraseology, since "passive power" is, in his opinion, no power at all, and a contradiction in terms; he declares further that he never found the term in any other good author, and charges Locke with having invented it. Sir William Hamilton, however, asserts that Reid is in error, both in supposing the distinction untenable, and Locke its author; it was first formally enounced by Aristotle, and from him was universally adopted. "Active and passive power," Sir William adds, "are in Greek styled *δύναμις ποιητική*, and *δύναμις παθητική*; in Latin, *potentia activa*, and *potentia passiva*." Vide Lectures on Metaphysics, Vol. I., Lect. x., p. 175, *et seq.*, Fifth Edition.

† Cf. chap. xxiii., sect. 28.

‡ Cf. chap. xxiii., sects. 7-10.

have something relative in them much more visibly; (c) sensible qualities are merely powers in different bodies relatively to our perception, etc.; and (d) even when considered in the things themselves, these qualities depend on the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of the parts. (Sect. 3.) 2°. Since all the powers we take cognizance of *terminate* only in the alteration of some sensible qualities in those subjects on which they operate, and so make them exhibit to us new sensible ideas, he reckons these powers amongst our simple ideas although they are *per se* complex ones. (Chap. xxiii., sect. 7.)

We are abundantly furnished with the ideas of passive power, by almost all sorts of sensible beings. Does Locke think we have fewer instances of active power?—No; since whatever change is observed, the mind must collect a power somewhere able to make that change, as well as a possibility in the thing itself to receive it.* (Sect. 4.)

Whence, according to Locke, is the clearest idea of active power obtained?—From spirit, *i.e.*, from reflection on the operations of our minds.

Give Locke's argument, that the clearest idea of active

* Locke here asserts the Principle of Causality :—"That principle which renders it compulsory for the human mind to conceive a cause for every phenomenon that begins to exist." The passage in the text directly contradicts Cousin's statement—that Locke never treated of the Principle of Causality. Cousin holds that this principle is a "Revelation of the Reason." (Henry's Translation of Cousin's Psychology, chap. iv.) For a summary of the different theories of causality held by various philosophers, *vide* Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, Vol. II., Lect. xxxix. (Cf. Thomson, Outline of the Laws of Thought, p. 194, *Note*.) For a further theory on this subject—that of Dean Mansel's—*vide* Mansel, Prolegomena Logica, p. 151; Metaphysics, p. 266, *et seq.* Respecting Mansel's opinion, cf. Mahaffy, Fischer's *Comm.*, Intro. v.

power is from spirit?—All powers relate to action, and there are only two kinds of action of which we have any notion : viz., (a) thinking, and (b) motion.* (a) Of thinking, body gives no idea at all ; it is only from reflection that we can obtain it ; (b) neither can body give us the idea of the beginning of motion ; we have this idea only from reflecting on what passes in ourselves, where we find by experience, that, barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our body which were before at rest.† (Sect. 4.)

Is it necessary to Locke's argument to prove that we cannot get a clear idea of power from the impulse of bodies one upon another?—No ; for even on that supposition we would get it from sensation, which is one of the sources of our ideas.

Locke thinks it evident that we find within ourselves a power to begin or forbear, continue or end, several mental actions and bodily motions, merely by a thought or preference of our minds? (Sect. 5.†)—The Will, or

* Cf. chap. xxii., sect. 10 ; in sect. 72 of the present chapter, he observes :—"These, in truth, though called and counted actions, yet, if nearly considered, will not be found to be always perfectly so. . . . A power to receive ideas or thoughts from the operation of any external substance, is called a power of thinking ; *but this is but a passive power or capacity.*"

† A disjunctive argument. With the above remarks, cf. chap. xxiii., sects. 28 and 30 ; in sect. 72 of the present chapter, he says that "the active power of motion is in no substance which cannot begin motion in itself or in another substance when at rest."

‡ We have in this section the best theory of power given by Locke. It also contains the germ of Maine De Biran's theory, concerning the origin of the idea of cause. *Vide* Henry's Translation of Cousin's Psychology, chap. iv., p. 189, *et seq.* ; cf. Mansel, Bampton Lectures, pp. 290, 291, Fifth Edition ; Prolegomena Logica, pp. 146, 348, Second Edition ; Metaphysics, p. 175, Second Edition ; Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, Lect. xxxix., Vol. II., p. 390, *et seq.*, Fifth Edition.

"The power which the mind has to order or forbear the consideration of any idea, or to prefer the motion of any part of our body to its rest, and *vice versa*, in any particular instance."*

Locke notices another mental power?—The Understanding, or "The power of perception." (Sect. 5; *cf.* chap. vi., sect. 2.)

What is Volition or Willing?—The actual exercise of the will.†

What is Perception?—The act of the understanding.

Perception is three-fold?—1°. The perception of ideas in our minds. 2°. The perception of the signification of signs. 3°. The perception of the agreement or disagreement existing between our ideas.‡ Locke attributes all these to the understanding, or perceptive power, although it be in the two latter only that use allows us to say we understand.

The term "Faculties" has been applied to both the Will and Understanding. To what erroneous opinion does Locke think this phraseology has given rise?—The opinion that there were some real beings, or distinct agents in the soul who performed the actions of understanding and volition.§ (Sect. 6.)

* Locke defines the Will more concisely, in sect. 71, as "A power to direct the operative faculties to motion or rest in particular instances;" *cf.* sects. 7, 15, and 17; chap. vi., sect. 2.

† *Cf.* sects. 15 and 28.

‡ These three sorts correspond respectively to Books II., III., IV. of the Essay.

§ *Cf.* sects. 17, 18, and 20; chap. vi. sect. 2. With Locke's remarks respecting this subject, compare the following passages:—"As to mental powers—under which term are included mental faculties and capacities—you are not to suppose entities really distinguishable from the thinking principle, or really different from each other." Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Vol. II., p. 2, Fifth Edition.—"What in-

Distinguish between voluntary and involuntary actions?—An action performed in obedience to the order or command of the mind is called voluntary; when performed without such a thought of the mind it is called involuntary.* (Sect. 5.)

Whence arise the ideas of Liberty and Necessity?—From the consideration of the extent of the power of the mind over the actions of the man, which every one finds in himself. (Sect. 7.)

Define Liberty?—A power to act or not to act, according as the mind directs.† (Sect. 71.)

When is an agent under necessity?—When he wants the power to act or not to act according to the determination of the mind.‡ (Sects. 8 and 71.)

Locke notices cases where liberty cannot, and may not exist, respectively?—1°. Liberty cannot be where there is

deed are faculties? We talk of faculties, as if they were distinct things separable; as if a man had intellect, imagination, fancy, etc., as he has hands, feet, and arms. That is a capital error." Carlyle, *On Heroes and Hero-Worship*, Lect. III.—"No sober-minded psychologist ever intends to represent the mental faculties as substantially and numerically distinct portions of the mind; but, as *entia rationis*, they may furnish more or less convenient heads of classification, to connect or distinguish the similar or dissimilar mental acts or states of which we are successively conscious." Mansel, *Metaphysics*, p. 197, Second Edition.

Sir William Hamilton observes that "*Faculty* (*facultas*) is derived from the obsolete Latin *facul*—the more ancient form of *facilis*, from which again *facilitas* is formed. It is properly limited to active power, and therefore, is abusively applied to the mere passive affections of mind." *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Vol. I., p. 177, Fifth Edition. Cf. note, page 26.

* "Voluntary is not opposed to necessary, but to involuntary." (Sect. 11.)

† Cf. sects. 8, 15, 23, 27, and 55.

Cf. Sect. 13.

no thought, volition, or will, but 2°. there may be thought, volition, and will without liberty. (Sect. 8.)

He gives instances in illustration of this statement?—1°. A tennis-ball, whether in motion by the stroke of a racket, or lying still at rest, is not by any one taken to be a free agent; we conclude that it has no liberty, since it does not think, and, consequently, has no volition. (Sect. 9.) 2°. Suppose a man be carried, while fast asleep, into a room, and there be locked fast beyond his power to get out; on awaking he finds himself in the company of a person with whom he willingly stays; although his stay, under these circumstances, be voluntary, he has not liberty to go away. (Sect. 10.)

Is Liberty an idea belonging to Volition?—No; it belongs to the person having the power of doing, or forbearing to do, according as the mind shall choose or direct.

Locke, while laying down his Theory of Liberty, notices two opinions on the subject, both differing from his own?—He places liberty in an indifferency of the operative powers of the man; so far as this indifferency reaches, so far only is a man free. Some have placed it (1) in an indifferency of the man, antecedent to the determination of his will; others, (2) in an indifferency antecedent to the thought and judgment of the understanding, as well as to the decree of the will. (Sect. 71.)

* Locke notices a common mistake, whereby some things are called powers and actions which, if duly considered, are rather passions than actions; grammar and the common forms of language, he thinks, are instrumental in this?—What is signified by verbs, called active by grammarians, does not always signify action; e.g., the propositions, “I see the moon,” “I feel the heat,” do not signify any action in me;

but merely the reception of simple ideas by me, wherein I am not active, but barely passive.* (Sect. 72.)

Locke has thus briefly given a view of our original ideas, whence all the rest are derived, and of which they are made up?—By a proper examination of the causes on which these depend, and of what they are made, he considers that there are eight original and primary ones to which all others may be reduced.

Enumerate these eight?—(1) EXTENSION, (2) SOLIDITY, (3) MOBILITY,† received by our senses from body. (4) PERCEPTIVITY, (5) MOTIVITY,‡ received by reflection from our minds. (6) EXISTENCE, (7) DURATION, and (8) NUMBER, received from both sources.§ (Sect. 73.)

Why does he think this reduction can be made?—Because by these eight, he thinks, might be explained the nature of colours, sounds, tastes, smells, and all our other ideas, provided we had faculties acute enough to perceive the severally modified extensions and motions of these minute bodies, which produce those several sensations in us.

CHAPTER XXII.

Of Mixed Modes.

AFTER treating of simple modes, Locke proceeds to consider mixed modes; define mixed modes, and give examples?—Mixed modes are combinations of simple ideas of

* Cf. note, page 88.

† *i.e.*, The power of being moved, (passive.)

‡ *i.e.*, The power of moving, (active.)

§ These are called LOCKE'S CATEGORIES.

different kinds ;* *e.g.*, those marked by the names obligation, drunkenness, a lie. (Sect. 1.)

Wherein are our complex ideas of mixed modes different from those of substances ?—They are not looked upon to be characteristic marks of any real beings, having a steady existence (as substances are), but scattered and independent thoughts, put together by the mind.†

For what reason does Locke think that men have applied the term “NOTIONS,” to complex ideas ?—They have been so designated as if they had their origin and constant existence more in the thoughts of men, than in the reality of things.‡ (Sect. 2.)

* What proves that several mixed modes must have been in the minds of men before they existed anywhere else ?—The consideration that in the beginning of language several of them must have been so.§

Whence has a complex idea its unity, consisting as it does of many distinct simple ideas ?—It has its unity from an act of the mind combining those several simple ideas together, and considering them as one complex one, consisting of those parts. (Sect. 4.)

What is the mark of this union ?—The NAME given to each particular combination of simple ideas.||

What causes men to make several combinations of simple ideas into mixed modes, and neglect others which have as much aptness to be combined ?—The end of language,

* Herein they differ from simple modes, which are combinations of simple ideas *of the same kind*. Cf. chap. xii., sect. 5 ; *vide* page 55.

† Cf. Book III., chap. iv., sect. 2 ; chap. v., sect. 3.

‡ Cf. Book III., chap. v., sect. 12.

§ Cf. Book III., chap. v., sects. 5 and 15.

|| Cf. Book III., chap. v., sects. 4 and 10.

which is to communicate our thoughts with ease to others,* causes us to make and affix names to those mixed modes which we have occasion to make use of, and to neglect those which we seldom require. (Sect. 5.)

Two phenomena of language justify us in arriving at this conclusion?—1°. Words in the language of one nation have none exactly answering to them in that of another which has no occasion for these combinations;† (e.g., the Greek *δοτρανισμὸς*, and the Latin *proscriptio*.) (Sect. 6.) 2°. Languages change, taking up new and laying aside old terms, because change of customs and opinions necessitates new combinations of ideas, and the rejecting of old ones. (Sect. 7.)

Whence arises it that the names of mixed modes are liable to be mistaken for the ideas themselves?—Being transient combinations of simple ideas, and having but a short existence anywhere but in the minds of men, and even there, having no longer existence than whilst they are thought on, the only way in which they appear to have a constant and lasting existence is in their names. (Sect. 8.)

* What consideration proves that many mixed modes could not exist together anywhere in the things themselves?—Several of them signify actions which require time for their performance, and so could never all exist together, e.g., *apotheosis*, *triumphus*.

Locke enumerates three ways whereby we get the complex ideas of mixed modes?—1°. By EXPERIENCE and OBSERVATION of things themselves, e.g., by seeing two men wrestle or fence we get the idea of wrestling or fencing. 2°. By INVEN-

* Cf. chap. xviii., sect. 7; Book III.; chap. iii., sect. 3; chap. v., sect. 7; chap. vi., sect. 33. For the Three Ends of Language, vide Book III., chap. x., sect. 23.

† Cf. Book III., chap. v., sect. 8.

TION, or voluntarily putting together several simple ideas in our own minds; *e.g.*, He who first invented printing or etching, had an idea of it in his own mind before it ever existed. 3°. By EXPLANATION of the name of actions we never saw, or notions we cannot see;—this is the most usual way. (Sect. 9.)

In making mixed modes, to what ingredients are we confined?—To the simple ideas derived from sensation and reflection.

Which of our simple ideas have been most modified, and most mixed ideas made out of them?—THINKING and MOTION, (which comprehend all action*) and POWER, whence all these actions are conceived to flow. (Sect. 10.)

Locke assigns a reason why these three ideas have been most modified?—Action is the great business of mankind, and the whole matter about which all laws are conversant.†

Locke here observes that men must, for the purpose of communication, have settled ideas and names of modes of action distinguished by their causes, means, objects, ends, instruments, time, place, and other circumstances; he enumerates and defines some of these?—Boldness is “The power to do what we intend before others, without fear or disorder.”‡ Habit is “The power or ability in man of doing anything, when it has been acquired by frequently doing the same thing.” Disposition is “Habit, ready and forward upon every occasion to break into action,” *e.g.*, testiness is “a disposition or aptness to be angry.”

Define “causes”?—The substances wherein power is, when they exert this power into act.§ (Sect. 11.)

* Cf. chap. xxi., sect. 4.

† Cf. chap. xviii., sect. 7.

‡ The Greeks, he remarks, call “the confidence of speaking” by a peculiar name, viz., “*παρρησία*.”

§ Cf. chap. xxvi., sect. 1.

Define "effects"?—The simple ideas introduced into any subject by the exertion of power.

How does Locke define "action" and "passion"?—The efficacy whereby a new substance or idea is produced, is called, in the subject exerting that power, "action ;" * but in the subject wherein any simple idea is changed or produced it is called "passion." (Sect. 11.)

We have different conceptions of action and passion in intellectual and corporeal agents respectively?—We conceive it as modes of thinking and willing in the former case, and as modifications of motion in the latter.

* Locke avows that he has no conception of any action besides thinking and motion which produces any effect ; a consideration of popular phraseology might seem at first sight to lead us to a contrary conclusion?—When a countryman says the cold freezes water, the word "freezing" might seem to import some action ; in reality, however, it signifies nothing but the effect, viz., that water, before fluid, is become hard and consistent, without containing any idea of the action whereby it is done.

* Although other simple ideas, besides power and action, enter into our complex ideas of mixed modes which have settled names annexed, Locke will not enumerate them?—1°. Because they are too numerous ; 2°. Because all that is requisite to his purpose is, (*a*) to show what sort of ideas mixed modes are, (*b*) how the mind comes by them, and (*c*) that they are made up of simple ideas got from sensation and reflection. (Sect. 12.)

* Locke has previously given another definition of action :—"Whatsoever modification a substance has, whereby it produces any effect." (Chap. xxi., sect. 72.)

CHAPTER XXIII.

Of our Complex Ideas of Substances.

WHENCE do we get our complex ideas of substances?—From the mind observing that several simple ideas, received from sensation and reflection, go constantly together; *and since we cannot imagine* how such simple ideas can subsist by themselves, *we presume them* to belong to one thing, and accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum, wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result; which therefore we call substance.* (Sect. 1.)

What is the only idea, according to Locke, we can have of “pure substance in general”?—“A supposition of we know not what support of such qualities (commonly called accidents) which are capable of producing simple ideas in us.” (Sect. 2.)

Locke shows, by an illustration, our ignorance of the nature of this substratum, and the folly of attempting to form any idea of it?—When we are asked what is the subject wherein such qualities as colour, weight, etc., inhere, we have nothing to say but the solid extended parts; and when questioned farther as to what these inhere in, we are not in a much better case than the Indian, who, saying that the world was supported on a great elephant, was asked what the elephant rested on; to which his answer was—“a great tortoise.” Upon being pressed farther to know what supported the tortoise, he replied, something, he knew not what.†

* Thus we see that Locke allows Substance to be an Idea of the Intellect or Reason.

† The illustration of the Indian philosopher occurred previously in chap. xiii., sect. 19; Locke repeatedly asserts in the present chapter that we have no clear idea of Substance. In Book I., chap. iv., sect.

Define substance in general?—"The supposed but unknown support of those qualities we find existing which we imagine cannot subsist, '*sine re substante*,' without something to support them."—We call this support "*substantia*,"

18, he states that "The idea of Substance is one which we neither have nor can have by sensation or reflection."

In refutation of Locke's statement, that the materials of all our knowledge are suggested and furnished to the mind only by sensation and reflection, the Bishop of Worcester employed the idea of substance in these words: "If the idea of substance *be grounded upon plain and evident reason*, then we must allow an idea of substance which comes not in by sensation or reflection; and so we may be certain of something which we have not by these ideas."—To this objection Locke replied: "These words of your Lordship contain nothing, as I see, in them, against me; for I NEVER SAID THAT THE GENERAL IDEA OF SUBSTANCE COMES IN BY SENSATION AND REFLECTION; or that it is a simple idea of sensation or reflection, *though it be ultimately founded in them*; for it is a complex idea, made up of the general idea of some thing, or being, with the relation of a support to accidents." (Cf. chap. xiii., sects. 19 and 20.) "For general ideas come not into the mind by sensation or reflection; but are the creatures or inventions of the understanding, as I think I have shown (Book III., chap. iii.); and also how the mind makes them from ideas which it has got by sensation and reflection; as to the ideas of relation, how the mind forms them, and how *they are derived from, and ultimately terminate in*, ideas of sensation and reflection, I have likewise shown." (Book II., chap. xxv., *et seq.*) Locke then proceeds to explain what he means by saying that "ideas of sensation and reflection are the materials of all our knowledge," by quoting from the following portions of his Essay—Book II., chap. i., sect. 5; chap. vii., sect. 10; chap. xxi., sect. 73. *Vide* First Letter to the Bishop of Worcester.

I may here notice, that Professor Webb is of opinion that Locke employs the term "*derived from*" merely as a rhetorical amplification of "*founded in*;" and also, that when Locke declares we have no idea of Substance, or of the Infinite, he used the word "Idea" to signify "Sensible Idea," or "Idea of the Imagination;"—*Ides* = Image. Mr. Graham remarks (Idealism, p. 124), that the hypothesis of Matter was a useful one to Locke, as he required external things to account for the existence of ideas in us.

which, in plain English, means "standing under," or "upholding."^{*}

Having obtained, as above, an obscure and relative notion of substance in general, whence come we to have notions of particular sorts of substances?—By collecting such combinations of simple ideas as are, by experience and observation of mén's senses, taken notice of to exist together, and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal constitution, or unknown essence of that substance; such are the ideas of man, horses, gold, etc. (Sect. 3.)

Define any particular sort of substance?—"A combination of simple ideas co-existing in such, though unknown, cause of their union, as makes the whole subsist of itself." (Sect. 6.)—"A collection of a certain number of simple ideas, considered as united in one thing." (Sect. 14.)

* Although the idea we have of any sort of corporeal substance is merely a collection of several simple ideas of sensible qualities, which we perceive united in that thing, nevertheless a reason may be assigned why these ideas are considered as in a substratum?—We cannot conceive how they could subsist alone, or in one another. (Sect. 4.)

Whence do we get the idea of spiritual substance?—Since we cannot conceive that the mental operations, viz., thinking, reasoning, fearing, etc., either subsist of themselves, or belong to, or are produced by body, we are apt to think that they are the actions of some other substance, which we call "spirit." (Sect. 5.)

How does Locke prove we have as clear an idea of spiritual substance (or spirit) as of bodily substance (or body)?†—The one is supposed to be (without knowing

* For Dean Mansel's criticisms on Locke's remarks in sect. 2, *vide* *Metaphysics*, p. 327, *et seq.*, Second Edition.

† Cf. sect. 15. With the above opinion Mr. Mill agrees. (*Examination of Hamilton*, chap. xii.)

what it is) the substratum to those simple ideas we have from without ; the other (without knowing what it is) the substratum to those operations we experience in ourselves within ; it is evident that the latter idea is as clear as the former. (Sect. 5.)

From the fact that we have as clear an idea of spirit as of body, Locke deduces an important consideration?—He alleges that it is absurd to make our ignorance of its nature a reason for denying the existence of spirit, as the same argument would have equal force in denying the existence of body.

Who has the most perfect idea of any particular sort of substance?—He who has collected and put together most of those simple ideas which exist in it ; (amongst which are to be reckoned its active powers, and passive capacities which, for brevity's sake, may be called simple ideas.*) (Sect. 7.)

Why need it not be wondered at, that powers make a great part of our complex ideas of substances?†—Their secondary qualities are those which in most of them serve principally to distinguish substances from one another, and usually make a considerable part of the complex ideas of the several sorts of them. (Sect. 8.)

Three sorts of ideas make our complex ones of substances?—1°. Primary qualities which are in them, whether we perceive them or not.‡ 2°. Secondary sensible qualities dependent on the primary, which are not in the things them-

* Cf. chap. xxi., sect. 3.

† Cf. sect. 37 ; chap. xxi., sect. 2.

‡ When the student reads in sect. 9 that "*the ideas* of the primary qualities of things are in them even when we perceive them not," he should bear in mind Locke's explanation of this statement, as given chap. viii., sect. 8 ; *vide* page 31.

selves, otherwise than as anything is in its cause. 3°. Active and passive powers which, as far as we have a notion of them, terminate in simple ideas.* (Sect. 9.)

When does Locke think the now secondary qualities of bodies would disappear; and what experiments prove the assertion?—He thinks they would disappear had we senses acute enough to discover the primary qualities of their minute parts. Sand or pounded glass, which is opaque to the naked eye, is pellucid in a microscope; blood, which to the naked eye appears all red, appears, by a microscope, to be a pellucid liquid with some red globules floating in it, etc. (Sect. 11.)

Why does Locke think that our faculties of discovering are suited to our state, and a proof of design, on the part of the Creator?—We are furnished with faculties enough to lead us to the knowledge of our Creator,† and the knowledge of our duty; and we are fitted well enough with abilities to provide for the conveniences of living. Were our senses to alter, it would not be beneficial to us, but injurious. (Sect. 12.)

What consideration ought to satisfy us that “in this globe of earth allotted for our mansion, the all-wise Architect has suited our organs, and the bodies that are to affect them, one to another”?—The fact of the inability of our constitution “to bear a remove into parts of this air, not much higher than that we commonly breathe in.”

From the consideration of the probable enlargement of our knowledge, which the alteration of our senses would occasion, Locke makes what he terms an “extravagant conjecture” about spirits?—He conjectures that one great

* *Cf.* chap. viii.

† *Cf.* *Introd.*, sect. 5; chap. vii., sect. 6; *Conduct of the Understanding*, sect. 23.

advantage which spirits have over us may consist in this,—that they may so frame and shape to themselves organs of sensation and perception, as to suit them to their present design, and the circumstances of the object they would consider. (Sect. 13.)

Locke, while begging his readers' pardon for such an extravagant conjecture, doubts whether any opinion can be dogmatically pronounced on the subject?—Although we cannot but allow that God may, if He please, give a thousand other faculties and ways of perceiving to angels, yet it is impossible for us to enlarge our guesses beyond the ideas received from our own sensation and reflection.*

It is for want of reflection that we are apt to think that our senses shows us nothing but material things?—Every act of sensation, when duly considered, gives us an equal view of both corporeal and spiritual nature. For, whilst I know, by seeing, hearing, etc., that there is some corporeal being without me, the object of that sensation, *I do more certainly know*, that there is some spiritual being within me, that sees and hears. (Sect. 15.)

What are the primary ideas peculiar to body and spirit, respectively, as contra-distinguished from each other; and what are the ideas common to both?—The cohesion of solid, separable parts, and a power of communicating motion by impulse, are peculiar to body; thinking, will, (or a power of putting body into motion by thought), and liberty (which is consequent to will), are peculiar to spirit; existence, duration, and mobility are common to them both. (Sects. 17 and 18.)

Why is figure excluded from the list of original ideas proper and peculiar to body?—Because it is only the consequence of finite extension. (Sect. 17.)

* Cf. chap. ii., sect. 3; *vide* page 20.

State Locke's reasons for assigning mobility to finite spirits?—We have no idea of motion, but as change of distance with other beings that are considered as at rest, and finding that spirits, as well as bodies, can only operate where they are,* and that spirits do operate at several times in several places, we cannot but attribute change of place to all finite spirits. We have also a strong proof of this from the separation of body and soul at death.† (Sects. 19 and 20.)

Locke mentions an analogous case, in order to show the conceivability of his opinion concerning mobility in finite spirits?—We may as certainly conceive a distance, and a change of distance, between two spirits, and so conceive their motion, as a mathematician conceives a distance, or a change of distance, between two points. (Sect. 19.)

Why does Locke think motion cannot be attributed to God?—Not, because he is an Immaterial, but because he is an Infinite Spirit. (Sect. 21.)

What does Locke think forms our complex ideas of body and soul, respectively?—Our idea of body is that of an extended solid substance, capable of communicating motion by impulse; and our idea of soul, as an immaterial spirit, is of a substance that thinks, and has a power of exciting motion in body by willing, or thought. (Sect. 22.)

* “Nothing can act but where it is; with all my heart; only, WHERE is it?”—Carlyle, *Sartor Resartus*; cf. Mill on Hamilton, chap. xxiv., p. 530, Third Edition.

† In sect. 21, Locke answers an objection of the Schoolmen, (viz., that spirits cannot change place; since they are not *in loco*, but *ubi*,) by saying that it is an absurd distinction, sufficiently refuted by being translated. This scholastic theory seems to mean that spirits have a position in space, but do not occupy space; an opinion which Locke, himself, apparently endeavours to establish, in sect. 19.

Locke compares our idea of spirit with that of body in three respects?—1°. The substance of both is unknown to us. 2°. We have distinct clear ideas of two primary qualities of body, viz., (1) solid coherent parts, and (2) impulse; and also have distinct clear ideas of two primary qualities of spirit, viz., (1) thinking, and (2) a power of action, or of beginning or stopping several thoughts or motions. 3°. We have clear ideas of several qualities inherent in bodies, viz., the various modifications of the extension of cohering solid parts, and their motion: and also have clear distinct ideas of the several modes of thinking; *e.g.*, believing, doubting, intending, etc. (Sect. 30.)

How does Locke propose to answer the man who asserts that he knows not what it is that thinks in him (*i.e.*, what the substance of that thinking thing is)?—By stating that he knows not what the substance of body is. (Sect. 23.)

How would he answer the further objection that may be made—asserting that we do not know how we think?—By stating that neither do we know how we are extended.

What is Locke's opinion regarding the various modifications of power possessed by different beings?—Pure Spirit (*viz.*, God) is only active; pure matter is only passive; created spirits, since they are both active and passive, may be conjectured not to be wholly separated from matter.* (Sect. 28.)

* *Cf.* chap. xxi., sects. 2 and 4. Locke's remarks in the above passage touch closely on the theory that God is the only Real Agent, or Efficient Cause, in the Universe. This theory was first explicitly held in the beginning of the twelfth century by Algazel of Bagdad—was involved in the Cartesian Doctrine of Occasional Causes—and was afterwards fully evolved by Malebranche, and other followers of Descartes. *Vide* Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Vol. I., pp. 302, 303; Vol. II., pp. 126, 127, 389, 390; Fifth Edition. *Cf.* Stirling's Translation

* From what consideration does it seem probable to Locke, that the simple ideas received from sensation and reflection are the boundaries of our thoughts?—Sensation convinces us that there are solid, extended substances; reflection, that there are thinking ones; experience assures us of their existence, and that the one can move body by impulse, the other by thought; but, beyond these ideas, as received from their proper sources, our faculties will not reach; consequently, if we would inquire farther into their nature, causes, and manner, we perceive not the nature of extension clearer than that of thinking. (Sect. 29.)

What attribute of body seems to come nearer a contradiction, and involve in it more apparent absurdity than anything in our notion of spirit?—The infinite divisibility of any finite extension; which involves us, whether we grant or deny it, in consequences impossible to be explicated or made consistent to our apprehensions.* (Sect. 31.)

Whence arise these seeming absurdities?—Because we, knowing nothing beyond our simple ideas, received from sensation and reflection, have no knowledge of the internal constitution and true nature of things. (Sect. 32.)

of Schwegler's History of Philosophy, p. 164, *et seq.* Many philosophers (Sir William Hamilton amongst the number) assert that Dugald Stewart maintained the Doctrine in question. Although, however, Stewart does not expressly reject it, yet in one passage he observes:—"The chief objection to the doctrine of *occasional causes* is, that it presumes to decide upon a question of which human reason is altogether incompetent to judge." Dissertation, Part II., sect. 2; *cf.* Part I., chap. ii., sect. 2. (For this quotation I am indebted to Professor Monck, T.C.D.)

* *Cf.* Book IV., chap. x., sect. 18. Dean Mansel observes (Bampton Lectures, p. 98, Fifth Edition), that the assumption of a finite divisibility of extension is equally incomprehensible; it being as impossible to conceive an ultimate unit, or least possible extension, as it is to conceive the process of division carried on to infinity.

How do we get our idea of God from sensation and reflection?—By joining infinity to our ideas of existence, duration, power, knowledge, pleasure, and happiness, etc.* (Sects. 33-35.)

Locke observes, that there is no attribute of God, save one, which we do not attribute to other spirits; what attribute does he except?—Infinity. (Sect. 36.)

Although it is impossible, from the limitation of our ideas to those derived from sensation and reflection, that we can certainly know how other spirits communicate their thoughts to each other, nevertheless we are bound to conclude something concerning this matter?—As beings who have greater knowledge and happiness than we possess, spirits must needs have a more perfect way of communicating their thoughts than we who are compelled to use corporeal signs and particular sounds.†

* Locke draws a three-fold conclusion from his consideration of our ideas of Substances?—He thinks that the foregoing discussion will render evident three things;—1°. That all our ideas of the several sorts of substances are nothing but collections of simple ideas, with a supposition of something to which they belong, and in which they subsist; though of this “supposed something” we have no clear distinct idea at all. 2°. That all the simple ideas which, thus united in one common substratum, make up our complex ideas of several sorts of substances, are no other but such as we have received from sensation or reflection.‡

* Cf. chap. xvii.; Book III., chap. vi., sect. 11; Book IV., chap. x.

† Cf. sect. 13; chap. ii., sect. 3. This question has been proposed in the following terms:—“What remark does Locke make about spirits’ mode of communicating with each other; why does he do so, and how does it appear to contradict other remarks of his?” (College Examination Papers.)

‡ Cf. note, page 98.

3°. That most of the simple ideas which make up our complex ideas of substances, when truly considered, are only powers, however we are apt to take them for positive qualities. (Sect. 37.)

CHAPTER XXIV.

Of Collective Ideas of Substances.

BESIDES complex ideas of several single substances, we have complex collective ideas of substances; why does Locke so call the latter?—Because these ideas are made up of many particular substances considered together as united into one idea, and which, so joined, are looked on as one; *e.g.*, an army, the world.* (Sect. 1.)

How are these collective ideas of substances made?—By the mind's power of composition. (Sect. 2.)

Locke says that there are no things so remote, or so contrary, which the mind cannot, by its art of composition, bring into one idea; what remarkable example of this does he give?—The idea signified by the name Universe. (Sect. 3.)

CHAPTERS XXV. AND XXVI.

Of Relations; including that of Cause and Effect.

WHENCE arises the idea of Relation?—Relation and respect arise when the mind so considers one thing, that it does, as it were, bring it to, and set it by another, and carry its view from the one to the other. (Chap. xxv., sect. 1.)

* Cf. chap. xii., sect. 6; *vide* page 55.

When are terms said to be related?—When they are so brought together and viewed by the mind.

What are EXTERNAL DENOMINATIONS?—Names which, when duly considered, include evident relations; the relation implied by these terms is not so easily taken notice of as that of relatives, on account of the want of correlative terms. (Sect. 2.)

Besides relations expressed respectively by relative terms and external denominations, Locke mentions a third class?—Terms which, although seemingly absolute, contain relations, *e.g.*, old, great, imperfect. (Sect. 3.)

Locke notices a further consideration concerning ideas of relation?—They may be the same in men who have far different ideas of the things related, or compared, *e.g.*, we may have far different ideas of a man, and yet may agree in the notion of a father. (Sect. 4.)

Where alone can relation take place?—Where there are two ideas or things, either in themselves really separate, or considered as distinct; and also a ground or occasion for their comparison. (Sect. 6.)

Locke mentions four important considerations with respect to relation in general?—I. THERE IS NO ONE THING, whether simple idea, substance, mode, or relation, or name of any of them, WHICH IS NOT CAPABLE OF CONSIDERATION IN REFERENCE TO OTHER THINGS. (Sect. 7.) II. THE IDEAS OF RELATIONS ARE OFTEN CLEARER THAN OF THE SUBJECTS RELATED: the reason of this is, because the knowledge of one action, or one simple idea, is often sufficient to give the notion of a relation, but to have a knowledge of a substantial being, an accurate collection of various simple ideas is necessary. (Sect. 8.) III. ALL RELATIONS “TERMINATE IN, AND ARE CONCERNED ABOUT,”* THE SIMPLE

* By these words, Locke expresses the connexion between Relations and Simple Ideas of Experience.

IDEAS OF SENSATION AND REFLECTION. (Sect. 9.) IV. TERMS LEADING THE MIND BEYOND THE SUBJECT DENOMINATED ARE RELATIVE. (Sect. 10.)

By what mode of proof does Locke attempt to show that all relations terminate in simple ideas?—By an *a fortiori* induction; the principal relations which he considers are those which seem most remote from this original, *e.g.*, cause and effect, identity and diversity, right and wrong,* etc. Sect. 9; *cf.* chap. xii., sect. 8; note, page 56.)

The relation of Cause and Effect is a most important one to consider?—It is the most comprehensive relation, wherein all things that do or can exist are concerned. (Sect. 11.)

Whence do we get the ideas of Cause and Effect?—From observing in the constant vicissitudes of things, that several particular qualities and substances begin to exist, and that they receive their existence from the due application and operation of some other being.† (Chap. xxvi., sect. 1.)

Define "Cause"?—"That which produces any simple or complex idea," (chap. xxvi., sect. 1;) "That which

* Locke treats of identity and diversity in chap. xxvii., and of right and wrong (or moral relations), etc., in chap. xxviii. In his discussion of Relations, Locke distinctly recognises the province of the Reason, or Intellect, in regard to them:—in chap. xxv., sect. 9, he tells us that "All Relations *terminate in, and are concerned about*, those simple ideas, either of Sensation or Reflection, which I think to be the whole materials of all our knowledge." (*Cf.* note, page 98.) In sect. 4 of the same chapter, he tells us that "The notion of a father is a notion *superinduced to* the substance, or man."

† Dean Mansel observes, (*Prolegomena Logica*, p. 146), that in chap. xxvi., Locke erroneously regards the *production* of change as perceptible by the senses; the other and very different origin suggested by the same philosopher, in chap. xxi., is the germ of the theory of Maine de Biran. *Cf.* note, page 88.

makes any other thing, whether simple idea, substance, or mode, begin to be." (Sect. 2.*)

Define "Effect"?—"That which has its beginning from some other thing." (Sect. 2.)

The originals of things may be distinguished into two sorts?—1°. CREATION; when the thing is wholly made new, so that no part of it existed before. 2°. GENERATION, MAKING, and ALTERATION; when the thing is made up of particles, all of which previously existed, but yet never existed in that particular form.

What is GENERATION?—The production of any being by an internal principle working insensibly, but set to work and received from some external agent or cause.

What is MAKING?—The production of any being by an extrinsical cause, working by a sensible separation or juxtaposition of discernible parts.

What is ALTERATION?—The production of a simple idea not existing in the subject before.

We may observe that the notion of Cause and Effect has its rise from ideas received by sensation or reflection?—In order to have the idea of cause and effect, it is sufficient to consider any simple idea as beginning to exist by the operation of some other, without knowing the manner of that operation.

Locke mentions some other ideas which are the foundations of very extensive relations?—Time and Place, in which all finite beings are concerned, and Extension; he remarks that in these the denominations given to the relations are, in many cases, seemingly absolute terms, *e.g.*, old and young; great and little. (Chap. xxvi., sects. 3-6; *cf.* chap. xxv., sect 3.)

* *Cf.* chap. xxii., sect. II.

What remarkable example does Locke give of two seemingly absolute terms, which are in fact relative?—In the proposition, “the ship has necessary stores,” the terms “necessary” and “stores” are apparently absolute, while in reality they are relative, the former referring to the accomplishing of the voyage, and the latter to future use.* (Sect. 6.)

* Professor Webb observes (*Intellectualism of Locke*, p. 178) that Locke's doctrine of Relation, as developed in the Second Book, is utterly unintelligible without a constant reference to the doctrine of Intuitive Knowledge, as developed in the Fourth.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

Of Words, or Language in General.

FROM three circumstances we are led to conclude that God has intended man for a social being?—He is laid 1°. under an inclination, and 2°. a necessity to have intercourse with his fellow-men; 3°. he is furnished also with language, the great instrument and common tie of society. (Sect. 1.)

There are three requisites for the perfection of language?—1°. Man should have his organs fashioned so as to be able to frame articulate sounds or words. 2°. He should make these words signs of internal conceptions. 3°. He should be able to employ general terms. (Sects. 1-3.)

In order to produce language, the first of these conditions is insufficient?—Parrots and other birds can make articulate sounds, while altogether incapable of language. (Sect. 1.)

Whence arises the necessity of the third condition?—If every particular thing had a distinct name, the multiplication of words would perplex their use.* (Sect. 3.)

* Cf. chap. III.

Besides names that stand for ideas, there is another class called "negative words;" explain what is meant by these?—They are words which men make use of, not to signify any idea, but the want or absence of some simple or complex idea, or of all ideas together, *e.g.*, nihil, ignorance, barrenness;* properly speaking, however, they relate to positive ideas, and signify their absence. (Sect. 4.)

Locke notices an etymological consideration which would seem to prove that all our ideas were ultimately derived from sensation?—Words which are used to stand for actions and notions quite removed from sense have their rise thence, and from obvious sensible ideas are transferred to more abstruse significations, and represent ideas not coming under the cognizance of our senses; *e.g.*, *imagine*, *apprehend*, *comprehend*, *adhere*, *conceive*, *instil*, *disgust*, *disturbance*, *tranquillity*, etc., are all words taken from the operations of sensible things, and applied to modes of thinking; *spirit*, in its first signification, is *breath*, and *angel*, a *messenger*.† (Sect. 5.)

* Cf. Book II., chap. viii., sect. 5; *vide* page 30. Locke notices a third class of words, chap. vii., sect. 1, viz., PARTICLES, or "words which signify the connexion that the mind gives to ideas or propositions one with another." The part of Grammar which treats of these terms, he thinks, has been much neglected. (Chap. vii., sect. 3.)

† Cf. Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, Vol. I., pp. 134, 135, Fifth Edition. Scarcely any passage in the writings of Locke has had more objections brought against it, or been the subject of more vehement controversy, than the one now under consideration. Locke has been charged with having been the Founder of the Sensual School of Philosophy, which arose in France in the eighteenth century, and which had Condillac, Helvetius, Diderot, Condorcet, Degerando, Cabanis, Laromiguière, Volney, and many others, amongst its most eminent exponents. In England, David Hartley (born 1704—the year in which Locke died,) promulgated a theory identical in principle with that of Condillac, although, unlike the French philosophers, he clearly recognized

* Locke conjectures that the previous consideration would tend to show us how nature, in the naming of things, un-awares suggested to men the originals and principles of all

the difference between his theory and that of Locke's. (Hartley, *Observations on Man*, Introd.) The "Hartleian School," as it was called afterwards, comprised amongst its members, Priestly, Darwin, Horne Tooke, and others. All these philosophers held that the sum total of our knowledge has its origin and foundation in sense (hence the terms Sensual and Sensational), and their doctrine was carried to its fullest development by Destutt de Tracy, who boldly announced "*penser c'est sentir*." Condorcet distinctly declares that "Locke was the first who proved that *all our ideas are compounded of sensations*." The doctrine of the Sensualists coincided with that of Gassendi (born in Provence 1592, died at Paris 1655—a defender of the system of Epicurus, and a great opponent of Descartes), who declared in a letter to Descartes :—"Deinde omnis nostra notitia videtur plane ducere originem a sensibus ; et quamvis tu neges 'quicquid est in intellectu præesse debere in sensu,' videtur id esse nihilominus verum, cum nisi sola incursione *κατὰ ἀφῆρτον*, ut loquuntur, fiat ; perficiatur tamen analogiâ, compositione, divisione, ampliacione, extenuacione, aliisque similibus modis, quos commemorare nihil est necesse." Condillac afterwards stated Gassendi's theory more precisely, thus :—"Our ideas are nothing more than *transformed sensations*." The question, therefore, to be decided is—Do Locke's opinions coincide with those of Gassendi, or do they not? Amongst those who have answered this question in the affirmative may be enumerated Sir William Hamilton, Victor Cousin, Dr. Albert Schweigler, Gottlieb Tenneman, and Dr. Whewell ; those who answer it in the negative may be divided into two classes : first, those who, like Dugald Stewart, endeavour to vindicate Locke from the charge of Sensualism and Materialism, by enlarging the functions attributed by Locke to Reflection, and second, those who, like Professor Webb, reject Stewart's method of justification as erroneous, and emphatically assert that Locke clearly recognised the Reason, Intellect, or Understanding, as a Third Source of Ideas, apart from Sensation and Reflection. A brief examination of the opinions of some of these philosophers will be advantageous.

Dugald Stewart admits that if Condorcet's statement respecting Locke's opinion be correct, it would follow that Locke had not advanced

their knowledge?—In the beginning of language, men were compelled to borrow words from ideas of sensation, in order to give names to any internal mental operations, or any other

a single step beyond Gassendi and Hobbes, both of whom repeatedly expressed themselves in nearly the same words with Diderot and Condorcet. In proof, however, of the assertion that Locke considered Reflection as a source of ideas altogether different from Sensation, Stewart quotes from the following passages of the Essay :—Book II., chap. i., sects. 4, 5, 7, 8, 23, 24; chap. xxiii., sects. 22, 23, 28, 29. He adds, moreover, that the idea attached by Locke to the term “Reflection” in the above passages is clear and precise; but he thinks that Locke sometimes employs the word in a more popular and extended sense as denoting “the attentive and deliberate consideration of any object of thought, whether relating to the external or internal world,” and that it is in this sense he employs it, when he refers to Reflection our Ideas of Cause and Effect, Identity and Diversity, and of *all other relations*. Lastly, Stewart asserts that “The word ‘Reflection’ expresses the peculiar and characteristic doctrine by which Locke’s system is distinguished from that of the Gassendists and Hobbists.” (Stewart, Dissertation, Part II., sect. 1.) Mr. Lewes (History of Philosophy, Vol. II., p. 253) notes with approval Dugald Stewart’s “ample exposure of the wide-spread error that Locke was the chief of the so-called Sensational School,” and thinks that Locke’s remarks in Book IV., chap. x., sect. 6, are in themselves a sufficient refutation of such a charge. Sir William Hamilton regards Locke and Gassendi as exactly upon a par, and both as deriving all our knowledge from experience; he furthermore declares that no interpretation of Locke can ever pretend to find in his Reflection a revelation to him of aught native or necessary to the mind beyond the capability to act and suffer in certain manners—a capability which no philosophy ever dreamt of denying. Sir William next proceeds to correct a “fundamental error in Mr. Stewart,” when he states that the term “Reflection” was first employed by Locke in its psychological signification, by showing that Gassendi held such a faculty as Reflection, and even attributed to it far higher functions than did the English philosopher. (Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, Lect. xxix.) Schwegler calls Locke “the Father of Modern Materialism and Empiricism,” and declares that “*Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu*” is the watchword of his position. (Stirling’s Translation of

ideas that came not under the senses, and so make them known to others; having thus got words to express these operations, they were sufficiently furnished with words to

Schwegler's History of Philosophy, pp. 177-181.) Tenneman says, "In Locke, the two ultimate sources of all our representations are Impressions through the external senses, and Reflection, or the perception of the operations of our minds; which has caused his system to be called one of Sensationalism, since he gives even to Reflection the appellation of an Internal Sense." (Johnson's Translation of Tenneman's History of Philosophy, pp. 325, 326, Bohn's Edition.) Cousin follows in a similar strain, and asserts that Locke opened the route to the theory of *sensation transformed*, by adding to Sensation only faculties whose sole office is to operate upon it without any original power of their own. (Henry's Translation of Cousin's Psychology, p. 125, *et al.*)

It now remained for Professor Webb to refute both Stewart, as the defender, and Hamilton, as the opponent of Locke, and declare "The Intellectualism of Locke." I have pointed out, in several passages of my Analysis, how Locke recognised the Intellect as a Third Source of Ideas, and cannot but express my regret that Professor Webb's able and interesting work is now out of print. Although it must be conceded that Locke has frequently followed in the footsteps of Gassendi, yet it is extremely unfair and erroneous to regard the opinions of the two philosophers as identical. If, indeed, Stewart's *sole* object were to vindicate Locke from the charge of *Materialism*, he must be allowed to have succeeded; but his method of proof fails to show that Locke held any *a priori* source of knowledge, since, in order to be an *Empiricist*, it is not necessary to deny a special faculty of Reflection.

Leibnitz, who represents Locke as a partisan of the Scholastic Maxim "*Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu*," accepted the adage, but he accepted it as only half the truth, and accordingly added (what Madame de Staël called "*cette sublime restriction*"), "*nisi ipse intellectus*." Dugald Stewart considers the addition of Leibnitz excellent, and a strong proof of the acuteness of the critic, but remarks that it only conveys in a more precise and epigrammatic form the words of Locke himself in Book II., chap. i., sect. 5; and further, that the words of Leibnitz are little more than a translation of the following passage of Aristotle (De Anima, Book III., chap. v.):—*Καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ νοῦς νοητὸς ἑστίν, ὥσπερ τὰ νοητά· ἵνα μὴ γὰρ εἴη ἄνω ὄντι, εὐδ αὐτὸ ἑστὶ το νοῦν καὶ*

make known all their ideas.* This is agreeable to his theory concerning the origin of our ideas.

What two questions† does Locke propose to consider, in order to understand the use and force of language as subservient to instruction and knowledge?—1°. What it is that names are immediately applied to in the use of language. 2°. (a) What the sorts and kinds (or *species* and *genera*) of

τὸ νοούμενον. (Stewart, Dissertation, Part I., chap. ii., and Part II., sect. I.)

The opinion of two eminent philosophers of our own day, on the celebrated emendation of Leibnitz, are especially worthy of consideration:—“If Phillis were to say to Amaryllis, ‘There is nothing in the cheese-vat which was not previously in the milk-pail,’ and Amaryllis were to add, ‘except the cheese-vat itself,’ the addition would be regarded as palpably unmeaning.” Webb, *Intellectualism of Locke*, p. 85.—“Except as a verbal jingle, how trivial is the expression—the intellect *in* the intellect! Suppose a man to say, ‘I have no money in my purse, except my purse itself,’ he would scarcely be less absurd. For when the schoolmen said, ‘Nothing was in the intellect which was not previously in the sense,’ they did not mean that the intellect was the same as the sense; they meant that the intellect was furnished with no ideas, notions, or conceptions, which had not been furnished them by sense; they meant that the senses were the inlets of the soul.” Lewes, *History of Philosophy*, Vol. II., pp. 254, 255.

Dean Mansel thinks, that when Locke called “Reflection” “Internal Sense” (Book II., chap. i., sect. 4; *cf.* chap. xi., sect. 17) he meant by such designation, “the consciousness of internal phenomena taking place in the mind itself.” For some valuable remarks of the same author on Locke’s different employment of the term “Reflection” in various portions of his *Essay*, *vide* *Metaphysics*, pp. 54, 67, 68, and pp. 143-145, Second Edition. In connection with this subject, *cf.* Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Vol. II., pp. 11, 24, 195, Fifth Edition; Bain, *The Senses and the Intellect*, p. 442, and p. 445, *Note*, Third Edition.

* For Cousin’s remarks on this subject, *vide* my Appendix.

† These are the two principal questions discussed in Book III.

things are, (*b*) wherein they consist, and (*c*) how they come to be made. (Sect. 6.)

A three-fold benefit, Locke thinks, may result from these inquiries?—We shall better come to find 1°. The right use of words. 2°. The natural advantages and defects of language; 3°. The remedies that ought to be used, to avoid the inconveniences of obscurity or uncertainty in the signification of words.*

CHAPTER II.

Of the Signification of Words.

WHENCE arises the necessity of some fixed system of sensible signs amongst men?—The comfort and advantage of society being impossible of attainment without communication of thoughts, it is necessary for man to make known his invisible ideas to others by external sensible signs. (Sect. 1.)

Three reasons may be assigned why words were selected as instruments for the communication of the thoughts of men one to another?—1°. The abundance man may form, 2°. The quickness, and 3°. The facility with which they can be made.

Locke uses two arguments to show that there is no natural connexion between any particular sound and any particular idea?—1°. If this were so, there would be only one language amongst men. (Sect. 1.) 2°. Words often fail to

* In sect. 6 Locke lays down the Plan of his Third Book; chap. ii., treats of the Signification of Words; chap. iii., of General Terms; chap. ix., of the Imperfection of Words; and chap. xi., of the Remedies of the Abuse of Words.

excite in other men (even that use the same language) the same ideas we take them to be the signs of. (Sect. 8.)

What is the use of words?—To be sensible marks of ideas. (Sect. 1.)

What do words in their primary signification stand for?—Ideas in the mind of him that uses them. (Sect. 2.)

Men in their thoughts often give words a secret reference to two other things?—1°. TO THE IDEAS IN OTHER MEN'S MINDS. 2°. TO THE REALITY OF THINGS. The first of these applies more particularly to names of simple ideas and modes; the second to substances, and their names. (Sects. 4 and 5.)

Locke makes two further remarks concerning words?—1°. Words by use readily excite ideas.* (Sect. 6.) 2°. Words are often used without signification. This is occasioned by learning them without examining or learning their signification.† (Sect. 7.)

Locke quotes an instance in order to show that no one has the power to make others have the same ideas in their minds as he has, when they both use the same words?—The great Augustus acknowledged that he could not make one new Latin word. This was equivalent to saying that he could not arbitrarily appoint what idea any sound should represent in the language of his subjects. (Sect. 8.)

* Cf. Book II., chap. xxxiii.

† Cf. chap. x., sects. 2-5.

CHAPTER III.

Of General Terms.

WHY are the greater part of words general terms?—1°. For every particular thing to have a name is impossible.* (Sect. 2.) 2°. If possible, it would be useless, because it would not serve to the chief end of language.† (Sect. 3.) 3°. It would not be of any great use for the improvement of knowledge. (Sect. 4.)

Give a reason for the impossibility of assigning a name to every individual thing?—In the application of names to things, it is necessary that the mind should have distinct ideas of the things, and, at the same time, retain the particular name that belongs to every one, with its peculiar appropriation to that idea. (Sect. 2.)

What things have proper names?—Those which men have often an occasion to mark particularly, and set before others in their discourses with them; such as persons, countries, cities, rivers, mountains, etc.‡ (Sect. 5.)

* Cf. chap. i., sect. 3; Mr. Mill thinks (*Logic*, Vol. II., p. 213, Seventh Edition) that even if there were a name for every individual object, we should require general names as much as we now do. Without them we could not express the result of a single comparison, nor record any one of the uniformities existing in nature; and should be hardly better off in respect to Induction than if we had no names at all.

† Cf. chap. v., sect. 7; chap. vi., sect. 33; chap. x., sect. 23; Book II., chap. xviii., sect. 7; chap. xxii., sect. 5.

‡ In chap. vi., sect., 42, he remarks;—"This is further to be observed concerning substances, that they alone of all our several sorts of ideas have particular or proper names, whereby one only particular thing is signified."

How do general words come to be made?—Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas. (Sect. 6.)

How do ideas become general?—By ABSTRACTION, *i.e.*, by separating from them the circumstances of time and place, and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence.*

In considering this matter a little more distinctly, Locke gives an instance which shows the various steps in the mental process of forming general ideas?—1°. When children first use the terms “nurse” or “mamma,” they confine these names to those individuals. 2°. Afterwards, when they learn, by experience, that a great many other things in the world resemble these persons in some common agreements of shape, and several other qualities, they frame an idea wherein is included the qualities in which the several particulars agree, to the exclusion of qualities peculiar to each

* Cf. Book II., chap. xi., sect. 9; chap. xii., sect. 1. Bishop Berkeley, and subsequently Hume, denied altogether the possibility of the existence of any such process of Abstraction as that described by Locke, (*vide* Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge*, Introd., sect. 10.) Dean Mansel expresses his concurrence with Berkeley’s remarks, and adds that the error of Locke consisted in regarding Abstraction *as a positive act of thought, instead of the mere negation of thought*, since Abstraction is nothing more than “non-attention to certain parts of an object.” (*Prolegomena Logica*, pp. 30-37; *cf.* *Metaphysics*, pp. 214-220, Second Edition.) Sir William Hamilton, also, asserts that “Abstraction is no positive act; it is merely the ‘negation of attention.’” (*Lectures on Metaphysics*, Lect. xxxv., Vol. II., p. 292; *cf.* *Lect. xxxiv.* The correctness of the views of Hamilton and Mansel, in regarding Abstraction as wholly a negative process, remains yet to be seen; a more accurate statement of the fact would, I think, be to assert that Abstraction may be considered in a two-fold point of view;—in the one as Attention, and in the other as Non-Attention. *Cf.* Hamilton’s own statements, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Vol. II., pp. 287, 293.

of them ; to this they give a name, *e.g.*, "man." Thus they come to have a general name, and a general idea, wherein they make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex ideas of several particular things, those qualities which are peculiar to each, and retain those common to them all. (Sect. 7.) 3°. By the same way that they arrive at the general name and idea of "man," they easily advance to more general names and notions, *e.g.*, "animal."* (Sect. 8.)

Locke notices that the doctrine of the schoolmen respecting *genera* and *species* was, at one time, considered to be of great importance. Give a brief summary of his opinion on this subject?—(a) *Genera* and *species* are nothing else than abstract ideas, more or less comprehensive, with names annexed to them. (Sect. 9.) (b.) General natures or notions are nothing else but abstract and partial ideas of more complex ones taken at first from particular existences. (Sect. 9.) (c) General and universal belong not to the real existence of things, but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, whether words or ideas. (Sect. 11.) (d) The general nature of abstract ideas is nothing but the capacity they are

* Cf. chap. vi., sect. 32. This is similar to the theory propounded by Adam Smith, which may thus be briefly stated :—A name is first assigned to an individual, then transferred to all the individuals that have a resemblance to the first, and, thirdly, generalized into a symbol of the points in which the individuals agree, to the exclusion of those in which they differ.—Smith, *Dissertation on the Origin of Languages*, quoted by Dugald Stewart, *Elements*, Vol. I., chap. iv., sect. 1, and by Sir William Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Lect. xxxvi. Cf. Condillac, *Essai sur l'Origine des Connoissances Humaines*; Webb, *Intellectualism of Locke*, Appendix, p. 188. For the different theories held by philosophers respecting the "*Primum Cognitum*," vide Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Lect. xxxvi., Vol. II., p. 319, *et seq.*, Fifth Edition.

put into by the understanding of signifying or representing several particulars. (Sect. 11.)

What is the meaning of DEFINITION?—The explaining of one word by several others, so that the meaning or idea it stands for may be certainly known.* (Sect. 10.)

How, according to Locke, would a definition be best made? What is his opinion respecting the ordinary method of defining by *genus* and *differentia*?—He considers a definition would best be made by enumerating those simple ideas that are combined in the signification of the term defined. The ordinary method, although the shortest, is probably not the best, and has not been adopted out of necessity, or for greater clearness, but for the sake of quickness and despatch.

He illustrates his views of definition by a particular example?—If an inquirer were told that the word “man” meant “a solid extended substance, having life, sense, spontaneous motion, and the faculty of reasoning,” he would doubtless understand the meaning of the term, and know what idea it stood for, as clearly, at least, as the ordinary definition—viz., “a rational animal”—could make it to him.

Two reasons may be assigned why definition by *genus* and *differentia* is usually resorted to?—1°. To save the labour of enumerating the several simple ideas which the next general word or *genus* stands for. 2°. Sometimes the shame of not being able to do so.

What consideration shows that the ordinary method of definition, far from being absolutely necessary, is not always possible?—Languages, as experience proves, are not always

* In chap. iv., sect. 6, Locke explains definition as “the showing the meaning of one word by several other not synonymous terms.” (Cf. chap. iv., sect. 12.) The test of a good definition is, that it set before the view of another the idea in the mind of the speaker.

so made according to the rules of logic that every term can have its signification exactly and clearly expressed by two others.*

In considering what kind of signification it is that general words have, Locke suggests three possible explanations, adopting one, and refuting the others?—1°. They do not signify *one particular thing*, for then they would not be general terms, but proper names. 2°. They do not signify *a plurality*, for then the grammatical distinction of number would be superfluous, *e.g.*, “man” and “men” would have the same signification. 3°. What they really signify is *a sort of things*, and each of them does that by being a sign of an abstract idea in the mind.† (Sect. 12.)

From this consideration of the nature of general terms, Locke thinks it evident that essences of the sorts, or *species* of things, are only abstract ideas; how does he proceed to prove this?—By a *SORITES*;‡—The having of the essence of any species makes a thing to be of that species; to be of any species is to have a right to the name of that species; to have a right to the name is to have a conformity to the idea to which the name is annexed; therefore having the essence of any species, and having conformity to the abstract idea, must needs be the same thing.

* What share does Locke allow to Nature in the making of abstract general ideas, and what is the peculiar province of the understanding in regard to them?—Nature, in the

* He here proposes to defer the further consideration of definitions till chapter iv.

† This is a disjunctive syllogism. *Cf.* his remarks, sect. 6, where he states that each individual, represented by a general idea, “*having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as we call it) of that sort.*”

‡ For the meaning of this term, the ordinary student is referred to Murray's Logic, Part III., chap. ix.

production of things, makes several of them alike ; but the sorting of them under names is the workmanship of the understanding, taking occasion, from the similitude it observes amongst them, to make abstract general ideas, and set them up in the mind, with names annexed to them, as patterns or forms.* (Sect. 13.)

* The supposed real essences of substances, if different from our abstract ideas, cannot be the essences of the species we rank things into?—As Locke has proved, the essences of species, set out and marked by names, are nothing but abstract ideas in the mind ; and when general names have any connexion with particular beings, these abstract ideas are the mediums which unite them ; so that the essences of species can be nothing but the precise abstract ideas we have in our minds.

* What consideration tends to prove that essences, or abstract ideas, are the workmanship of the understanding ; and give instances in point?—The complex ones are often, in several men, different collections of simple ideas ; thus, we see that what is *covetousness* to one man is not so to another ; even the abstract ideas of substances, which seem to be taken from the things themselves, are not constantly the same ; e.g., it has often been doubted whether the fœtus born of a woman were a man, and disputes have arisen whether or not it ought to be nourished or baptized, which could not be, if the abstract idea or essence to which the name “man” belonged were of nature’s making.† (Sect. 14.)

The word “Essence” may be used in two significations?—1°. The proper original signification, (from *essentia*=being) the being of anything, whereby it is what it is. This is

* “Forms,” in this sense, are ideas taken from things, and set up in the mind as more perfect models ; e.g., “justice,” “a circle.”

† Cf. chap. vi. ; Book IV., chap. iv., sects. 14-16.

called THE REAL ESSENCE. 2°. The word has been almost wholly applied to the artificial constitution of *genus* and *species*. This is called the NOMINAL ESSENCE.* (Sect. 15.)

Concerning the real essence of corporeal substances, there are, if Locke mistake not, two opinions?—1°. The opinion of those who, using the word “essence” for they know not what, suppose a certain number of those essences, according to which all natural things are made, and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake, and so become of this or that species. 2°. The second and more rational opinion is of those who look on all natural things to have a real but unknown constitution of their insensible parts, from which flow those sensible qualities, which serve us to distinguish them one from another, according as we have occa-

* Cf. sect. 18 ; chap. vi., sects. 2 and 6. Compare also the following passages :—“The objective tendency of Locke’s unmetaphysical mind led him to a clear recognition of the scholastic error respecting Essences, *i.e.*, the existence of entities corresponding to general terms. He showed that what had for centuries been regarded as essences of classes were merely the signification of their *names*; and I agree with Mr. Mill in considering this among the most valuable of the many services Locke rendered to philosophy.”—Lewes, *History of Philosophy*, Vol. II., p. 252.—“A fundamental error is seldom expelled from philosophy by a single victory. . . . The essences of individuals were an unmeaning figment arising from a misapprehension of the essences of classes, yet even Locke, when he extirpated the parent error, could not shake himself free from that which was its fruit. He distinguished two sorts of essences, Real and Nominal. But, besides nominal essences, he admitted real essences, or essences of individual objects, which he supposed to be the causes of the sensible properties of those objects. We know not (said he) what these are (and this acknowledgment rendered the fiction comparatively innocuous;) but if we did, we could, from them alone, demonstrate the sensible properties of the object, as the properties of the triangle are demonstrated from the definition of the triangle.”—Mill, *Logic*, Vol. I., pp. 125, 126, (*cf.* p. 195); *Seventh Edition*.

sion to rank them into sorts under common denominations.* (Sect. 17.)

Against the first of these opinions two objections may be urged?—1°. An *a priori* objection: the frequent production of monsters in all the species of animals, and of changelings and other strange issues of human birth, is impossible to reconcile with this hypothesis. 2°. An *a posteriori* objection: the supposition of essences that cannot be known, and the making of them, nevertheless, to be that which distinguishes the species of things, is wholly useless and unserviceable to any part of our knowledge.†

Locke considers that the scholastic doctrine of the immutability of essences proves them to be only abstract ideas?—It is manifest that the doctrine that “essences are ingenerable and incorruptible,” cannot be true of the real constitutions of things, which begin and perish with them. (Sect. 19.)

* On what is this doctrine of the immutability of essences founded?—On the relation established between the essences

* Cf. chap. vi.; chap. ix., sects. 12 and 13; Book II., chap. xxxi., sect. 6; Book IV., chap. vi., sect. 4.

† In chap. viii., sect. 2, Locke remarks that all our simple ideas have both abstract, as well as concrete names, whereof one is a substantive, and the other an adjective—*e.g.*, whiteness, white. He further observes that our ideas of substances have very few or no abstract names at all. This seems to him to intimate the confession of all mankind that they have no ideas of the real essences of substances, since they have not names for such ideas. (From this passage an answer may be obtained to the following question, proposed for Honors:—“What is the fact in language which, according to Locke, intimates a confession that men have no ideas of real essences?”) For definitions of the terms “abstract” and “concrete,” *vide* Mill, *Logic*, Vol. I., p. 29, Seventh Edition: Whately, *Logic*, p. 81; Thomson, *Outline of the Laws of Thought*, p. 95.

and certain sounds as signs of them ; it will accordingly be always true, as long as the same name can have the same signification.

CHAPTER IV.

Of the Names of Simple Ideas.

LOCKE observes that the names of simple ideas, mixed modes,* and substances, have each of them something peculiar and different from the other ; what difference exists between the names of simple ideas and substances, as distinguished from mixed modes ?—The names of both the former intimate real existence, the names of the latter do not ; since they terminate in the mind, as he proves afterwards in chap. v. (Sect. 2.)

The names of simple ideas and modes differ in common from those of substances ?—The names of both the former always signify both real and nominal essence ; those of the latter, rarely, if ever, anything but the nominal essence ; this he shows fully in chap. vi. (Sect. 3 ; cf. chap. iii., sect. 18.)

Locke enumerates four peculiarities in the names of simple ideas ?—1°. They are indefinable.† (Sect. 4.) 2°. They are least doubtful. (Sect. 15.) 3°. They have fewer ascents *in lined prædicamentali*. (Sect. 16.) 4°. They are perfectly taken from the existence of things, and are not at all arbitrary ; he observes that the names of simple modes differ very little from those of simple ideas. (Sect. 17.)

* Under Mixed Modes he comprises Relations. (Sect. 1.)

† The names of all complex ideas, he observes, are capable of definition.

Definition consisting in the showing the meaning of one word by several other not synonymous terms, three reasons may be assigned why simple ideas are indefinable?—1°. If they were definable, it would be a process *in infinitum*; for the terms of each definition would still require to be defined. (Sect. 5.) 2°. The several terms of a definition, signifying several ideas, cannot all together represent an idea which has no composition at all. (Sect 7.) 3°. Simple ideas are only to be got by those impressions objects themselves make on our minds by the proper inlets appointed to each sort.* (Sect. 11.)

What, does Locke think, is “not seldom the occasion of great wrangling and obscurity in men’s discourses”?—The want of duly considering what words are, and what are not, capable of being defined. (Sect. 4.)

Locke enumerates and criticises several attempts which have been made to define two simple ideas in particular?—

* Cf. Book IV., chap. xviii., sect. 3. Compare also the following passage :—“Another subject of dispute between different schools of philosophy is, What are the limits of definition? The Scholastic Logicians, holding that definition was by *genus* and *differentia*, very consistently laid it down as a canon, that no object was definable which could not be regarded as a Species. *Summa genera* and *individuals* were by this rule incapable of definition. On the other hand, Descartes and Locke, rejecting this restriction, maintain that *simple ideas* alone cannot be defined. Both are right, according to their different meanings of definition. With the former it signifies ‘the resolution of a complex *general concept* into the simpler concepts which it comprehends.’ With the latter, it is ‘the resolution of a complex *individual object of sense* into the simpler objects of which it is composed.’ The one is a ‘mental analysis of notions;’ the other, ‘a sensible analysis of intuitions.’ No definition, as Locke truly observes, will convey the *idea* of whiteness to a blind man—*i.e.*, it will not enable him to form a sensible image of the colour. But no definition (in the Scholastic sense) was ever intended to accomplish this object.”—Mansel, *Prolegomena Logica*, pp. 52, 53.

I. MOTION. Three classes of philosophers have attempted to define this idea : 1°. The Schoolmen, as "the act of a being in power, as far forth as in power."* 2°. The Atomists,† as "a passage from one place to another." 3°. The Cartesians, as "the successive application of the parts of the superficies of one body to those of another." The Scholastic definition is absurd, as it would never explain the nature of the idea to anybody ignorant of it. The Atomistic definition is merely putting one synonymous word for another, which is to *translate* and not to *define*; the Cartesian attempt at definition is equally futile. (Sects. 8 and 9.)

II. LIGHT. 1°. The Scholastic definition of light, viz., "the act of perspicuous, as far forth as perspicuous" is not less absurd than the one which they give of motion; yet it betrays its uselessness and insignificance more plainly from its inability to make the word light understood by a blind man. 2°. The Cartesian definition, viz., "a great number of little globules, striking briskly on the bottom of the eye," would never make a man understand what the

* "*Actus entis in potentiâ quatenus in potentiâ.*"

† The Atomists were a school of philosophers who flourished about five centuries before Christ. The foremost amongst them were Leucippus, and Democritus (born about 460 B.C.) The doctrine of these philosophers was, to adopt the language of Schwegler, "That all phenomenal specific quality was derived from a primeval infinitude of original constituents or atoms, which, alike in quality, were unlike in quantity." For further information respecting the peculiar tenets of the Atomists, *vide* Stirling's Translation of Schwegler's History of Philosophy, pp. 25-27; Lewes, History of Philosophy, Vol. I., pp. 96-103; Johnson's Translation of Tenneman's History of Philosophy, Bohn's Edition, p. 73.

Locke defines an atom as "a continued body under one immutable superficies, existing in a determined time and place."—(Book II., chap. xxvii., sect. 3.)

word light stands for, who understood it not before.* (Sect. 10.)

What incident does Locke narrate, in order to show the absurdity of any one attempting to have a simple idea without applying to his senses the proper object which may produce it?—A studious blind man, who attempted to understand the names of lights and colours, boasted to his friend that he understood what scarlet signified; upon being asked what it was, he replied, it was like the sound of a trumpet. (Sect. 11.)

Locke mentions a story of a contest between a painter and a statuary, each contending for the excellency of his art; what is the story, and for what purpose does he narrate it?—The statuary having boasted that his art was to be preferred, since even those who had lost their eyes could yet perceive the excellency of it, the painter agreed to refer the matter to the judgment of a blind man, who was accordingly brought where there was a statue made by the one, and a picture drawn by the other; upon tracing with his hands all the lineaments and features of the face and body of the statue, he, with great admiration, applauded the skill of the workman. On being led to the picture and having his hands placed on it, he was told that, now he touched the head, and then the various other parts; as his hand moved over the parts of the picture on the canvas, without finding any distinction, he cried out that this must be a very admirable and divine piece of workmanship which

* In this section, Locke observes that, no matter how exactly we possess the idea of the cause of light, it would never give us the idea of light itself; he notices with approval the Cartesian distinction between light, which is the cause of the sensation in us, and the idea which is produced in us by it, and is that which is properly light. Cf. Book II, chap. viii., sects. 2 and 7; *vide* page 31.

could represent to them all those parts where he could neither feel nor perceive anything. The painter gained the prize.

Locke tells this story in order to show that a complex idea may be explained to any one, provided he has previously experienced its elements; thus the word "statue" may be explained to a blind man by other words, when "picture" cannot; his senses having given him the idea of figure, but not of colours.* (Sect. 12.)

Why are the names of simple ideas less doubtful than those of modes and substances?—1°. Because, since the name of each stands for only one simple perception, men easily agree in their signification. 2°. There is not a multiplicity of simple ideas to be put together, which causes the doubtfulness in the names of mixed modes. 3°. There is no supposed, but unknown real essence, with an unknown number of properties dependent thereon, which makes the difficulty in the names of substances.† (Sect. 15.)

Why have simple ideas and their names fewer ascents *in lined predicamentali*—from the lowest species to the highest genus?—Because the lowest species being but one simple idea, nothing can be left out of it; that, when the difference is taken away, it may agree with some other thing in one idea common to them both, which having one name, is the genus of the other two; e.g., there is nothing that can be left out of White and Red to make them agree in one common appearance, and so have one general name. (Sect. 16.)

On what principle then, do we enumerate several simple

* He gives another instance of this in the word "rainbow" which cannot be defined, so as to be understood by a blind man. (Sect. 13.)

† Cf. chap. ix., sect. 18.

ideas under one general name?—When to avoid unpleasant enumeration we classify them, we do so by a word *denoting the way they get into the mind*; e.g.—When Red, White, Yellow, etc., are comprehended under the term “Colour,” it signifies merely that such ideas are produced in the mind only by the sight, and have entrance only through the eyes.

CHAPTER V.*

Of the Names of Mixed Modes and Relations.

THE names of mixed modes have two peculiarities?—1°. The essences of species, or (as Locke prefers to call them), the abstract ideas which these names stand for are made by the understanding; herein they differ from those of simple ideas. (Sect. 2.) 2°. These essences are made arbitrarily, and without patterns, or reference to any real existence; herein they differ from those of substances. (Sect. 3.)

In the making of complex ideas, the mind performs three operations?—1°. It chooses a certain number of those ideas which it has already. 2°. It gives them connexion, and makes them into one idea. 3°. It ties them together by a name. (Sect. 4.)

Locke adduces two arguments in order to show that the mind proceeds arbitrarily in making the essences of the species of mixed modes?—1°. They are evidently arbitrary, since a species can be constituted before any one individual of that species ever existed; a remarkable instance of

* With this chapter, *cf.* Book II., chap, xxii., *passim*.

this is, that the "Resurrection" was necessarily a species of mixed mode in the mind, before it really existed. (Sect. 5.)

2°. They are evidently arbitrary, since (*a*) we may observe several words in one language which have none answering to them in another; this could not have happened if they were the steady workmanship of nature, and not collections made and abstracted by the mind for the convenience of communication. Again, (*b*) we may observe that, although the words in original languages and their translations, respectively, are supposed to be equivalent, nevertheless there is scarcely one-tenth of the names of complex ideas (especially of mixed modes) that stand for the same idea; *e.g.*, the words *hora*, *pes*, *libra*, and their respective translations, *hour*, *foot*, *pound*, stand for totally different ideas. (Sect. 8.)

For what purpose does Locke take such particular notice of these non-correspondences between different languages?—In order to guard us against the error of supposing that *genera* and *species*, and their essences, are things regularly and constantly made by nature, and have a real existence in things, instead of being, as they really are, merely an artifice of the understanding, as he has shown. (Sect. 9.)

We are not to suppose, however (although the mind can make the complex ideas of mixed modes with great liberty, since they are all dependent on it), that it proceeds free from all limitation?—The mind never gives connexion to several simple ideas, and combines them into one, unless it be for the convenience of communication, which is the chief end of language.* (Sect. 7.)

What is the use of language?—By short sounds to signify with ease and despatch general conceptions.

* Cf. note, page 120.

What consideration will convince us of the near relationship existing (at least in mixed modes) between species, essences, and their general names?—That it is the name that seems to preserve those essences, and give them their lasting duration, *e.g.*, How many different ideas the word *triumphus* holds together! (Sect. 10.)

* The arbitrary character of mixed modes enables us to account for five things?—1°. Men make use of only such mixed modes as are set out by name.* (Sect. 11.) 2°. Their names lead our thoughts to the mind and no farther; hence he thinks, as before observed, that essences of the species of mixed modes are with great propriety called NOTIONS, “as by a peculiar right appertaining to the understanding.”† (Sect. 12.) 3°. The complex ideas of mixed modes are generally more compounded and decomposed than those of natural substances, as is instanced in the word “procession.” (Sect. 13.) 4°. The names of mixed modes, as being formed by the mind, always signify the real essences of their species. (Sect. 14.) 5°. The names of mixed modes are got for the most part before the ideas they stand for are perfectly known; he allows, however, that in the beginning of languages men must have got the idea before they annexed the name to it. (Sect. 15.) Locke thinks that what has been said of mixed modes is, with very little difference, applicable to relations also.‡ (Sect. 16.)

* As an instance of this he remarks :—“Thus we see that killing a man with a sword or a hatchet are looked on as no distinct species of action; but if the point of the sword first enter the body, it passes for a distinct species, where it has a distinct name, as in England, in whose language it is called ‘stabbing’; but in another country, where it has not happened to be specified under a peculiar name, it passes not for a distinct species.” Cf. Book II., chap. xviii., sect. 7.

† Cf. Book II., chap. xxii., sect. 2; *vide* page 93.

‡ Cf. chap. iv., sect. 1.

Locke anticipates, and vindicates himself from an accusation of being too diffuse in his treatment of the names of essences, of mixed modes, and of words in general?—He allows it might be brought into a narrower compass, and confesses that he had not, when first beginning his Essay, contemplated such a departure from his METHOD; but he nevertheless thinks that a consideration of the disturbances that have been caused amongst men by disputes about essences, and the errors which have arisen from the ill-use of words, will justify his having done so.* (Sect. 16.)

CHAPTER IX.

Of the Imperfection of Words.

THERE is a preliminary consideration necessary before we proceed to examine the perfection or imperfection of words?—It is necessary first to consider their use and end; for as they are more or less fitted to attain that, so they are more or less perfect. (Sect. 1.)

The use of words is two-fold?—1°. One for the recording of our own thoughts, for which any word will serve, provided it be constantly used in the same signification. 2°. The other for communicating our thoughts to others. (Sects. 1 and 2.)

For communication, words have also a two-fold use?—1°. Their CIVIL USE, *i.e.*, such a communication of thoughts and ideas by words, as may serve for the upholding common conversation and commerce about the ordinary affairs

* Cf. chap. ix., sect. 21; Book II., chap. xxxiii., sect. 19; note, page 9.

and conveniences of civil life, in the societies of men one amongst another. 2°. Their PHILOSOPHICAL USE, *i.e.*, such a use of them as may serve to convey the precise notions of things, and to express in general propositions certain and undoubted truths, which the mind may rest upon and be satisfied with in its search after true knowledge. (Sect. 3.)

The chief end of language in communication being to be understood, in what case do words fail in that end both in civil and philosophical discourse?—When any word does not excite in the hearer the same idea which it stands for in the mind of the speaker.* (Sect. 4.)

What is it that causes doubtfulness and uncertainty in the signification of words?—The difference of the ideas they stand for.

What are the FOUR CAUSES OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS, enumerated by Locke?—1°. When the ideas they stand for are very complex, and made up of a great number of ideas put together. 2°. When the ideas they stand for have no certain connexion in nature, and so no settled standard anywhere in nature existing, to rectify and adjust them by. 3°. When the signification of the word is referred to a standard, which standard is not easy to be known. 4°. When the signification of the word and the real essence of the thing are not exactly the same. These he thinks are the difficulties that attend the signification of words that are intelligible; those which are unintelligible, such as names standing for simple ideas which another has not organs or faculties to attain, need not here be mentioned. The names of mixed modes are most liable to doubtfulness and imperfection for the two first of these reasons; and the names of substances chiefly for the two latter. (Sect. 5.)

* *Cf.* chap. iv., sect. 6.

From the imperfection in the names of mixed modes arising from the First Cause of the Imperfection of Words, Locke deduces an important consideration which is at variance with an opinion expressed by him in various other parts of his Essay?—Since the greater part of moral words are the names of very compound ideas, it comes to pass that they have seldom in two different men the same precise signification; since one man's complex idea seldom agrees with another's and often differs from his own—from that which he had yesterday, or will have to-morrow. (Sect. 6; *cf.*, chap. xi., sects. 2 and 27.) The opinion of Locke, however, that morality is capable of demonstration (chap. xi., sect. 16; Book I., chap. iii., sect. 1; Book IV., chap. iii., sect. 18;* chap. iv., sect. 7; chap. xii., sect. 8.) is confessedly based on the hypothesis that moral words are precise and invariable in their signification.

To obviate the Second Cause of Imperfection in the names of mixed modes, the rule of Propriety or Common Use may in some measure serve in civil conversation; Locke assigns two reasons why Propriety will not be efficacious in philosophical discourse?†—1°. Because nobody has authority to establish the precise signification of words, nor determine to what ideas any one shall annex them.‡ 2°. Because the rule and measure of propriety itself is nowhere established. (Sect. 8.)

* In Book IV., chap. iii., sect. 19, Locke acknowledges the ever-varying signification of words which stand for moral ideas, in terms precisely similar to those in the text; although he has just declared in the previous section that Morality is capable of demonstration. *Vide* note, page 175.

† He says afterwards (sect. 15) that the general names of *substances* may be sufficient for Civil, but are insufficient for Philosophical Use; *e.g.* the term "gold." (*Cf.* sects. 17 and 20.)

‡ *Cf.* chap. ii., sect. 8.

Locke notices a third circumstance which also contributes to doubtfulness in the signification of the names of mixed modes?—The manner in which the names of these mixed modes are learned, especially the most material of them—moral words. We may observe that when people wish to make children understand what the names of simple ideas or substances stand for, they generally show them the thing whereof they wish them to have the idea;* but in mixed modes the sounds are usually learned first, while they are dependent for the knowledge of the idea, either to the explanation of others, or to their own observation and industry. (Sect. 9.)

* This doubtfulness in the names of mixed modes, consequent on the manner in which their names are learned, will account for the many disputes about words which we daily see around us?—Disputants not being agreed as to the signification of the terms they employ, nor having in their minds the same complex ideas which they make them stand for, it follows, that in the interpretation of laws, whether human or divine, there is no end; comments beget comments, and explanations make new matter for explanations; and of limiting, distinguishing, and varying the signification of these moral words there is no end. These ideas of men's making are, by men still having the same power, multiplied *in infinitum*.†

* These latter considerations will serve to explain the unavoidable obscurity prevalent in the writings of ancient authors; Locke proposes a rule which he thinks we ought to adopt in deciding doubts as to the meaning of these writers?—To lay them aside altogether (except where they

* Cf. chap. xi., sects. 14, 20, and 21.

† Cf. Bacon, *De Aug. Scient.*, Book IX.

treat of truths we are required to believe, or laws we are to obey) resolving thus with ourselves—" *Si non vis intelligi, debes negligi.*" (Sect. 10.)

The names of substances have a double reference in their ordinary use?—1°. Sometimes they are made to stand for the real constitution of things from which all their properties flow, and in which they all centre—of this real constitution or essence we are totally ignorant, hence their names can never be adjusted or established by those standards to which they are referred. (Sect. 12.) 2°. "The simple ideas that are found to co-exist in substances," being that which their names immediately signify, these, as united in the several sorts of things, are the proper standards to which their names are referred.* (Sect. 13.)

Locke assigns three reasons why the names of substances, when referred to their Nominal Essence, must needs be of various and uncertain signification?—1°. Because the simple ideas that co-exist and are united in the same subject being very numerous, and having all equal right to enter into the complex specific idea which the specific name stands for, men, though they propose to themselves for consideration the very same subject, come to frame very different ideas about it, and so the name unavoidably has different significations. (Sect. 13.) 2°. Because the simple qualities which make up the complex ideas, being most of them powers in relation to changes which they are apt to make in or receive from other bodies, are almost infinite. (Sect. 13.) 3°. Because there is scarce any particular thing existing, which, in some of its simple ideas, does not communicate with a greater, and in others with a less number of particular beings. (Sect. 14.)

* Cf. chap. iii., sect. 17; Book II., chap. xxxi., sect. 6.

What incident does Locke narrate to show the imperfection of the ordinary names of substances for purposes of philosophical inquiry?—Why does he charge this as an imperfection rather on words than on our understandings?—He tells how he was once at a meeting of very learned and ingenious physicians,* where there arose a question, whether any liquor passed through the filaments of the nerves; after the debate had proceeded for some time, Locke, suspecting that the greatest part of disputes were more about the signification of words than a real difference in the conception of things, proposed that the disputants should first examine and establish amongst themselves, what the word “liquor” signified. After expressing some surprise, they acceded to the proposal, and discovered that the word was of unsettled signification, and that it stood for a different idea in the mind of each of them.† He confesses that when he began his present Essay he had not the least suspicion that the treatment of words was of any mo-

* Locke was himself a physician; his proficiency in medical science is attested by Dr. Sydenham; and by Lord Shaftesbury, whose life he is said to have saved, *Cf.* Dugald Stewart, *Dissertation*, Part II., sect. 1; Lewes, *History of Philosophy*, Vol. II., p. 240; Fox Bourne, *Life of John Locke*, *passim*.

† In sect. 17, he gives another instance of the unavoidable uncertainty existing in the names of substances;—when children use the word “gold,” they mean “a body of a certain yellow shining colour,” and therefore to them the shining yellow part of a peacock’s tail is gold; others join “fusibility” to the complex idea the word “gold” stands for, and therefore very properly assert that the word “gold” should only be applied to those bodies which have a shining yellow colour, and are capable of being reduced by fire to fusion, but not to ashes; others, again, holding the latter view to be an imperfect one, assert that weight, as well as colour and fusibility, should be joined to the complex idea; and so on. *Cf.* chap. ii., sect. 3; chap. vi., sect. 31; chap. x., sect. 17.

ment in the consideration of the understanding ; but when he began to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge, he found such a close connexion between it and words, that it was impossible to separate the discussion of them.* (Sects. 16 and 21.)

For two reasons the names of simple ideas are, of all others, the least liable to mistakes?—1°. Because the ideas they stand for, being each but one single perception, are much easier got and more clearly retained than the more complex ones of substances and mixed modes. 2°. Because they are never referred to any other essence, but barely that perception they immediately signify.† This reference makes the name of substances very perplexed. (Sect. 18.)

* Locke remarks that, next to the names of simple ideas, the names of simple modes are least doubtful, especially those of figure and number ; he lays down a general criterion as to what ideas have the least dubious names?—Those ideas which are least compounded.‡ (Sect. 19.)

What illustration does Locke give of the disturbing influence of language on thinking?—The obscurity and disorder of words, like the medium through which visible objects pass, do often cast a mist before our eyes, and impose upon our understandings. (Sect. 21.)

Locke thinks that a consideration of the uncertainty in the signification of words should teach us moderation in imposing our own sense of old authors, especially in discourses of religion, law, and morality ; by what parallel does he

* Cf. chap. v., sect. 16 ; Book II., chap. xxxiii., sect. 19 ; note, page 9.

† Cf. chap. iv., sect. 15.

‡ The most doubtful, he goes on to say, are the names of very compounded mixed modes and substances. (Sect. 20.)

justify his statement that the revelation of the will of God might be ambiguous?—It need not be wondered that the will of God, when clothed in words, should be liable to the doubt and uncertainty which unavoidably attends that sort of conveyance ; when even His Son, whilst clothed in flesh, was subject to all the frailties and inconveniences of human nature, sin excepted. (Sects. 22 and 23.)

* From these considerations, Locke deduces an important practical inference?—Since the precepts of natural religion are plain and intelligible to all mankind, and seldom controverted ; and other revealed truths which are conveyed to us by books and languages, are liable to the natural obscurities and difficulties incident to words ; it would become us to be more careful and diligent in observing the former, and less magisterial, positive, and imperious in imposing our own sense and interpretations of the latter. (Sect. 23.)

CHAPTER X.

Of the Abuse of Words.

WHEREIN does the abuse of words differ from their imperfection?—The imperfection of words arises from the natural defects of language, while the abuses are wilful faults and neglects committed by men in the way of communication. (Sect. 1.)

Locke enumerates SEVEN ABUSES OF WORDS?—

I.—USING WORDS WITHOUT ANY, OR WITHOUT CLEAR AND DISTINCT IDEAS. (Sects. 2 and 3.)

II.—INCONSTANCY IN THE USE OF THEM. (Sect. 5.)

III.—AFFECTED OBSCURITY BY WRONG APPLICATION.
(Sect. 6.)

IV.—TAKING THEM FOR THINGS; this abuse more particularly affects the names of substances. (Sect. 14.)

V.—SETTING THEM IN THE PLACE OF THINGS THEY CANNOT SIGNIFY. (Sect. 17.)

VI.—A SUPPOSITION THAT WORDS HAVE A CERTAIN AND EVIDENT SIGNIFICATION. (Sect. 22.)

VII.—FIGURATIVE SPEECH AND ALLUSION IN LANGUAGE.
(Sect. 34.)

The First Abuse is two-fold?—1°. One may observe, in all languages, certain words which, in their first original and their appropriated use, stand for no clear and distinct ideas; these have been chiefly introduced by the several sects of religion and philosophy,* the leaders of which coin new words, either (*a*) affecting something singular and out of the way of common apprehensions; or (*b*) to support some strange opinions; or (*c*) to cover some weakness of their hypothesis. (Sect. 2.) 2°. Others extend this abuse further, by familiarly using words which the propriety of language has affixed to very important ideas, without any distinct meaning at all; e.g., many men use such words as “wisdom,” “glory,” “grace,” etc., without understanding their meaning.† (Sect. 3.)

What is the cause of the First Abuse of Words?—It arises from men learning names before they know the ideas they belong to, and never afterwards taking the pains to

* Lower down in this section, he designates “the schoolmen and metaphysicians,” and also “the disputing natural and moral philosophers of these latter ages” as the “great mint-masters of this kind of terms.”

† Cf. chap. xi., sects. 8 and 9.

settle in their minds determined ideas; this custom has been especially prejudicial in moral matters.* (Sect. 4.)

How does Locke illustrate the difficulty of refuting men of unsettled notions?—By saying that it is as easy to draw those men out of their mistakes who have no settled notions, as to dispossess a vagrant of his habitation who has no settled abode.

How does Locke illustrate the dishonesty of the Second Abuse of Words?—By showing that a man in his accounts with another, may, with as much fairness, make the same characters of numbers stand at different times for different collections of units, as in his discourse or reasoning make the same word stand for different collections of different ideas. (Sect. 5.)

The Third Abuse of Words is three-fold?—1°. Applying old words to new and unusual significations.† 2°. Introducing new and ambiguous terms without defining either. 3°. Putting them together so as to confound their ordinary meaning. (Sect. 6.)

What does Locke censure as having contributed to the prevalence of this abuse? He instances two schools of philosophy which have not been exempt from it?—He considers that logic and the liberal sciences, as they have been handled in the schools, have been chiefly instrumental in it; the PERIPATETICS were the most eminent in this way; still other sects have not been wholly free from it, *e.g.*, the CARTESIANS confounded *body* and *extension*.‡ (Sect. 6.)

* Cf. chap. ix., sect. 9; chap. xi., sect. 24.

† Vide note, page 54; cf. sect. 23; chap. xi., sects. 11 and 12; First Letter to the Bishop of Worcester.

‡ Cf. chap. vi., sects. 5 and 21; Book II., chap. i., sect. 9. According to Descartes, the fundamental attribute of Substance must be Extension, because we can abstract from Substance all the qualities except

Locke considers that there is no better way to give plausibility and apparent validity to any strange or absurd doctrine, than to surround it with legions of obscure, doubtful, and undefined words?—This mode of procedure would make these retreats more like the dens of robbers, or holes of foxes, than the fortresses of fair warriors, which, if it be hard to get them out of, it is not for the strength that is in them, but the briars and thorns, and the obscurity of the thickets they are beset with. (Sect. 9.)

Locke thinks that the scholastic disputes have helped much to increase the natural imperfections of language, and to perplex the signification of words; the mischief done, however, did not stop in logical subtleties and empty speculations, but has invaded the great concerns of human life and society, and has in a great measure destroyed the two great rules of religion and justice; he adduces two facts in support of this opinion?—1°. The greatest part of comments and disputes upon the laws of God and man serves only to make the meaning more doubtful, and to perplex the sense. 2°. We see that princes, speaking or writing to their servants, in their ordinary commands are easily understood; while speaking to their people in their laws, they are not so. (Sect. 12.)

What class of persons are especially liable to the Fourth Abuse of Words?—Those who most confine their thoughts to any one system, and give themselves up into a firm belief of the perfection of any received hypothesis. These men

Extension. The fundamental attribute of Mind is Thought, *because by this attribute Mind is revealed to itself.* Descartes, however, like Locke, was not an Idealist, since he distinctly asserts that Spirit and Body are essentially diverse, and possess nothing in common. Cf. Stirling's Translation of Schwegler's History of Philosophy; Lewes, History of Philosophy, Vol. II.; Johnson's Translation of Tenneman's History of Philosophy, Bohn's Edition.

come to be persuaded that the terms they employ are so suited to the nature of things, as to correspond perfectly with their real existence. (Sect. 14.)

Locke gives some examples of this abuse from the history of philosophy; he also instances its prevalence, where we would little expect it, in the employment of a word in frequent use?—1°. (a) Every one bred up in the Peripatetic philosophy thought that the ten names under which are ranked the ten predicaments, were exactly conformable to the nature of things. (b) All scholastic philosophers were persuaded that “substantial forms,” “vegetative souls,” “abhorrence of a vacuum,” “intentional species,” etc., were something real. (c) The Platonists have their “SOUL OF THE WORLD; and (d) the Epicureans their “endeavours towards motion in their atoms when at rest.”* (Sect. 14.) 2°. . He also

* Descartes held that since the essence of Substance is Extension, it necessarily follows that wherever there is Extension, there Substance must exist also, and consequently empty space is a chimera; Locke has previously referred to Descartes's opinion in Book II., chap. iv., sects. 3 and 5; *vide* pages 23 and 24. Cf. Book II., chap. xiii., sect. 11, *et seq.*; chap. xv., sects. 2-4; chap. xvii., sect. 20; Book IV., chap. vii., sects. 12 and 13. Other philosophers denied the existence of a vacuum, on the grounds that “Nature abhors a vacuum.” “Plato assumed that first, before the creation of anything, a World-Former (Demiurgus) existed as moving deliberating principle; and then, coeval with him, on the one hand, the ideal world (which ever self-identical, remains immovable as the eternal archetype,) and on the other, a chaotic, formless, lawless, fluctuating mass, which holds within it the germs of the material world, but without yet possessing any definite form or substance. With these two elements, the Creator composes, next, THE SOUL OF THE WORLD, that is, *the invisible, dynamical principle of order and motions in the world* (which is conceived, however, as extended in space.)” Stirling's Translation of Schweigger's History of Philosophy, p. 82.

The Epicurean doctrine of Atoms is similar to that held by Democritus, to whom I have before referred (note, page 130.) Democritus,

mentions the many intricate disputes that have occurred respecting MATTER ; as if there were some such thing really in nature, distinct from body. Now it is evident that the word "matter" stands for an idea distinct from the idea of "body" ; for if the ideas the two terms stood for were precisely the same, they might indifferently be put for one another, which is not the case ; e.g., though it is proper to say "there is one matter of all bodies," yet it is not right to say "there is one body of all matters ;" hence the question may be asked—Whence arises the confusion ?—Locke's opinion is, that, though matter and body be not really distinct, (for wherever there is the one there is the other,) yet matter and body *stand for two different conceptions, whereof the one is incomplete and but a part of the other.* (Sect. 15.)

What does Locke consider to have "no doubt produced those obscure and unintelligible discourses and disputes which have filled the heads and books of philosophers concerning *materia prima*" ?—Since solidity cannot exist without extension and figure, "*the taking matter to be the name of something really existing under that precision*" has probably occasioned the discourses and disputes referred to.*

having postulated the existence of Atoms, next proceeds to discuss the question, "What causes their mutation and movement?" He finds this in the nature of the atoms themselves, which have a motion of their own as a constituent property.

Reid, Cousin, and Sir William Hamilton, maintain that Locke's Theory of Ideas is identical with the Peripatetic Theory of Intentional Species—a doctrine which, in the section under our notice, Locke ridicules, and designates as "gibberish." (Cf. Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion, sect. 9.) For some excellent remarks on this subject, *vide* Webb, Intellectualism of Locke, chap. ii.

* Matter, he observes, appears to be used for "the substance and solidity of body, without taking in its extension and figure ;" and there-

The observance of a certain precaution, Locke thinks, would cause fewer disputes to exist in the world?—The precaution of taking words for what they are,—the signs of our ideas only,—and not for things themselves.

Locke gives three instances of the Fifth Abuse of Words? —1°. When a man says “gold is malleable,” he means something more than this, that “what I call gold is malleable,” (which is the real import of the proposition,) but would have it understood that “what has the real essence of gold is malleable,” which is equivalent to saying, “malleableness, depends on, and is inseparable from the real essence of gold”; he all the time not knowing wherein the real essence consists.* (Sect. 17.) 2°. When we say that “*animal rationale*”† is, and “*animal implume bipes latis unguibus*”‡ is not, a good definition of a man, we suppose the name “man” to stand for the real essence of a species; while we do not know wherein that real essence consists. (Sect. 17.) 3°. In general, putting words for the real essences of substances. (Sect. 18.)

What is the cause of the Fifth Abuse of Words?—Men are disposed to substitute their names for the real essences of things, on account of the supposition that nature works regularly in the production of things, and sets the boundary to each of those species by giving exactly the same real

fore it is that we speak of it always as one, because in truth it expressly contains nothing but the idea of a *solid substance which is everywhere the same, everywhere uniform*. We no more conceive, or speak of “different matters” in the world, than we do of “different solidities” although we both conceive and speak of “different bodies,” *because extension and figure are capable of variation*.

* Cf. Book IV., chap. vi., sect. 9.

† Aristotle’s definition. Cf. chap. iii., sect. 10.

‡ Plato’s definition. Cf. chap. xi., sect. 20.

internal constitution to each individual which we rank under one general name. (Sect. 20.)

This abuse contains two false suppositions?—1°. That there are certain precise essences according to which nature makes all particular things, and by which they are distinguished into species. 2°. That we have ideas of these proposed essences.* (Sect. 21.)

In treating at length of the Sixth Abuse of Words, Locke instances a term, in order to show that there are few names of complex ideas which any two men use for the same precise collection of simple ones?—There is no more familiar term than “life,” so that we would affront any one who uses it, by requesting him to explain it; nevertheless, if a dispute arise, whether an embryo in an egg before incubation, or a man in a swoon without sense or motion, be alive or not, we can easily perceive that a clear, distinct, settled idea does not always accompany the word. (Sect. 22.)

Amongst what class of people has the abuse of taking words upon trust produced the most extensive and injurious effects?—Amongst men of letters.

Locke considers that the many obstinate disputes which have laid waste the intellectual world are chiefly owing to ill-use of words†—Although it be generally believed that there is a great diversity of opinions in the books and variety of controversies with which the world is distracted, yet we shall find that when learned men dispute with each other, they really use different languages.

The ENDS OF LANGUAGE are three, according to Locke?—1°. To convey one man’s ideas or thoughts to another. 2°. To do it with as much ease and quickness as

* Cf. chap. iii., sect. 17.

† Cf. Bacon, *De Aug. Scient.* Book V., chap. iv.—“Equivocations and wrong acceptations of words are the sophisms of sophisms.”

possible. 3°. Thereby to convey the knowledge of things. (Sect. 23.)

Enumerate the cases in which men fail in the first of these ends?—1°. When they have names in their mouths without any determinate ideas in their minds, whereof they are the signs. 2°. When they apply the common received names of any language to ideas, to which the common use of that language does not apply them.* 3°. When they apply these names unsteadily.

When do men fail in the second of these ends?—When they have complex ideas without distinct names annexed to them. (Sect. 24.)

When do men fail in third end of language?—When their ideas agree not to the reality of things.† (Sect. 25.)

How far are we liable to these failures in our notions concerning substances? How far in modes and relations?—In substances we are liable to fail in all these respects; but in modes and relations, since we cannot have ideas disagreeing with the existence of things, we are only affected by the first four inconveniences. (Sect. 33.)

To what does Locke compare the man who has words without any distinct ideas in his mind to which he applies them?—To a man who has nothing in his study but the titles of books, without possessing their contents. (Sect. 26.)

To what does he compare the man who has complex ideas without particular names for each of them?—To a bookseller who has in his warehouse unbound volumes without titles. (Sect. 27.)

To what does he compare the man who does not con-

* *Vide* note, page 54.

† Locke has thus enumerated five cases in which we are liable to fail in the ends of language.

stantly put the same sign for the same idea?—To a man who, in the market and exchange, sells different things under the same name. (Sect. 28; *cf.* sect. 5.)

Locke anticipates that figurative speech* will not be considered an abuse of language; he considers it allowable to a certain extent?—It may be admitted in discourses where pleasure and delight are sought rather than information and improvement. (Sect. 34.)

Except in two particulars, rhetorical language should not be admitted into scientific inquiries?—All artificial and figurative applications of words, except order and clearness, tend only to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and mislead the judgment.

How does Locke designate rhetoric, and to what does he compare eloquence?—He calls the former “That powerful instrument of error and deceit;” he says that the latter, like the fair sex, has too prevailing beauties in it to suffer itself ever to be spoken against.

CHAPTER XI.

Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuses.

THE remedies for the natural and improved defects of language are worthy of consideration?—Speech is the great bond that holds society together, and the common conduit†

* *Cf.* note, page 44.

† *Cf.* Sect 5; Book IV., chap. v., sect. 10. Compare also Bacon, *De Aug. Scient.* Book IX.—“The pure waters of divinity are drawn and employed, nearly in the same manner as the natural waters of springs; viz. 1. either received in cisterns, and thence derived through different pipes, for the more commodious use of men; or 2. immediately poured into vessels for present occasions.”

whereby the improvements of knowledge are transmitted from man to man, and from generation to generation. (Sect. 1.)

Locke thinks it vain to expect that men should use their words constantly in the same sense,* and for none but determined ideas?—That would be equivalent to demanding that all men should have the same notions, and should talk of nothing but what they have clear and distinct ideas of; nevertheless it is necessary for all searchers after or maintainers of truth to think themselves bound to study how to deliver themselves without obscurity, doubtfulness, or equivocation. (Sects. 2 and 3.)

Locke thinks that a due consideration of the errors resulting from an ill use of words is likely to lead us to a very adverse conclusion respecting language?—He that shall well consider these disputes will have reason to doubt whether language, as it has been employed, has contributed more to the improvement or hindrance of knowledge amongst men.† (Sect. 4.)

From the ill use of words two inconveniences have resulted?—1°. Men suffer from it in their private meditations; but 2°. Much more manifest are the disorders following from it in conversation, discourse, and arguing with others;‡ for language being the great conduit whereby men convey their discoveries, reasoning, and knowledge from one to another, he that makes an ill use of it, though not corrupting the fountains of knowledge which are in things themselves, nevertheless does all he can to break or stop the pipes whereby it is distributed for the public use and advantage of mankind.§ (Sect. 5.)

* Cf. Sect. 27; chap. ix., sect. 6. Book IV., chap. iii. sect. 19.

† Few persons will feel disposed to admit Locke's conclusion.

‡ Cf. Book II., chap. xxix., sect. 12.

§ Cf. note, preceding page.

What test does Locke propose in order to detect a verbal dispute?—If the idea be not agreed on betwixt the speaker and hearer, for which the words stand, we may assume that the argument is not about things, but names. (Sect. 6.)

* Locke illustrates the difference between verbal and real questions by discussing an example?—He takes the question, “Whether a bat be a bird or not?”—This may be considered in a two-fold point of view:—1°. As a question between those who confessedly have but imperfect ideas of both these sort of things for which the names are supposed to stand, and then it is a real inquiry concerning the name of a bat or bird, in order to make the inquirers’ imperfect ideas of it more complete. 2°. As a question between disputants, whereof the one affirms and the other denies that a bat is a bird, and then the question is a purely verbal one concerning the signification of one or both these words.* (Sect. 7.)

* Locke desires it to be considered whether (*a*) the greater part of disputes in the world are not merely verbal and about the signification of words; and whether (*b*) if the terms they are made in were defined, and reduced in their signification to a determined collection of simple ideas, these disputes would not end of themselves, and immediately vanish; he proposes a test whereby we may know a man to be a champion for knowledge, truth, and peace?—We may assume a man to be so when in a dispute he strips all his terms of ambiguity and obscurity.†

Locke proposes FIVE REMEDIES FOR THE ABUSES OF WORDS?—

* For the distinction between Verbal and Real Questions, *vide* Whately, *Logic*, Book IV., chap. iv., pp. 177-182; Mill, *Logic*, Vol. I., chap. vi.

† Cf. Book iv., chap. xix., sect. i.

I. TO USE NO WORD WITHOUT AN IDEA. (Sect. 8.)

II. TO HAVE ANNEXED TO THEM (*a*) CLEAR AND DISTINCT SIMPLE IDEAS, (*b*) DETERMINATE COMPLEX ONES, AND (*c*) IDEAS CONFORMABLE TO THINGS AS THEY EXIST IN SUBSTANCES. (Sects. 9 and 10.)

III. PROPRIETY, *i.e.*, to apply the words as nearly as possible to such ideas as common use has annexed them to.* (Sect. 11.)

IV. TO MAKE KNOWN THEIR MEANING, and that in three ways—(*a*) in simple ideas, by synonymous terms or showing ; (*b*) in mixed modes, by definition ; (*c*) in substances, by showing their leading sensible qualities, and defining their powers. (Sects. 12-15, and 19-22.)

V. BY CONSTANCY IN THEIR SIGNIFICATION.† (Sect. 26.)

In cases where a synonymous word fails to explain the name of any simple idea, there are two other ways which we can have resort to?—1°. By naming the subject wherein that simple idea is to be found, *e.g.*, telling a rustic that a “*feuille morte*” colour is that of withered leaves falling in autumn. 2°. (The only sure way.) By presenting to a man’s senses the subject which may produce it in his mind.‡ (Sect. 14.)

Upon what grounds does Locke think himself justified in asserting that Morality is capable of demonstration, as well as Mathematics?—Because the precise real essences of the things moral words stand for may be perfectly known, and so the congruity or incongruity of the things themselves

* *Vide* note, page 54.

† These Five Remedies enumerated by Locke ought, in my opinion, to be considered as remedies for the Five Failures in the Ends of Language, rather than for the Seven Abuses of Language. *Vide* note, page 151.

‡ *Cf.* Chap. iv., sect. 11.

be certainly discovered, in which consists perfect knowledge.* (Sect. 16.)

Locke on this point anticipates an objection against his doctrine, arising from the consideration of the frequent recurrence of the names of substances in moral discourses?—When substances are introduced into moral discourses, their divers natures are not so much inquired into as supposed; e.g., when we say that “man is subject to law,” we merely mean by “man” “a corporeal rational creature,” without considering either the nature of its real essence or its other qualities.† (Sect. 16.)

What is Locke’s opinion regarding the relation existing between definitions and moral discourses?—Definition is the only way whereby the precise meaning of moral words can be certainly known.‡ (Sect. 17.)

Locke thinks that a “Reflection on the knowledge of spirits” is likely to confirm us in the opinion, that the greater part of all our knowledge of corporeal things lies in our senses?—We have no notion how spirits separate from body acquire a knowledge of corporeal things, although we must admit that their knowledge and ideas in this respect must be much more perfect than ours; since the whole of our knowledge reaches not beyond our own ideas, limited to the ways of perception.§ Nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that spirits of a higher rank than those immersed in flesh may have as clear ideas of the radical constitution

* Cf. Book I., chap. iii., sect. 1; Book IV., chap. iii., sect. 18; chap. iv., sect. 7; chap. xii., sect. 8.

† He thinks that if there could be found a monkey, or any other creature, having the use of reason to such a degree as to be able to understand general signs, and to deduce consequences about general ideas, it would be subject to law, and *in that sense* be a man.

‡ Cf. Book IV., chap. iii., sect. 20.

§ Cf. Book II., chap. ii., sect. 3; chap. xxiii., sects. 13 and 36.

of substances as we have of a triangle, but how they come by that knowledge exceeds our comprehension.* (Sect. 23.)

* Locke suggests a plan for the construction of a dictionary of natural substances, by which might be avoided the confusion entailed by several persons applying the same name to a collection of a smaller or greater number of sensible qualities?—He proposes that words standing for things, known and distinguished by their outward shapes, should be expressed by little draughts and prints made of them; he thinks himself justified in submitting this proposal, from a consideration of the benefit derived in this way by naturalists, when treating of plants and animals, although he thinks such a dictionary is scarcely ever to be hoped for, as requiring too much time, cost, pains, and sagacity. (Sect. 25.)

* Cf. Book IV., chap. iii., sects. 6, 17, and 27. For further references, *vide* Appendix.



BOOK IV.

CHAPTER I.

Of Knowledge in General.

How is it evident that our knowledge is conversant only about our ideas?—Since the mind in all its thoughts and reasonings has no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it does or can contemplate, it is manifest that our knowledge is only conversant about them. (Sect. I.)

Define KNOWLEDGE?—"THE PERCEPTION OF THE AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT OF ANY OF OUR IDEAS"*—

* Mr. Mill limits this Definition to our knowledge of Resemblances, and even with this restriction he does not think the proposition strictly correct ; for the comparison is not made, as Locke represents, between the ideas of the two phenomena, but between the phenomena themselves. This mistake he traces to an imperfect conception, on Locke's part, of what takes place in Mathematics, where frequently the comparison is really made between the ideas without any appeal to the senses ; only however because in Mathematics a comparison of the ideas is equivalent to a comparison of the phenomena themselves. (Mill, *Logic*, Vol. II., pp. 142, 143, Seventh Edition.)

[The student, acquainted with Mill's system, will see that the foregoing criticism is based on the distinction which that philosopher makes between "sensation" (the impression on the organ of sense—that which is received directly from sense,) and "idea" (the representation of a sensation in the imagination.) Professor Monck, however, has pointed out to me that Locke, while distinguishing between sensation and

e.g., when we know that *white* is not *black*, we only perceive that these two ideas do not agree. (Sect. 2.)

imagination, does not appropriate the word "idea" to the latter, as Mr. Mill assumes. On the contrary, he employs the terms "sensations," "sensitive ideas," and "ideas of sensation," almost interchangeably.]

Professor Webb, while noticing that this statement of Locke's has been vehemently impugned, observes that in reality it merely amounts to the self-evident assertion, "that in every proposition there must be a Subject and a Predicate, and that in every intelligible proposition the Subject and the Predicate must stand for definite Ideas." (Intellectualism of Locke, p. 108.)

Dean Mansel censures this Definition of Locke as abounding in verbal inaccuracy, for which however he does not hold Locke entirely responsible, as he attributes it in a great measure to the unsettled signification of philosophical terms in Locke's time. Taking Perception in the strict sense of the word, Mansel thinks it is incorrect to say, in general terms, that the agreement of Ideas is, in all cases, *perceived*. Further, if knowledge be extended to include the evidence of the senses, he is of opinion that we cannot correctly say that in all knowledge we have a distinct consciousness of two Ideas and their agreement. Finally, the term Idea admits of a variety of subordinate senses, in some of which, Mansel thinks, the Definition would be decidedly inaccurate. But although inapplicable to Judgments distinguished as Psychological, yet as limited to the Logical Judgment Proper, he thinks that the Definition, though susceptible of verbal improvement, is substantially correct. (Prolegomena Logica, pp. 73-75.)

I may add that Mansel's distinction between a Psychological Judgment, or "the Judgment of a relation between the conscious subject and the immediate object of consciousness," and a Logical Judgment, or "the Judgment of a relation which two objects of thought bear to each other," (Prolegomena Logica, p. 63,) has been objected to by Mr. Mill, on the grounds of being extra-logical, insignificant, and founded on a false theory. (Mill on Hamilton, p. 410, *et seq.*) For Cousin's criticism on Locke's Theory of Knowledge, *vide* Elements of Psychology, chaps. vi.-vii., (Henry's Translation.) For Tenneman's remarks on the same subject, *vide* History of Philosophy, pp. 326, 327, Bohn's Edition, (Johnson's Translation.)

This Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas is four-fold?—

I. IDENTITY OR DIVERSITY, as “blue is not yellow.”

II. RELATION, as “two triangles upon equal bases and between the same parallels are equal.”

III. CO-EXISTENCE OR NECESSARY CONNEXION, as “iron is susceptible of magnetic impressions” :—this sort of agreement belongs particularly to substances.

IV. REAL EXISTENCE* agreeing to any idea, as “God is.” (Sects. 3 and 7.)

* Professor Webb remarks that in this place LOCKE completely anticipates KANT’s celebrated distinction between Analytic and Synthetic Judgments. Identity corresponds to the latter philosopher’s Analytic Judgments ; Relation to his Synthetic *a priori* Judgments ; Co-existence to his Synthetic *a posteriori* Judgments ; while Real Existence belongs to the domain of Ontology. (Intellectualism of Locke, p. 114.) Mr. Mahaffy informs us, (Fischer’s *Comm.*, p. 28, *note*), that Mr. Monck called his attention to the last paragraph of Locke’s chapter on Trifling Propositions, (chap. viii. sect. 13, *q.v.*) where he discusses the “Infallible Rule,” which is much more explicit than any quotation in Professor Webb’s book. Mr. Lewes thinks that the passage in which LOCKE anticipates KANT, is that one where he speaks of propositions which affirm something of another, *which is a necessary consequence of its precise complex idea, but not contained in it.* (Chap. viii., sect. 8.) Mr. Lewes further observes, that a glance at Kant’s *Prolegomena*, sect. 3, p. 182, would have shown both Mr. Mahaffy and Professor Webb, that Kant was fully alive to Locke’s priority. (History of Philosophy, Vol. II., pp. 474, 475.) This conclusion, however, Mr. Mahaffy denies. (Kant’s Critical Philosophy, Vol. 1., Part I., p. 42.)

In case the student should be unacquainted with the meaning of the foregoing terms, I here insert their definitions as given by Dean Mansel :—An Analytical or Explicative judgment is one which contains nothing in the predicate, but what has already been implied in the conception of the subject, *e.g.*, “all bodies are extended.” A Synthetical

Ampliative Judgment is one in which the predicate adds an attri-

Why is the perception of identity and diversity absolutely necessary?—Because without it there could be no knowledge, reasoning, imagination, or distinct thoughts at all. (Sect. 4.*)

What is the only source of doubtfulness in the perception of identity and diversity?—If any doubt at all arise about it, it will always be found to be about the *names*, and not about the *ideas* themselves.†

Whence arises the necessity of our perceiving the relations existing between our ideas?—If we could not perceive the relation between any two ideas, there would be no room for positive knowledge at all. (Sect. 5.)

In treating of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, Locke confesses that his division is illogical; he nevertheless attempts to justify himself?—Though identity and co-existence are truly nothing but relations, yet they are such peculiar ways of agreement or disagreement of our ideas, that they well deserve to be considered as distinct heads, and not under relation in general. (Sect. 7.)

Knowledge is two-fold :—1°. ACTUAL. 2°. HABITUAL; define each of these kinds?—1°. ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE is the present view the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas, or of the relation they have one to another. 2°. A man is said to know any proposition, which, having been once laid before his thoughts, he evidently perceived the agreement or disagreement of the

bute to the subject which has not already been thought therein, *e.g.*, “all bodies are heavy.” Synthetical Judgments are called *a posteriori*, when dependent on experience; *a priori*, when not so dependent.—All Analytical Judgments are formed by the mind *a priori*. (Prolegomena Logica, pp. 101, 102.)

* With this section, *cf.*, Book II., chap. xxvii., sects. 1-3.

† *Cf.*, Book II., chap. xxix., sect. 6.

ideas whereof it consists ; and so lodged it in his memory, that, whenever that proposition comes again to be reflected on, he, without doubt or hesitation embraces the right side, assents to, and is certain of the truth of it. This is called **HABITUAL KNOWLEDGE.*** (Sect. 8.)

If we were capable of Actual Knowledge alone, what consequence would ensue?—We would then know but one truth—that being all we are able to think of at one time.

Habitual knowledge is two-fold?—1°. The first is of such truths laid up in the memory as, whenever they occur to the mind, it actually perceives the relation existing between those ideas. 2°. The second is of such truths whereof the mind having been convinced, it retains the memory of the conviction without the proofs ; *e.g.* a man is always certain of the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two right angles, when he remembers that he once perceived the demonstration. (Sect. 9.)

We are apt to suppose that this second kind of Habitual Knowledge is not true knowledge, since a man may be thought rather to believe his memory than really to know ;† what is it that is apt to mislead our first thoughts in this matter?—The consideration that the agreement or disagreement of our ideas in this case is not perceived, as it was

* Compare the following passage :—“The infinitely greater part of our spiritual treasures lies always beyond the sphere of consciousness, hid in the obscure recesses of the mind.” Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Lect. xviii., Vol. I., p. 339, Fifth Edition.

“It seems,” says Leibnitz, “that our able author [Locke] maintains that there is nothing virtual in us, and even nothing of which we are not always actually conscious.”—This statement is completely refuted by Locke’s distinction, as laid down in the text.

† Locke acknowledges that, at one time, he considered that this way of entertaining truth was not perfect knowledge, but a sort of assurance which exceeded mere belief.

at first, by an actual view of all the intermediate ideas whereby the agreement or disagreement of these in any proposition was at first perceived ; but by other intermediate ideas, that show the agreement or disagreement of the ideas contained in the proposition, whose certainty we remember.

As an example of this, Locke instances a proposition which shows the ground upon which particular demonstrations in mathematics afford general knowledge ?—A man who has once seen and clearly perceived the demonstration of the truth of the proposition, “The three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles,” knows it to be true, although he has forgotten the demonstration ; the intermediate ideas by which he now perceives its truth are the recollection of his former perception, and *the immutability of the same relations between the same immutable things* ; whence he infers that what he once knew to be true, he will always know to be true, as long as he can remember he once knew it. But since the memory is not always so clear as actual perception, and does in all men more or less decay in course of time, we may plainly see that Demonstrative Knowledge is much more imperfect than Intuitive, as will further appear from the considerations of the next chapter.

CHAPTER II.

Of the Degrees of our Knowledge.

WHEREIN lies, according to Locke, the different clearness of our knowledge ?—In the different ways of perception which the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas. (Sect. I.)

Enumerate and define the various degrees of Know-

ledge?—I. INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE is the perception by the mind of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other. (Sect. 1.) II. DEMONSTRATIVE KNOWLEDGE is the perception by the mind of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas, *not immediately*, but by the aid of intermediate ideas. (Sect. 2.) III. SENSITIVE KNOWLEDGE is the perception by the mind of the particular existence of finite things without us; this, while going beyond bare probability, and yet not reaching to either of the two first-mentioned degrees of certainty, passes under the name of knowledge. (Sect. 14.)

What relation exists between our Intuitive and all our other knowledge?—On Intuition depends all the certainty and evidence of all our other knowledge; than which certainty a man cannot imagine, and therefore not require, a greater, *e.g.*, we cannot conceive ourselves capable of greater certainty than to know that any idea in our minds is such as we perceive it to be; and that two ideas which we perceive to be different, are different. (Sect. 1.)

Whence arises the necessity of Demonstrative Knowledge?—Because two ideas cannot always be put together by the mind so as immediately to show their agreement or disagreement:—*e.g.*, when the mind wishes to know the agreement or disagreement in size between the three angles of a triangle and two right angles, and is not able to do so by an immediate comparison, it does so by comparing them with some other angles, to which they are mutually equal. (Sect. 2.)

Locke compares Intuitive and Demonstrative Knowledge in several respects?—1°. Demonstrative Knowledge depends on proofs. (Sect. 3.) 2°. Demonstrative Knowledge has not its evidence so clear and bright, nor the

assent so ready as in Intuitive Knowledge; because pains and attention are necessary in order to perceive the agreement or disagreement of the ideas considered. (Sect. 4.)
 3°. Demonstrative Knowledge has precedent doubt. (Sect. 5.)
 4°. Each step in Demonstrative Knowledge depends on Intuitive evidence. (Sect. 7.)

Define (1) PROOFS, and (2) DEMONSTRATION?—1°. PROOFS are those intervening ideas which serve to show the agreement or disagreement of any two others. 2°. DEMONSTRATION is the plain and clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas by means of proofs; (this agreement or disagreement being *shown to*, and made to be perceived by the understanding.) (Sect. 3.)

Define SAGACITY?—A quickness in the mind to find out intermediate ideas that shall discover the agreement or disagreement of any others, and to apply them aright.*

How does Locke illustrate the relative clearness of Intuitive and Demonstrative Knowledge?—By comparing the perception produced by demonstration to a face reflected by several mirrors one to another. (Sect. 6.)

Three steps are needful in Demonstrative Knowledge?—1°. INTUITION. 2°. MEMORY. 3°. ORDER.—*i.e.* 1°. Each step reason makes in Demonstrative Knowledge requires Intuitive Knowledge. 2°. The mind must remember this Intuitive certainty. 3°. This Intuitive certainty must be carried exactly in the mind, and no part left out. (Sect. 7.)

The necessity of Intuitive Knowledge in each step of Demonstrative reasoning has given rise to an erroneous opinion?—The scholastic maxim that all reasoning was "*ex præcognitis et præconcessis*."† (Sect. 8.)

Locke shows that it is not Mathematics alone that are

* Cf. chap. xvii., sect. 2.

† Locke considers that by this maxim two things are meant; 1°. That axioms are the truths first known to the mind. 2°. That upon

capable of demonstrative certainty ; he assigns two reasons why this opinion has obtained credence amongst men?—Wherever the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, by an intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement they have with any intermediate ideas, there the mind is capable of demonstration ; which is not limited to the ideas of extension, figure, number, and their modes. The reasons why Mathematics alone have been thought so capable are, 1°. On account of the general usefulness of these sciences, and 2°. Because the modes of number have the least difference very clear and perceivable ;* and although in extension every least excess is not so perceptible, nevertheless it can be represented by visible and lasting marks, whereby the ideas under consideration are perfectly determined, which in general they could not be, where they are marked only by names and words. (Sects. 9 and 10.)

* After stating that demonstration is not limited to the ideas of extension, figure, number, and their modes, Locke points out the difficulty of extending it to a particular class of ideas? He thinks, however, that, under certain conditions, this difficulty may be overcome?—In those simple ideas whose modes and differences are made and counted by *degrees*, and not *quantity*, we have not so nice and accurate a distinction of their differences as to perceive and find ways to measure their just equality, or the least differences.†

them the other parts of knowledge depend. Locke denies the truth of both these propositions. (Chap. vii., sect. 8, *et seq.*) In modern phraseology, the Schoolmen held that our Knowledge was *analytical*, not *synthetical*.

* Cf. Book II., chap. xvi., sects. 3 and 4.

† This arises, he says, from our ignorance of the variations of the minute "*corpuscles*," or particles of matter, which produce these ideas in us, and on which they depend. Cf. chap. iii.; chap. vi.; Book II., chap. viii.; chap. xxiii.

Since this is so, we cannot, for instance, demonstrate the certain equality of any two degrees of *whiteness*. But when *the difference is so great as to produce in the mind clear distinct ideas whose differences can be perfectly retained*, then those ideas whose modes consist of degrees (amongst which class may be reckoned all secondary qualities) are as capable of demonstration as ideas of number and extension. (Sects. 11-13.)

* What is Locke's opinion regarding the manner in which external bodies affect our senses?—He thinks it evident that it can be performed in no other way save by *the immediate contact of the sensible bodies themselves*. (Sect. 11.)

In treating of sensitive knowledge, Locke mentions two contrary opinions* regarding the existence of the external world; he notices a consideration which would seem to justify the advocates of the latter theory in their conclusion?—1°. Those who think that from the existence of ideas in our minds we may infer the existence of some real things without, corresponding respectively to those ideas. 2°. Those who deny this, because men may have such

* The two Schools of Philosophy here referred to are the REALISTS, or those who hold the separate existence of our external percepts, as opposed to the IDEALISTS; to the former class Locke is to be referred. The student must be careful in remembering that the first of these terms was not formerly employed in this signification. During the middle ages, Christendom was divided between the NOMINALISTS, or those philosophers who held that there were no existences in nature, corresponding to general terms, and the REALISTS who maintained that for every general term there was a mysterious entity existent outside of the mind, *in each*, and yet *distinct from each*, individual comprehended under that term. The opinions of these last-mentioned philosophers are now possessed of no interest except as a matter of historical curiosity. It is probable that the section which we are now considering suggested Berkeley's Idealism.

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ideas in their minds when no such thing exists, no such object affects their senses.* (Sect. 14.)

Locke thinks we are provided with an evidence for the existence of external objects which puts us past doubting?—He appeals to his readers, whether every one be not invincibly conscious to himself of a different perception when he looks on the sun by day, and thinks on it by night.

An objector may say that the difference between an idea revived in our minds by our memory, and actually coming in by our senses, is no proof of the matter in question; since a dream may do the same thing, and all these ideas may be produced in us without any external objects. How does Locke propose to deal with this?—1°. It is unimportant whether or not he removes the objector's scruples, since, where all is but a dream, reasoning and arguments are of no use, truth and knowledge nothing. 2°. The objector must evidently allow that there is a very manifest difference between dreaming of being in the fire and being actually in it. 3°. To the absolute sceptic, who maintains that being actually in the fire is but a dream, and who denies the external existence of any such thing as fire, Locke gives as his final answer, "This certainty is as great as our happiness or misery, beyond which we have no concernment to know or to be."†

Does it necessarily follow that where our ideas are clear and distinct, or obscure and confused, our knowledge will be so too?—No, for the clearness or obscurity of our know-

* Cf. Book II., chap. xvii., sect. 4.—"Our ideas are not always proofs of the existence of things." The distinction between Realism and Idealism is involved in Locke's remarks, Book II., chap. viii., sect. 2. Compare also chap. xi., sect. 1, of the present Book.

† Locke answers the sceptic in a different way in chap. xi., sect. 3, *q.v.*

ledge consists in the clearness or obscurity of the *perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas*, and not in the clearness or obscurity of *the ideas themselves*. (Sect. 15.)

Locke gives an instance of the possibility of having clear ideas without having clear knowledge?—A man who has as clear ideas of the angles of a triangle, and of equality to two right ones, as any mathematician in the world, may yet have but a very obscure perception of their agreement, and so have but a very obscure knowledge of it.*

CHAPTER III.

Of the Extent of Human Knowledge.

FROM five considerations, Locke thinks it is evident that the extent of our knowledge comes not only short of the reality of things, but even of the extent of our own ideas? —1°. We can have knowledge no farther than we have ideas. (Sect. 1.) 2°. No farther than we can have perception of their agreement or disagreement either, (*a*) by intuition, *i.e.*, the immediate comparing any two ideas, (*b*) by reason, *i.e.*, examining the agreement or disagreement of two ideas by the intervention of some others, (*c*) by sensation, *i.e.*, perceiving the existence of particular things. (Sect. 2.) 3°. Our Intuitive Knowledge cannot extend itself to all our ideas, since we cannot perceive their relationship by placing them in juxtaposition, or by immediately comparing them one with another. (Sect. 3.) 4°.

* The two examples which he cites for a different purpose in chap. iii., sect. 6, will also serve as illustrations of the possibility of having clear ideas without having clear knowledge.

Nor can our Demonstrative or Rational* Knowledge reach to the whole extent of our ideas, from want of connecting mediums between them. (Sect. 4.) 5°. Sensitive Knowledge reaches no further than the existence of things actually present to our senses, and therefore is much narrower than our knowledge in either of the two former. (Sect. 5; *cf.* chap. xi., sect. 9.)

* Although human knowledge is thus limited, Locke thinks that there is a way whereby it might be carried much farther than it has hitherto been?—If men, instead of employing all their industry and labour of thought for the colouring and support of a falsehood, or for the maintaining a favourite system or party, would apply themselves to improve the means of discovering truth, the desired result would probably follow, but not so far as to solve *all* the difficulties that may arise in the consideration of our ideas. (Sect. 6.)

What examples are given by Locke to show that our knowledge can never reach to all we might desire to know concerning those ideas we have; nor be able to surmount all the difficulties, and resolve all the questions that might arise concerning any of them?—1°. We have the ideas of a square, a circle, and equality; and yet perhaps shall never be able to find a circle equal to a square, and certainly know that it is so. 2°. We have the ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or not.†

Although we shall never certainly know whether matter thinks or not, nevertheless, Locke considers this supposition not impossible to be conceived?—It is in respect of our notions, not much more remote from our comprehen-

* *Cf.* chap. xvii., sect. 17.

† *Cf.* note, preceding page.

sion to conceive that God can, if He pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than that He should superadd to it another substance with a faculty of thinking; since we know not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort of substances that power has been given, although it is a flat contradiction to suppose that senseless unthinking matter should be the first eternal thinking being.* Nor is our inability to conceive anything a valid reason for rejecting its reality, for we must allow that God has annexed effects to motion, which we can in no way conceive motion able to produce.†

* The materialistic tendency which this supposition involves may be objected to, as lessening the belief in the soul's immateriality. How does Locke answer this objection?—All the great ends of morality and religion are well enough secured, without philosophical proofs of the soul's immateriality; since it is evident that He who made us at the beginning to subsist here, sensible, intelligent beings, and for several years continued us in such a state, can and will restore us to the like state of sensibility in another world, and make us capable there to receive the retribution He has designed to men, according to their doings in this life.‡

* Locke mentions some considerations which tend to show us the difficulty of our possessing any knowledge concerning the nature of the soul; he thinks such knowledge beyond the reach of our faculties?—He that considers how

* This he proves in chap. x., sect. 14, *et seq.* On this subject, *cf.* Locke's controversy with the Bishop of Worcester, usually appended in present Editions of the Essay as a note to this chapter.

† *Cf.* sect. 28; chap. x., sect. 19; Book II., chap. viii., sect. 11; note, page 33.

‡ *Cf.* Book II., chap. xxi., sect. 70; chap. xxviii., sect. 8.

hardly sensation is, in our thoughts, reconcilable with extended matter, or existence to anything that has no extension at all, will confess that he is very far from knowing what his soul is. This is a point which, in Locke's opinion, seems to be put out of the reach of our knowledge; since on whatsoever side we view it, either as an unextended substance, or as a thinking extended matter, the difficulty to conceive either will, whilst either alone is in our thoughts, still drive us to the contrary side.

What does Locke say puts it past controversy that we have something in us that thinks?—Our very doubts about what it is, confirm the certainty of its being.*

How far does our knowledge of 1°. Identity and Diversity, 2°. of Co-existence, 3°. of Relation, 4°. of Real Existence, respectively extend?—

I. Our knowledge of Identity and Diversity extends as far as our ideas. (Sect. 8.)

II. Our knowledge of Co-existence extends a very little way, though in this consists the greatest and most material part of our knowledge concerning substances. (Sect. 9, *et seq.*) Our knowledge of Incompatibility or Repugnancy to Co-existence is larger; *e.g.*, we know (*a*) that any subject may have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once; we know (*b*) that no one subject can have two smells or two colours at the same time. (Sect. 15.)

* *Cf.* chap. ix., sect. 3. It was Descartes who first stated this. According to him, the first step towards knowledge is to doubt every thing that appears in the least degree uncertain. In thus assuming everything as false in regard to which any doubt can be entertained, there is one primary Fact revealed to the doubter in his own consciousness, *viz.*, that he himself exists. This Fact possesses the most indubitable certainty. Hence the famous Cartesian Enthymeme "*Cogito, ergo sum*;"—"I think, therefore, I am."

III. How far our knowledge of Relations extends is hard to determine; because the advances made in this part of our knowledge depend on our sagacity in finding intermediate ideas. (Sect. 18.)

IV. As to the fourth sort of knowledge, (*a*) we have the knowledge of our own existence by Intuition, (*b*) of the existence of God by Demonstration, and (*c*) of other things by Sensation. (Sect. 21.*)

For two reasons our knowledge of Co-existence reaches a very little way?—1°. Because the simple ideas whereof our complex ideas of substances are made up are, for the most part, such as carry not with them, in their own nature, any visible necessary connexion or inconsistency with any other simple ideas, whose Co-existence with them we would inform ourselves about.† (Sect. 10.) 2°. In substances there is no discoverable connexion between any secondary quality and those primary qualities it depends on.‡ (Sect. 12.)

Whence do we obtain the ideas we have of spirits?—Such ideas as we have of other spirits are drawn from that of our own, by reflecting on the operations of our own souls within us, as far as they can come within our observation.§ (Sect. 17.)

* Cf. chap. ix., sect. 2; see my note at that place.

† Here, as well as in other portions of the Essay, Locke anticipates Kant in the recognition of The Criterion of Necessity; (cf. sect. 14; chap. xii., sect. 9; *et al.*) *Vide* Webb, *Intellectualism of Locke*, pp. 110-112.

‡ Cf. sect. 14; chap. iv., sect. 12; chap. vi., sects. 6, 7, and 14.

§ In Sect. 6 he observes:—"For I would fain know what substance exists, that has not something in it which manifestly baffles our understandings." (Cf. Book II., chap. xxiii., sect. 31.) "Other spirits, who see and know the nature and inward constitution of things, how much must they exceed us in knowledge! To which if we add larger comprehension, which enables them at one glance to see the connexion

Locke thinks Morality capable of demonstration;* he mentions two Ethical propositions as certain as any demonstration in Mathematics?—The idea of a Supreme Being, infinite in power, goodness, and wisdom, whose workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and the idea of ourselves, as understanding rational beings; being such as are clear in us, would, he thinks, if duly considered and pursued, afford such foundations of our duty and rules of action as might place Morality amongst the sciences capable of demonstration. The two propositions he mentions are—(a) “Where there is no property there is no injustice.” (b) “No government allows absolute liberty.”† (Sect. 18.)

Two things have made Moral Ideas to be thought incapable of demonstration?—1°. THEIR WANT OF SENSIBLE REPRESENTATIONS.—Ideas of quantity can be set down and represented by sensible marks and diagrams, which are not liable to the uncertainty words carry in their signification; while, on the other hand, we have nothing but words to express moral ideas by; which, though when written they remain the same, *yet the ideas they stand for may change in the same man, and it is very seldom that they*

and agreement of very many ideas, and readily supplies to them the intermediate proofs, which we by single and slow steps, and long poring in the dark, hardly at last find out, and are often ready to forget one before we have hunted out another; we may guess at some part of the happiness of superior ranks of spirits, who have a quicker and more penetrating sight, as well as a larger field of knowledge.” Cf. Baxter, *Dying Thoughts*.

* Cf. chap. iv., sect. 7; chap. xii., sect. 8; Book I., chap. iii., sect. 1; Book III., chap. xi., sect. 16.

† Both these propositions are what Kant calls “Analytical Judgments,” and are therefore not fair instances in point. *Vide note*, pages 160 and 161.

*are not different in different persons.** 2°. THEIR COMPLEXEDNESS—Moral ideas are commonly more complex than those of the figures ordinarily considered in mathematics. (Sect. 19.)

From the complexity of moral ideas TWO INCONVENIENCES have resulted?—1°. Their names are of more uncertain signification. 2°. The mind cannot easily retain the precise combinations of moral ideas so perfectly as is necessary in order to compare them.

* What is Locke's opinion as to the true use of diagrams in mathematics?—Their use is to retain more easily the precise combinations, which are necessary in the examination of habitudes and correspondences, agreements or disagreements of the several ideas about which demonstration is made; and not for the sake of aiding our intuitive perception of the several relations.†

The disadvantages which exist in moral ideas, on account of their complexity, often lead us to suppose that they are incapable of demonstration; Locke, however, thinks that these disadvantages may, in a great degree, be remedied?—By DEFINITIONS; setting down that collection of simple ideas which every term shall stand for, and then using the terms steadily and constantly in that precise collection.‡ Locke thinks that the other disadvantages under which these ideas labour, viz., their want of sensible representations, may hereafter be removed by some method suggested by Algebra§ or a kindred science. (Sect. 20.)

* These words plainly contradict Locke's statement that Morality is capable of demonstration, and are directly opposed to his remarks in Book III., chap. xi., sect. 16. Cf. note, page 138.

† Cf. chap. xi., sect. 6.

‡ Cf. Book II., chap. xxix., sect. 12; Book III., chap. xi., sects. 15, 17, 18, and 26.

§ Cf. sect. 18; chap. xii., sect. 15; chap. xvii., sect. 11.

The CAUSES OF OUR IGNORANCE are three?—1°. Want of ideas.* 2°. Want of discoverable connexion between the ideas we have. 3°. Want of tracing and examining our ideas. (Sect. 22.)

The ideas men are in want of are of two classes?—1°. Those ideas we are incapable of acquiring on account of the disproportionality of our few and narrow inlets of knowledge to the vast extent of being. 2°. Those ideas we are capable of, but still want on account (*a*) of their remoteness, or (*b*) of their minuteness; *e.g.*, we have ideas of bulk, figure, and motion, yet not knowing what is the particular bulk, figure, and motion, of the greatest part of the bodies of the universe, we are ignorant of the several powers, efficacies, and ways of operation, whereby the effects which we daily see are produced.† (Sects. 23-25.)

The want of ideas which we have no conception of cannot be described?—Because the want of such ideas is a part as well as cause of our ignorance. (Sect. 23.)

What single consideration, according to Locke, suffices to show that the ideas we can attain to by our faculties are very disproportionate to things themselves?—That a positive, clear, distinct idea of substance, which is the foundation of all the rest, is concealed from us.

In one respect the intellectual and sensible world are perfectly alike?—The part which we see of either of them holds no proportion with what we see not.

On what grounds does Locke suspect that Natural Philosophy is incapable of being made a Science?—He considers that, although we may have a useful and experimental philosophy in physical things, still a scientific will be beyond our reach; because we want perfect and ade-

* *Cf.* chap. xvii., sect. 9.

† *Cf.* chap. vi., sects. 10 and 11.

quate ideas of those very bodies which are nearest to us, and most under our command. He thinks that we may have distinct ideas of the several sorts of bodies that fall under the examination of our senses, but an adequate idea of any one amongst them he suspects we do not possess.* (Sect. 26.)

This consideration, viz., how disproportionate our knowledge is to the whole extent of material beings, will lead us to an important truth?—That the whole intellectual world

* The following passages will show more fully Locke's opinion on this subject :—"But whilst we are destitute of senses acute enough to discover the minute particles of bodies, and to give us ideas of their mechanical affections, we must be content to be ignorant of their properties and ways of operation ; nor can we be assured about them any further than some few trials we make are able to reach. *But whether they will succeed again another time, we cannot be certain.* This hinders our certain knowledge of universal truths concerning natural bodies : and our reason carries us herein very little beyond particular matters of fact." (Sect. 25.)—"But as to a perfect science of natural bodies, (not to mention spiritual beings,) we are, I think, so far from being capable of any such thing, *that I conclude it lost labour to seek after it.*" (Sect. 29.)—"This way of getting and improving our knowledge in substances only by experience and history, which is all that the weakness of our faculties in this state of mediocrity which we are in this world can attain to, makes me suspect that Natural Philosophy is not capable of being made a Science." (Chap. xii., sect. 10.)—"But whether Natural Philosophy be capable of certainty or no, the ways to enlarge our knowledge, as far as we are capable, seems to me, in short, to be these two. 1°. To get and settle in our minds determined ideas of those things whereof we have general or specific names ; at least of so many of them as we would consider and improve our knowledge in, or reason about. 2°. The art of finding out those intermediate ideas, which may show us the agreement or repugnancy of other ideas which cannot be immediately compared." (Chap. xii., sect. 14.) Cf. chap. vi., sects. 13 and 14 ; chap. xii., sect. 9 ; chap. xvi., sect. 12. For Bacon's views respecting the right way of interrogating Nature, *vide* De Aug. Scient.

(which is certainly a greater and more beautiful one than the material) is concealed from us by an impenetrable obscurity. (Sect. 27.)

What is the extent of our knowledge concerning the existence of spirits?—We have no certain information even of their existence save by revelation,* if we except a few “superficial ideas” of spirit which we get by reflection from our own, and thence the best we can collect of the Father of all spirits.† That there are minds and thinking beings in other men as well as himself, everyone has a reason, from their words and actions, to be satisfied;‡ and the knowledge of his own mind cannot suffer a man that considers, to be ignorant that there is a God.

* Wherever there is a want of a discoverable connexion between the ideas we have, there we are incapable of certain and universal knowledge; Locke gives instances of our ignorance arising from this source?—Although we may conclude that the things we observe to proceed regularly do so in obedience to some fixed law, yet of this law we are ignorant.§ He thinks it unnecessary to mention such

* Cf. chap. xi., sect. 12; chap. xvi., sect. 12.

† Cf. chap. x.; Book II., chap. xvii.; chap. xxiii., sects. 33-35; Book III., chap. vi., sect. 11.

‡ For Mr. Mill's views on this point, *vide* Mill on Hamilton, chap. xii., pp. 236, 237, Third Edition.

§ On this passage, Mr. Lewes remarks:—“Here we have Hume's doctrine of Causation anticipated.” (History of Philosophy, Vol. II., p. 260.) According to Hume, all our *experience* of Causation is simply that of a constant succession. An antecedent followed by a sequent—one event followed by another, this is all we experience. We attribute, indeed, to the antecedent, a *power* of producing or causing the sequent; but we can have no experience of such a power. We believe the future will resemble the past because *Custom* has taught us to rely upon such a resemblance.

instances as are universally acknowledged to depend wholly on the determination of a free agent, *e.g.*, the resurrection of the dead, the future state of this globe of earth, etc (Sect. 29.)

Where only are we capable of certain and universal knowledge?—In those ideas *wherein there are certain relations, habitudes, and connexions, so visibly included in the nature of the ideas themselves*, that we cannot conceive them separable from them by any power whatever; *e.g.*, the idea of a right-lined triangle necessarily carries with it an equality of its angles to two right ones.

What has most contributed to the third Cause of our Ignorance?—THE ILL USE OF WORDS;* thus we find that mathematicians, who abstract their thoughts from names, and set before them the ideas themselves, have avoided much of the perplexity which has hindered men's progress in other parts of knowledge. (Sect. 30.)

The neglect in tracing our ideas will account for the inequalities we observe amongst men as regards their proficiency in a particular science?—Many are ignorant of mathematical truths, not from any imperfection of their faculties, or uncertainty in the things themselves, but from want of application in acquiring, examining, and duly comparing those ideas.

The extent of our knowledge may be considered from a two-fold point of view?—1°. In respect of the several sorts of beings that exist. 2°. In respect of universality; in this latter, our knowledge follows the nature of our ideas, *i.e.*, if the ideas are abstract, our knowledge is universal. Truths belonging to essences of things (or abstract ideas) are

* Cf. Book II., chap. xxvii., sect. 28; Book III., chap. x., *passim*; chap. xi., sect. 4.

eternal, and are only to be discovered by the contemplation of those essences.* (Sect. 31.)

CHAPTER IV.

Of the Reality of Knowledge.

LOCKE anticipates and answers an objection to his theory of placing Knowledge in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas?—An objector may say that all our knowledge is chimerical, as being only about our ideas; for, on that supposition, the visions of an enthusiast and the reasonings of a sober man would be equally certain, nay, the advantage, if any, would be on the side of the former. Locke admits that this would be true, if our knowledge of ideas *terminate in them, and reach no further where something further is intended*; our knowledge, therefore, is real only so far as there is *a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things*.† The question at issue reduces then simply

* Cf. chap. xi., sect. 14.

† Victor Cousin, in his adverse and severe criticism of Locke's Theory of Knowledge, employs the first four sections of the chapter we are now considering, together with Locke's remarks in Book II., chaps. viii., xxx., xxxi., xxxii., as the basis of his argument. Cousin's objections may be thus briefly summarized. According to Locke, there is knowledge upon this condition, and upon this condition only, viz., that the idea represents its object, and is conformed to it. But upon what condition does an idea represent its object, and be conformed to it? Upon this condition—that the idea *resemble* its object—that the idea have to its object *the relation of a copy to its original*. Accordingly, all Conformity supposes Representation—all Representation implies Resemblance—all Resemblance involves an Image. We

to this ;—how the mind knows that ideas agree with things themselves. (Sects. 1-3.)

Locke is of opinion that we may be assured that two sorts of ideas agree with things?—1°. ALL SIMPLE IDEAS, which, since the mind can by no means make to itself, must necessarily be the product of things operating on the mind in a natural way, and producing therein those perceptions which they are ordained and adapted to by the wisdom and

have thus the Representative Idea reduced to an Image, and, since every image is necessarily sensible and material, we have, finally, the Representative Idea reduced to a Material Image. Locke's Idea, therefore, is a Material Idea-Image, and the consequence of his system, when considered in relation to the Object of Knowledge, is Nihilism, and when considered in relation to the Subject of Knowledge, Materialism—Elements of Psychology, Henry's Translation, chaps. vi.-vii. Now I think that a careful examination of the very passages which Cousin criticizes will necessarily lead us to conclude that they can never bear the interpretation which he puts upon them. Even when Locke speaks of primary qualities as being "resemblances," (Book II., chap. viii., sect. 15; *et al.*) the context evidently shows he merely intends to assert (as Professor Webb has pointed out—*vide* note, page 34,) that *those qualities exist in nature exactly as in thought we conceive them to exist.* (Cf. Book II., chap. viii., sects. 9, 15, 17, and 23.) Again, in the case of secondary qualities, the following passages, out of many, will show that Locke means by "Conformity" "The Effect of a Power, or Cause" —"Those ideas of whiteness and coldness, pain, etc., being in us *the effects of powers* in things without us, ordained by our Maker to produce in us such sensations ; they are real ideas in us, whereby we distinguish the qualities that are really in things themselves. Our ideas are real distinguishing characters, whether they be only *constant effects*, [secondary qualities] or else exact resemblances of something in the things themselves [primary qualities.]" (Book II., chap. xxx., sect. 2.)—"Thus the idea of whiteness or bitterness, as it is in the mind, *exactly answering that power* which is in any body to produce it there, has all the *real conformity* it can or ought to have with things without us." (Book IV., chap. iv., sect. 4.) Cf. Webb, Intellectualism of Locke, chap. vii.

will of the Creator;* from this it follows that simple ideas are not "fictions of our fancies." (Sect. 4.†) 2°. ALL OUR COMPLEX IDEAS, EXCEPT THOSE OF SUBSTANCES, since they are "archetypes of the mind's own making," and not intended to be the copies of anything, nor referred to the existence of anything as their originals.‡ (Sect. 5.)

From this latter consideration the reality of both 1°. Mathematical, and 2°. Moral Knowledge, necessarily follows?—1°. In Mathematics we consider the truth and properties belonging to a rectangle or circle (for instance) only as they are ideas in our own minds; but nevertheless the knowledge we have of these properties is true and certain of real things existing, because real things are no further

* Cf. Book II., chap. xxx., sect. 2; chap. xxxi., sect. 2; chap. xxxii., sect. 14; Book III., chap. iv., sect. 11; chap. v., sect. 2. Victor Cousin holds that the existence of an External World is proved from the Principle of Causality; (*vide* Book II., chap. xxi., sect. 4; note, page 87;) "The Principle of Causality is the father of the external world." Elements of Psychology, Henry's Translation, p. 177. Locke anticipates this mode of proof here, and again in chap. xi., sect. 2; this shows us how erroneous the following statement of Cousin's is:—"It is so far from being true that the senses and the external world give us the Principle of Causality, that were it not for the intervention of this principle, the external world, *from which Locke derives it*, would have for us no existence." Elements of Psychology, p. 176.

† Mr. Lewes observes (History of Philosophy, Vol. II., p. 263) that this section contains a plain and explicit avowal of the relativity of our knowledge;—of the impossibility of ever transcending the sphere of our consciousness, and penetrating into the essence of things. The relativity of our knowledge is now generally understood to mean that all our knowledge is relative to the human mind percipient. Cf. the writings of Sir William Hamilton, Mr. Mill, Professor Bain, and others. Mr. Mill, however, observes (Examination of Hamilton, chap. ii.) that the phrase is ambiguous.

‡ Cf. Book II., chap. xxii., sect. 2; chap. xxx., sect. 4; chap. xxxi., sects. 3, 4, and 14; Book III., chap. v.

considered, in these propositions, than as things really agree to these archetypes in our minds. (Sect. 6.) 2°. Our Moral Knowledge is as capable of real certainty as Mathematics, since our moral ideas likewise are archetypes themselves. (Sect. 7.)

We need not wonder at Locke having placed the certainty of our knowledge in the consideration of our ideas, with so little regard to the real existence of things?—Most of the discourses of those who pretend, at least, to inquire after truth and certainty, are merely general propositions, and notions in which existence is not at all concerned. (Sect. 8.)

How does Locke answer the objection that the virtues and vices will be confounded, if it be conceded that our Moral Knowledge lies in the contemplation of our moral ideas?—No confusion or disorder will exist in the things themselves, nor in the reasonings about them, but only in their names. (Sect. 9.)

Locke notices that wrong names usually breed more disorders in Moral discourses than in Mathematics; why is this?—Because in Mathematics, when the figure is once drawn and seen, the name becomes useless; and therefore mistakes are easily rectified; but this cannot be done in Moral names, because of the many decompositions that go to make up the complex ideas of those modes.*

Although, in general, wrong names, attached to moral ideas, disturb not the certainty of our knowledge concerning them, one important exception must be made?—When God, or any other law-maker, has defined any moral names, there they have made the essence of that species to which the name belongs, and accordingly it is not safe to apply or use them otherwise; but in other cases it is a mere impropriety of speech to do so. (Sect. 10.)

* Cf. chap. iii., sect. 19; Book III., chap. ix., sect. 6.

Locke assigns a reason why it is insufficient to put together such ideas as have no inconsistency, in order to have ideas of substances capable of affording us real knowledge?—Since we do not know the real constitution of substances on which our simple ideas depend, there are very few of these ideas we can be sure are or are not inconsistent in nature, any further than experience and sensible observation reach.* (Sect. 12.)

How far then is our knowledge concerning substances real?—As far as our complex ideas of them are such, and only such, as are made of those simple ones that have been discovered to co-exist in nature.

* Upon what grounds does Locke justify the assertion that “whatever simple ideas have been found to co-exist in any substance, these we may with confidence join together again, and so make abstract ideas of substances”?—Whatever ideas have once had an union in nature, may be united again.

* Locke thinks that incorrect employment of words, and the erroneous opinion that species and their essences are something else than abstract ideas, have given rise to difficulties about truth and certainty, and have proved great obstacles to our acquiring clear and distinct knowledge concerning substances; what remedy does he propose?—He advises us to accustom ourselves to separate our contemplations and reasonings from words.† (Sect. 17.)

* Cf. chap. iii., sects. 12 and 14; chap. vi., sects. 6, 7, and 14.

† I have before noticed (note, page 167,) that the question at issue between the REALISTS and the NOMINALISTS, viz., as to the nature of *Genera* and *Species*, was one to which, in former times, a great amount of importance was attached. While the controversy was raging between these two Schools of Philosophy, an intermediate sect arose, whose distinguishing tenet is said to have been, that the mind has a

Distinguish between "CERTAIN KNOWLEDGE," and "CERTAIN REAL KNOWLEDGE"?—Wherever we perceive the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, there

power of forming general conceptions. The origination of this opinion is generally ascribed to Peter Abelard (born near Nantes, A.D. 1079; died at Clugny, A.D. 1142.) Dugald Stewart thinks (*Elements*, Vol. I., chap. iv., sect. 3) that the doctrine of the CONCEPTUALISTS (as they are called) amounted to the two following propositions :—"1°. That we have no reason to believe the existence of any essences or universal ideas corresponding to general terms. 2°. That the mind has a power of reasoning concerning *genera* or classes of individuals, *without the mediation of language*."

Locke, although vacillating in his opinion, seems, on the whole, to have been a Conceptualist; the words in the text are a proof of this. I shall briefly enumerate a few of the passages which may be adduced on either side to prove that Locke held the doctrines of the Nominalists and Conceptualists respectively. Locke enunciates the views of the Nominalists in the following places :—Book II., chap. xi., sects. 9 and 10; Book III., chap. iii., *passim*; chap. ix., sect. 2; chap. xi., sect. 9. He coincides with the opinions of the Conceptualists in Book II., chap. xiii., sect. 28; Book IV., chap. iv., sect. 13; chap. v., *passim*; chap. vi., sect. 1.

In order to show more clearly to the student the distinction between Realism, Conceptualism, and Nominalism respectively, I think I could not do so more concisely than by first proposing a question, and then stating the answer which would be given by each of these Schools of Philosophy in turn. Supposing we were to ask, What is meant by the term "Man"?—The Realists would reply—"A mysterious entity *outside* the mind, distinct *from* each, and yet *in* each individual." The Conceptualists—"An entity *inside* the mind, distinct from each individual." The Nominalists—"A particular image, or a general symbol representative of a class."

I have already remarked (note, page 167), that the term "Realist" is ambiguous. Locke was a Realist as opposed to Idealists; but, probably, a Conceptualist as opposed to both Realists and Nominalists. Mr. Graham points out (*Idealism*, p. 113) that the term "Idealist" has also become ambiguous; a discussion of this subject, however, is foreign to my present purpose.

is Certain Knowledge; and wherever we are sure those ideas agree with the reality of things, there is Certain Real Knowledge. (Sect. 18.)

In treating of the reality of knowledge, Locke thinks he has supplied one of those *desiderata* required amongst men? —By showing wherein real certainty consists.

CHAPTER V.

Of Truth in General.

WHAT IS TRUTH?—"The joining or separating of signs, as the things signified by them do agree or disagree one with another." (Sect. 2.) "The marking down in words the agreement or disagreement of ideas as it is." (Sect. 9.)

What is FALSEHOOD?—"The marking down in words the agreement or disagreement of ideas otherwise than it is." (Sect. 9.)

To what does Truth properly belong?—Only to propositions;† *i.e.*, to the joining or separating of signs. (Sect. 2.)

There are two kinds of propositions?—1°. MENTAL PROPOSITIONS, wherein the ideas in our understandings are, without the use of words, put together, or separated by the mind, perceiving or judging of their agreement or disagreement. 2°. VERBAL PROPOSITIONS, which are words, the signs of our ideas, put together or separated in affirmative or negative sentences. (Sect. 5.)

* Cf. St. John xviii., 38; Bacon, *Essays On Truth*, p. 1.

† Cf. Book II., chap. xxxii., sect. 1.

Whence arises the difficulty of considering truth of thought and truth of words distinct from each other?—1°. Because it is unavoidable, in treating of mental propositions, to make use of words; and then the proposition under consideration becomes verbal. (Sect. 3.) 2°. Because most men, if not all, in their thinking and reasoning within themselves, make use of words instead of ideas, at least when the subject of their meditation contains in it complex ideas.* (Sect. 4.)

Distinguish between MENTAL and VERBAL TRUTH?—Mental Truth is when ideas are so put together or separated in the mind, as they or the things they stand for do agree or not. Verbal truth is the affirming or denying of words one of another, as the ideas they stand for agree or disagree. (Sect. 6.)

Verbal truth is two-fold?—1°. PURELY VERBAL AND TRIFLING; of this he speaks afterwards in chapter viii. 2°. REAL AND INSTRUCTIVE, which is the object of that real knowledge of which he has spoken already.†

Locke notices an objection which may be urged against his theory of Verbal Truth, similar to that previously mentioned against his theory of Knowledge; how does he answer it?—It may be objected that, if truth be nothing but the joining or separating of words in propositions, as the ideas they stand for do agree or disagree, the knowledge of truth is comparatively valueless, since by this account it amounts to no more than the conformity of words to the chimeras of men's brains. Locke acknowledges that propositions will be only verbal when they stand for ideas in

* In the above passages, Locke contradicts one of the peculiar tenets of the Conceptualists, as laid down by Stewart. (*Vide* note, pages 184 and 185.)

† *Cf.* note, page 193.

the mind that have not agreement with the reality of things ; but they contain real truth *when their signs are joined as our ideas agree, and when our ideas are such as we know are capable of having an existence in nature.* (Sects. 7 and 8.)

Besides truth taken in the strict sense already mentioned, there are two other kinds of truth?—1°. MORAL TRUTH, which is speaking of things according to the persuasion of our own minds, though the proposition we speak agree not to the reality of things. 2°. METAPHYSICAL TRUTH, which is nothing but the real existence of things, conformable to the ideas to which we have annexed their names.* (Sect. 11.)

CHAPTER VI.

Of Universal Propositions : their Truth and Certainty.

WHAT makes the consideration of words and propositions a necessary part of any treatise of knowledge?—The examining the ideas by themselves, independently of their names, is the most philosophical ;† yet, from the prevailing custom of using sounds instead of ideas, words require to be considered.‡ (Sect. 1.)

* “ Truth is either *logical* or *ethical*. Logical truth is the agreement of our speech with the reality of things ; ethical truth, the agreement of our speech with the judgment of the mind.” (Murray’s Logic, Part II., chap. iii.)

† “ As it is impossible to comply exactly with the precept of Locke, to judge of ideas in themselves, their names being wholly laid aside, the next best course is, to examine them, as far as possible, through the medium of two independent languages.”—Mansel, *Prolegomena Logica*, p. 42, *Note*. Cf. note, preceding page.

‡ Cf. chap. v., sects. 3 and 4.

CERTAINTY is two-fold?—1°. CERTAINTY OF TRUTH is when words are so put together in propositions as exactly to express the agreement or disagreement of the ideas they stand for, as really it is. 2°. CERTAINTY OF KNOWLEDGE is to perceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas, as expressed in any proposition; this we usually call “knowing,” or “being certain of the truth of any proposition.” (Sect. 3.)

There is one condition necessary to be fulfilled before we can be certain of the truth of any general proposition?—We must first know the essence of each species its terms stand for: this is easy to do in simple ideas and modes, (since in these the real and nominal essence is the same,*) but difficult in substances. (Sect. 4.)

Locke assigns a reason why very few general propositions concerning substances are to be made, which can carry with them undoubted certainty?—Not because in using their names for the ideas we have in our minds, we are uncertain what things are signified by them, but because the complex ideas these names stand for are such combinations of simple ones as carry not with them any discoverable connexion or repugnancy but with a very few other ideas.† (Sect. 6.)

* Cf. Book III., chap. iii., sects. 15 and 18; chap. iv., sect. 3.

† In sect. 7, he enlarges upon this statement by assigning two reasons (already indicated, chap. iii., sect. 14—cf. sects. 10-13), why so very few general propositions concerning substances are to be made which can carry with them undoubted certainty: viz.,—1°. Because we know not the real constitutions of substances, on which each secondary quality particularly depends. 2°. If we knew them, it would only serve us for *experimental* knowledge, and reach with certainty no further in each case than that bare instance; because our understandings can discover no conceivable connexion between any secondary quality and any modification whatsoever of any of the primary ones.

* Locke would gladly meet with one general affirmation concerning any quality of gold (for instance) that we can certainly know to be true ; how does he meet the objection which may be made to this statement ?—An objector may ask, Is not this a certain universal proposition—“ All gold is malleable ” ? (a) Locke admits that it is certain *if malleableness be part of the complex idea the word “ gold ” stands for*, but then it is a trifling proposition ; (b) if however malleableness be *not* a part of the complex idea, it is not a certain proposition. (Sect. 9.)

* How far can we make universal propositions concerning substances, of whose truth we may be assured ?—As far as the co-existence of the qualities of substances contained in any proposition is known ; this, however, will reach but a little way, since our complex ideas of the sorts of substances are so remote from their internal constitution. (Sect. 10.)

* What reflection concerning the qualities which make our complex ideas of substances, does Locke think, will lead us to conclude that we are far from being admitted into the secrets of nature ?—We are wont to consider that each substance we meet with is an entire thing by itself, having all its qualities in itself, and independent of other things ; losing sight of the operations and motions of the invisible fluids they are encompassed with, upon which depend the greater part of those qualities which we take notice of, and employ to distinguish them from one another. (Sect. 11.)

* In illustration of this last statement, Locke gives some examples which show that the qualities which make our complex ideas of substances depend greatly on external, remote, and unperceived causes ?—1°. If a piece of gold be put anywhere by itself, separate from the reach and influence of all other bodies, it will immediately lose all its

colour and weight, and perhaps its malleableness too, which, for aught Locke knows, will be changed into a perfect friability. 2°. Water, in which to us fluidity is an essential quality, if left to itself, will cease to be fluid. 3°. If the air be but for a minute taken away from the greatest part of living creatures, they will presently lose sense, life, and motion. 4°. If this earth were placed a little farther from, or a little nearer to the sun, it is more than probable that the greatest part of terrestrial animals would immediately perish.

* In order to understand aright the constitution of substances, Locke thinks we must look beyond our own earth and atmosphere?—We must look even beyond the sun, or remotest star our eyes have yet discovered ; for it is certain that things, however absolute and entire they may seem in themselves, are but *retainers to other parts of nature*, for that which they are most taken notice of by us.

There are two conditions necessary to be satisfied before we can have any useful knowledge of substances?—1°. We must know (*a*) what changes the primary qualities of one body do regularly produce in the primary qualities of another, and (*b*) how these changes are effected. 2°. We must know what primary qualities of any body produce certain sensations or ideas in us ; this Locke thinks utterly impossible without revelation. (Sect. 14.)

Where alone are we capable of general certainty?—In the consideration of our abstract ideas. If we seek it elsewhere, in experiment or observations without us, our knowledge goes not beyond particulars. (Sect. 16.)

CHAPTER VIII.

Of Trifling Propositions.

LOCKE notices three classes of Universal Propositions, which, though certainly true, yet add no light to our understandings, bring no increase to our knowledge, and are, therefore, trifling?—1°. All purely identical propositions, *e.g.*, “a soul is a soul.” (Sect. 2.) 2°. When a part of the complex idea is predicated of the name of the whole; a part of the definition of the word defined,* *e.g.*, “lead is a metal.” (Sect. 4.) 3°. Using the same words in various significations; this is the worst sort of trifling.† (Sect. 11.)

Some men may object to Locke calling Identical Propositions “trifling.” He endeavours to remove misapprehension by defining his terms?—By Identical Propositions he professes to mean “Such propositions wherein the same term, importing the same idea, is affirmed of itself.” (Sect. 3.)

In treating of trifling propositions, Locke notices, by way

* These are what are now called “Analytical Propositions.”

† *Cf.* Book III., chap. x., sect. 5. In Dean Mansel’s opinion, there is an inconsistency between Locke’s rejection of innate ideas, and his condemnation of frivolous propositions. If the principles of thought are competent to supply any positive addition to what is given in intuition, it follows that the act of thought can in so far create its own materials: this brings us back of necessity to the theory of innate ideas. If, on the other hand, the understanding can only modify what is given out of the act of thought, it follows that analytical judgments are not mere verbal frivolities, but fundamental laws of the thinking faculty. (*Prolegomena Logica*, pp. 191, 192, Second Edition; *cf.* *Metaphysics*, pp. 231-233, Second Edition.) For Cousin’s criticisms on Locke’s discussion of Maxims, and Trifling Propositions, *vide* *Elements of Psychology*, p. 326, *et seq.* (Henry’s Translation.)

of comparison, an instructive proposition?—He who declares that the thing in which sense, motion, reason, and laughter, are united, has actually a notion of God, or is capable of being cast into sleep by opium, enunciates a proposition which carries instruction to one whose idea signified by the name “man,” has not contained in it having the notion of God, or being cast into sleep by opium. (Sect. 6)

We can know the truth of two sorts of propositions with perfect certainty?—1°. Trifling propositions which have a verbal certainty, but are not instructive. 2°. Those which affirm something of another, which is a necessary consequence of its precise complex idea, but not contained in it,* *e.g.*, Euclid I., 17 ; here the relation of the external angle to either of the internal opposite angles makes no part of the complex idea signified by the name “triangle.” (Sect. 8.)

There are two marks whereby we may know barely verbal propositions?—1°. ALL PROPOSITIONS WHEREIN TWO ABSTRACT IDEAS ARE AFFIRMED ONE OF ANOTHER are only verbal, *e.g.*, “parsimony is frugality ;” “gratitude is justice ;” that such propositions are merely about the signification of sounds appears from the consideration that no abstract idea can be the same with any other but itself. (Sect. 12.) 2°. ALL PROPOSITIONS, WHEREIN A PART OF THE COMPLEX IDEA WHICH ANY TERM STANDS FOR IS PREDICATED OF THAT TERM, are only verbal, *e.g.*, “gold is heavy.” (Sect. 13.)

Locke, in conclusion, lays down an “INFALLIBLE RULE”†

* Locke's distinction between propositions which are purely verbal or trifling, and those which are real and instructive, corresponds to Kant's distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments ; but the latter philosopher would not have admitted that all analytical judgments are purely verbal and trifling. *Vide* Monck, Introduction to the Critical Philosophy, p. 7.

† *Cf.* note, pages 160 and 161.

which we may use as a general criterion in order to detect trifling propositions?—Wherever the distinct idea which any word stands for, is not known and considered, and something not contained in the idea is not affirmed or denied of it, there our thoughts are occupied wholly with sounds, and are consequently unable to attain to any real truth or falsehood. (Sect. 13.)

CHAPTER IX.

Of our Knowledge of Existence.

LOCKE notices (a) one class of propositions which cannot concern existence, and (b) another which can only concern existence?—(a) Universal propositions of whose truth and falsehood we can have certain knowledge. (b) All particular affirmations and negations that would not be certain if they were made general. (Sect. 1.)

We have a three-fold knowledge of existence?—1°. We have the knowledge of our own existence by INTUITION; 2°. of the existence of God by DEMONSTRATION; 3°. and of other things by SENSATION.* (Sect. 2.)

What evidence have we of our own Existence?—Experience convinces us that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, and an internal infallible perception that we are.† (Sect. 3).

What is the ultimate limit of scepticism?—If a man doubt all other things, that very doubt makes him perceive his own existence, and will not suffer him to doubt that.‡

* Cf. chap. iii., sect. 21. Here we have Locke's Doctrine of Ontology.

† Cf. Book II., chap. i., sect. 10; chap. xxiii., sect. 15.

‡ Cf. chap. iii., sect. 6; note, page 172.

CHAPTER X.

Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a God.

ALTHOUGH God has given us no innate ideas of Himself,* yet by furnishing us with mental faculties, He has not left Himself without witness?—We have sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of Him, as long as we carry ourselves about us.† (Sect. 1.)

How far has God provided us with means whereby to discover and know Him?—As far as is necessary to the end of our being, and the great concernment of our happiness.

State briefly Locke's PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF A GOD, derived by reasoning from our own existence?—1°. Man knows that he himself exists, and is something. (Sect. 2.) 2°. He knows by an intuitive certainty that bare nothing

* Cf. Book I., chap. iv. Descartes is the philosopher to whose opinion Locke here alludes. Descartes himself, however, declares :—“ When I said that the idea of God is innate in us, I never meant more than this, *that Nature has endowed us with a faculty by which we may know God*; but I have never either said or thought that such ideas had an actual existence, or even that they were *species* distinct from the faculty of thinking. I will even go farther, and assert that nobody has kept at a greater distance than myself from all this trash of scholastic entities. . . . Although the idea of God is so imprinted on our minds, that every person has within himself the faculty of knowing Him, it does not follow that there may not have been various individuals who have passed through life without ever making this idea a distinct object of apprehension; and, in truth, they who think they have an idea of a plurality of gods, have no idea of God whatsoever.”—*Cartesii Epist.*, Epist. xcix.

† Cf. chap. iii., sect. 27; Book I., chap. iii., sect. 6; chap. iv., sects. 9, 12, and 17; Book II., chap. xvii.; chap. xxiii., sects. 33-35; Book III., chap. vi., sect. 11.

cannot produce a real being,* and that any thing having a beginning must be produced by something else. (Sect. 3.†) 3°. He knows that what had its beginning and being from another must also have both (*a*) all that which is in and belongs to its being, and (*b*) its powers from another; hence this Eternal Being must be Most Powerful, as the Source and Original of all power. (Sect. 4.) 4°. From the fact of man finding in himself both perception and knowledge, he infers the existence of a Most Knowing Eternal Being. (Sect. 5.) 5°. Finally, from these considerations, a man is led, by his reason, to the conclusion that there exists an Eternal, Most Powerful, Most Knowing Being, whom we call by the name of God. (Sect. 6.)

On what grounds does Locke object to Descartes' proof of the existence of a God, derived from our own idea of a MOST PERFECT BEING?‡—Although this argument may serve

* "*Ex nihilo nil fit.*" (Sect. 15.) Locke, in his proof of the existence of a God, seems to assume the Principle of Causality. (*Cf.* note, page 87.) He evidently regards this Principle as a portion of our Intuitive Knowledge, which "neither requires nor admits any proof." (Chap. vii., sect. 19.)

† "At least one part of Book IV. was written before one part of Book II. Speaking of ideas of duration in Book II., chap. xvii., sect. 5, Locke says, 'He that considers something now existing, must necessarily come to something eternal. But having spoke of this in another place, I shall here say no more of it.' The 'other place' is Book IV., chap. x., sect. 3." Fox Bourne, *Life of John Locke*, Vol. II., p. 102, *Note*.

‡ According to Descartes, when a man interrogates his own consciousness, he finds he possesses the idea of God. The question then arises—How has he come by this idea? Since it cannot have come in by the senses, neither can the man have invented it, it follows that this idea must be innate, just as the idea of the man's own self is innate. Again, a man must infer the existence of God from his own imperfection; because infinity and perfection are implied, as correlatives, in the

to convince some persons, yet it is a bad way of establishing the truth, and silencing Atheists, to take the fact of the possession of such an idea of God by particular individuals, as the sole proof of the existence of a Deity, and endeavour to invalidate other arguments which may be put forward. (Sect. 7.)

* We must manifestly arrive at the conclusion (from the patent absurdity of its opposite*) that some being must have existed from eternity ; Locke endeavours to show by a disjunctive argument what the nature of that Eternal Being is?—We can only conceive two sorts of beings in the world. 1°. INCOGITATIVE BEINGS, viz., such as are purely material, without sense, perception, or thought ; e.g., the clippings of our beards and parings of our nails. 2°. COGITATIVE BEINGS, viz., sensible, thinking, perceiving beings, such as

man's ideas of imperfection and finitude. Finally, the best and most evident proof of the existence of God is the one that follows from the very notion of Him ; because of all the ideas which a man possesses, one only, viz., that of a Most Perfect Being, involves *necessary* existence. Cf. Stirling's Translation of Schwegler's History of Philosophy, pp. 159, 160 ; Lewes, History of Philosophy, Vol. II., pp. 151-153 ; Johnson's Translation of Tenneman's History of Philosophy, p. 306, Bohn's Edition.

Mr. Lewes throws the Third Cartesian Demonstration into the form of a Syllogism, thus :—

All that we clearly and distinctly conceive as contained in anything is true of that thing.

Now we conceive, clearly and distinctly, that the existence of God is contained in the idea we have of Him.

Ergo, God exists.

Previous to Descartes, Anselm of Canterbury (born 1033—died 1109) had endeavoured to prove the existence of God from the notion of a Most Perfect Being. *Vide* Anselm, *Proslogium*, *Seu Fides Quaerens Intellectum*.

* *I.e.*, that there was a time wherein there was perfectly nothing.

we find ourselves to be. It is impossible to think that incogitative beings could produce cogitative; therefore it is obvious to reason that the first Eternal Being must be a cogitative or thinking being, whether material or not (Sects. 8-13.)

* In this connexion, Locke proposes what he considers as a universal and philosophical system of measurement?—A gry = one-tenth of a line, a line = one-tenth of an inch, an inch = one-tenth of a philosophical foot, a philosophical foot = one-third of a pendulum, whose diadroms, in the latitude of 45°, are each equal to one second of time, or one-sixtieth of a minute.* (Sect. 10, note.)

* It having been settled that the first Eternal Being must necessarily be cogitative, the next question to be considered is, whether it be material or not;—how does Locke deal with this inquiry?—

I. Even if we grant that the first thinking being was material, it would still follow that there is a God; but the danger of this supposition lies in this, that if the materiality of the First Being be once admitted, men are apt to forget the demonstration whereby an Eternal Knowing Being was proved necessarily to exist, and would then argue that all was matter, and so deny a God. By adopting this mode of procedure, however, they destroy their own hypothesis; since by separating matter and thinking, and supposing no necessary connexion between them, they establish the necessity of admitting the existence of an Eternal Spirit, but not of matter;—it having been proved already that we must allow an Eternal Cogitative Being. (Sect. 13.)

II. There are three possible forms under which we may suppose that the First Being was material; Locke refutes

* This question has been proposed for Henry.

each of these suppositions in order :—1°. We may imagine *that every particle of matter thinks* ; we must then allow *an infinity of gods*. (Sect. 14.) 2°. We may imagine *that one particle of matter alone thinks* ; we must then allow *the creation of matter by a powerful thought*—a fact which all materialists deny ; if we say that *all* the rest of matter is equally eternal with that thinking atom, we frame an hypothesis without the least appearance of reason. (Sect. 15.) 3°. We may imagine *that a certain system of matter, duly put together, thinks* ; we must then ascribe all the wisdom and knowledge of the Eternal Being only to a *juxtaposition of parts*. (Sect. 16.)

III. But further : this corporeal system either has (*a*) all its parts at rest, or (*b*) it is in a certain motion of the parts that its thinking consists : (*a*) if it be perfectly at rest, it is but one lump, and so has no privilege above one atom ; (*b*) if it be the motion of the parts on which its thinking depends, all the thoughts there must be unavoidably accidental and limited. (Sect. 17.)

How does Locke endeavour to show the inconclusiveness of the opinion held by some, that MATTER IS CO-ETERNAL WITH AN ETERNAL MIND ; and whence does the refutation derive its importance?—This question is important to be considered, because, although it does not deny the being of a GOD, it denies the CREATION : the only plausible grounds for this opinion is, that we cannot conceive how matter can be made out of nothing. This opinion is thus refuted by Locke ;—since it is manifestly absurd to maintain that we ourselves have existed from all eternity, and consequently it must be allowed that thinking things can be made out of nothing (as all things non-eternal must be), why should we not also allow it possible for a material

being to be made out of nothing by an equal power? (Sect. 18.)

* What is Locke's opinion as to the relative difficulty of conceiving the creation of matter and the creation of spirit?—Although we have experience of the latter in view and not of the former, nevertheless, when well considered, creation of spirit will be found to require no less power than the creation of matter; for if we would emancipate ourselves from vulgar notions, and raise our thoughts as far as they would reach, to a closer contemplation of things, we might be able to form "some dim and seeming conception" of how matter might at first be made, and begin to exist by the power of the Eternal First Being; but to give beginning and being to a spirit, would be found a more inconceivable effect of omnipotent power.* Locke declines discussing this question further, since it tends to lead us away from the notions on which present philosophy is founded.†

* How does Locke answer the objection, that it is impossible to admit the making of anything out of nothing, since we cannot possibly conceive it?—It is not reasonable to deny the power of an Infinite Being because we cannot comprehend its operations; and it is an overvaluing ourselves to conclude all things impossible to be done, whose manner of doing exceeds our comprehension. We do not deny other effects on these grounds, *e.g.*, we cannot conceive how anything but the impulse of body can move body, and yet that is not a sufficient reason to deny it im-

* In Book II., chap. xxiii., sect. 31, (*vide* page 105,) Locke specifies one respect in which matter is more inconceivable than spirit. He here specifies another respect in which spirit is more inconceivable than matter.

† *Cf.* Book II., chap. xxi., sect. 73.

possible* against the constant experience we have of it in ourselves in all our voluntary motions, which are produced in us only by our free mental action or thought;† for example, my right hand writes, whilst my left hand is still; nothing can cause this phenomenon but my will. (Sect. 19.)

CHAPTER XI.

Of our Knowledge of the Existence of other Things.

THE knowledge of the existence of all other things, except God and ourselves, we can only have by Sensation; why is this?—There is no necessary connexion of real existence with any idea which a man has in his memory, or of any other existence but that of God, with the existence of any particular man; hence it is only the actual reception of ideas from external objects that can give us information respecting the existence of other things, and make us know that something exists at that time without us which causes that idea in us.‡ (Sects. 1 and 2.)

* In using the words “deny it impossible,” I have followed most of the modern editions of the Essay. Mr. St. John, however, reads “deny it possible”—the phrase employed in the Fol. 1714.

† Cf. chap. iii., sects. 6 and 28; Book II., chap. viii., sect. 11; note, page 33. Locke, in his Third Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, expresses himself thus:—“For if this be a right rule of reasoning, to deny a thing to be, because we cannot conceive the manner how it comes to be, I shall desire them who use it, to stick to this rule, and see what work it will make both in divinity as well as philosophy.”

‡ Cf. chap. iv., sect. 4; Book II., chap. xxx., sect. 2; chap. xxxi., sect. 2; chap. xxxii., sect. 14; Book III., chap. v., sect. 2. I have already remarked (note, page 182) that Locke here anticipates Cousin's proof of an External World.

What does Locke think gives us the greatest assurance we are capable of concerning the existence of material beings?—The confidence that our faculties do not deceive us in the evidence they afford us.* (Sect. 3.)

We are confirmed, in the assurance afforded us through our senses of the existence of external things, by FOUR CONCURRENT REASONS?—I. Because we cannot have ideas of these things but by the inlet of the senses. This appears evident from the fact that those who want the organs of any sense can never have the ideas belonging to that sense produced in their minds.† (Sect. 4.) II. Because an idea from actual sensation, and another from memory, are very dis-

* Cf. sect. 2; chap. ii., sect. 14; note, page 168. "In the Fourth Book, Locke raises the sceptical objection, that if all knowledge relates, as he says it does, to ideas, how can we be assured of the existence of things without us?—He attempts to answer this objection in two separate chapters (Book IV., chaps. iii. [ii.?] and xi.), but with indifferent success. He finally resolves the difficulty in two ways; first, in a practical way, that our assurance of an External World is as great as our state needs; and next, in a manner similar to Descartes, viz. by Faith, as he says, 'The confidence that our faculties do not herein deceive us, is the greatest assurance we are capable of concerning the existence of material beings.' (chap. xi., sect. 3.)"—Graham, *Idealism*, pp. 122, 123. Mr. Graham goes on to remark, that the practical answer was none for a Speculative Philosopher, and that the certain trust in our faculties will suit Locke less than his great antagonist Descartes, since the latter believed both in innate ideas, and also that such ideas, if clearly conceived, have objective facts corresponding to them; while according to the former, all knowledge and all ideas come from Experience, (p. 123.) Sir William Hamilton frequently employs the Cartesian argument derived from "The veracity of the Deity." Cf. Leibnitz, *Nouveaux Essais*, liv. Compare also Locke's remarks, chap. xvi., sect. 14, of the present Book.

† The organs themselves, he says, cannot produce these ideas; for then the eyes of a man in the dark would produce colours, and his nose smell roses in the winter.

ting perceptions. (Sect. 5.) III. Because Pleasure or Pain, which accompanies actual sensations, accompanies not the returning of these ideas without the external objects. (Sect. 6.) IV. Because our senses assist one another's testimony of the existence of external things;—*e.g.*, he that sees a fire may, if he doubt whether it be anything more than a mere fancy, feel it also, and be convinced by putting his hand in it. (Sect. 7.)

* Mathematical demonstration, although not depending on sense, seems to derive greater certainty from it?—If a man proved, from a diagram placed before him, the inequality of the angles of a figure therein represented, it would be thought strange if he denied the existence of these lines and angles. (Sect. 6.)

What answer would Locke give to the sceptic, who mistrusted his senses, and affirmed that all we do is but a dream without possessing any actual reality?—The testimony of our senses is not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as great as our condition requires.* (Sect. 8.)

How far does the knowledge afforded by the testimony of our senses extend?—As far as actual sensation from particular objects, and no further.† (Sect. 9.)

How does Locke show the folly of expecting demonstration in everything?—He who in the ordinary affairs of life would admit nothing but plain direct demonstration, would be sure of nothing but perishing quickly.‡ (Sect. 10.)

* *Cf.* chap. ii., sect. 14.

† *E.g.* "For if I saw such a collection of simple ideas as is wont to be called 'man,' existing together one minute since, and am now alone, I cannot be certain that the same man exists now, since there is no necessary connexion of his existence a minute since with his existence now: by a thousand ways he may cease to be, since I had the testimony of my senses for his existence." (Sect. 9.) *Cf.* chap. iii., sect. 5.

‡ *Cf.* chap. xiv., sect. 1; *Introd.*, sect. 5; (*vide* page 10.)

How are we capable of knowledge respecting the past existence of external objects?—By memory ; this knowledge however reaches no further than our senses have formerly assured us. (Sect. 11.)

What grounds have we for believing in the existence of finite spirits?—Concerning their existence we must content ourselves with the evidence of Faith ; since universal certain propositions in this case are beyond our reach.* (Sect. 12.)

Two sorts of propositions are knowable?—1°. Those concerning the existence of any particular thing answerable to such an idea ; 2°. Those expressing the agreement or disagreement of our abstract ideas. (Sect. 13.)

Why are propositions concerning abstract ideas called “ ETERNAL TRUTHS ”?—Not because they are eternal propositions actually formed, and antecedent to the understanding that makes them ; nor because they are imprinted on the mind from any patterns external to it, and existent before ; but because being once made about abstract ideas, so as to be true, they will, whenever they can be supposed to be made again at any time past or to come, by a mind having those ideas, always actually be true. (Sect. 14.)

* *Cf.* chap. iii.. sect. 27 ; chap. xvi., sect. 12 ; *et al.* For Cousin's objections to Locke's doctrine in this section, *vide* Elements of Psychology, Henry's Translation, chaps. vi.-vii. For Webb's refutation of Cousin's objections, *vide* Intellectualism of Locke. chap. vii.

FINIS.

APPENDIX.

NOTE A.

THE first question which will be likely to occur to the student is :—What does Locke mean by the HUMAN UNDERSTANDING?—The general signification of this phrase in the Essay seems to be, “THE SUM TOTAL OF THE COGNITIVE POWERS.”—“ALL THOSE FACULTIES WHICH HAVE TO DO WITH KNOWLEDGE;” it is in this sense that he employs it in *Introd.*, sect. 3; sometimes, however, he apparently means, some one Special Cognitive Faculty. In his Second Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, he defines “The Understanding” as “The Faculty of Thinking.” For some remarks on this subject, *vide* Fox Bourne, *Life of John Locke*, Vol. II., p. 139, *Note*.

NOTE B.

LOCKE'S METHOD ;. *INTROD.*, *SECT.* 3.

According to Cousin, there are two radical errors in the method pursued by Locke ;—1°. Locke treats of the Origin of Ideas before studying sufficiently what the Ideas are. 2°. He not only puts the question of the Origin of Ideas

before that of the Inventory of the Ideas ; but he entirely neglects the latter question. According to Mill, Locke's procedure is the correct one, for to begin the inquiry where Cousin takes it up, is in fact to beg the question. (Mill on Hamilton, p. 170, *et seq.*, Third Edition.)

NOTE C.

With Locke's remarks, Introd., sect. 7, *cf.* Epistle to the Reader :—"Were it fit to trouble thee with the history of this Essay, I should tell thee, that five or six friends meeting at my chamber, and discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the difficulties that rose on every side. After we had awhile puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course, and that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, *it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with.*" Compare also Book IV., chap. iii., sect. 22 ; and my note, page 11.

Hegel, while admitting the plausibility of this procedure, thinks it not less absurd than to refuse to enter the water till we have learnt how to swim. *Cf.* Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences, sect. 10, where he argues that we must first *know* before we can examine the instruments of knowledge.

Dean Mansel observes (Metaphysics, p. 10, Second Edition), that if Locke laid the foundation of a better method of metaphysical inquiry, when he expressed himself in the terms quoted above, he prematurely excluded the very ques-

tion which his method was required to solve, by asserting that we have no ideas of body or spirit as substances, but merely suppose an unknown substratum to our external or internal ideas. (Book II., chap. xxiii.)

For Professor Bain's remarks on this subject, *vide* The Senses and the Intellect, p. 326, Third Edition.

NOTE D.

The grounds of Scepticism are somewhat different in Locke and Bacon; according to the former, Scepticism resulted from the observation of so many various and contradictory opinions extant amongst mankind, (Intro., sect. 2;) according to the latter, it proceeded from the failures of the older logicians. (De Aug. Scient., Book V., chap. ii.)

NOTE E.

SIGNIFICATION IN WHICH LOCKE EMPLOYS THE TERM "IDEA."
Vide NOTE, PAGE 42.

Many disputes have arisen as to what Locke means by the term "Idea," and the question is still a disputed one amongst philosophers. Bishop Stillingfleet was the first who objected to the term, on the grounds that this new way of speaking had given occasion to the enemies of the Faith to employ it as an effectual battery against the mysteries of the Christian Religion.

Locke, in reply to this charge, stated that no term could possibly be free from misappropriation by any particular individual or sect, and justified himself in the employment

of the word "Idea," by alleging that, in so doing, he was not postulating any new mental phenomenon, but merely using it in its received signification, viz., "the immediate object of the mind in thinking." *Vide* Locke's Second Letter to the Bishop of Worcester.

Philosophers have suggested three possible explanations of the signification of the term "Idea," as employed by Locke;—1°. A Separate Entity, either external to, or existent in the mind. 2°. A modification of the mental substance. 3°. A modification of the mental energy non-existent out of consciousness. It is most probable that it is in the last of these significations that the term is understood by Locke. *Vide* Book II., chap. i., sects. 3 and 5; chap. viii., sects. 1, 7, and 8; chap. x., sects. 2 and 7; chap. xxxi., sects. 2 and 12; chap. xxxii., sects. 1, 3, and 14; Book III., chap. ix., sect. 18; Book IV., chap. iv., sect. 4; Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion, sect. 39. Compare also the following passage:—"Whatever idea was never perceived by the mind, was never in the mind. Whatever idea is in the mind, is either an actual perception, or else having been an actual perception, is so in the mind, that by the memory it can be made an actual perception again." (Book I., chap. iv., sect. 20.)

NOTE F.

In order to supersede the metaphors "White Paper," (the *Tabula Rasa* of Aristotle,) and "Empty Cabinet," which Locke employs to illustrate the Original Condition of the Mind, other figurative descriptions have been proposed,—"The mind is itself innate," says Leibnitz, "and there are included in it substance, duration, change, action,

perception, pleasure, and a thousand other objects of our intellectual ideas. . . . I have used the comparison of a block of marble which has certain veins in it, rather than a plain piece of marble such as the philosophers call *tabula rasa*; because, if the soul resembled tablets unwritten on, truths would be in us like the figure of Hercules is in the block of marble, when that marble may receive indifferently one figure or another. *But if there are veins in the marble* which mark the figure of Hercules rather than any other figure, that marble would be more determinate, and the figure of Hercules *would in some way be innate*, although labour would be necessary to discover the veins, and to free them from their envelopment of marble. Thus are ideas and truths innate in us." Professor Sedgwick proposes another metaphor, which Dr. Whewell considers "much more apt and beautiful" than that of the "White Paper" of Locke, or the "*Tabula Rasa*" of Aristotle;—"Man's soul at first is one unvaried blank, till it has received the *impressions of external experience*. Yet has this blank been already touched by a celestial hand, and when plunged in the colours which surround it, it takes not its tinge from accident, but design, and comes out covered with a glorious pattern." These metaphors may be very beautiful, very appropriate, and very true, but regarded as emendations of what *Locke intends to illustrate*, I confess myself unable to see the significance which so many philosophers have attached to them. "He could not possibly have mistaken my meaning," wrote Locke in reply to the charge which Mr. Lowde brought against him of having made Virtue Vice, and Vice Virtue, "if he had but given himself the trouble to consider what the argument was which I was then upon, and what was the chief design of that chapter." These remarks of our Author are, I think, especially applicable to

the present case. If we turn to Book II., chap. i., sect. 2, we read thus: "Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, *void of all characters, without any ideas*; how comes it to be furnished?" Locke in this passage never denies that the mind may be possessed of certain inherent properties and spontaneous force. Cf. Webb, Intellectualism of Locke, pp. 57, 58. Compare also my note, page 18. (In the reply to Mr. Lowde, to which I have referred, we find this statement:—"Whereas, truly before they [Ideas or Notions] are known, there is nothing of them in the mind, *but a capacity to know them.*")

The following is the passage from Aristotle in which the metaphor we have been considering occurs: *Δεῖ δ' οὕτως, ὥσπερ ἐν γραμματείῳ ᾧ μηδὲν ὑπάρχει ἐντελεχείᾳ γεγραμμένον ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ.*—*De Anima*, Book III., chap. v. On this Sir James Mackintosh remarks.—"How many ultimate facts of that nature, for example (*i.e.*, those which are presupposed by the doctrine of association) are contained and involved in Aristotle's celebrated comparison of the mind in its first state to a sheet of unwritten paper! The texture of the paper, even its colour, the sort of instrument fit to act on it, its capacity to receive and to retain impressions, all its differences, from steel on the one hand to water on the other, certainly presuppose some facts, and may imply many, without a distinct statement of which, the nature of writing could not be explained to a person wholly ignorant of it."—*Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy*, edited by Whewell, p. 201, Third Edition. (In connexion with this quotation, cf. Mr. St. John's Edition of the Essay, Vol. I., pp. 142, 143.)

NOTE G.

Locke states in Book II, chap. i., sect. 8, that the ideas of Reflection are later than those of Sensation, because they need attention ; with this section, compare the following :—

Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν εὐθὺς γενομένοις πάρεστι φύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θηρίοις, ὅσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει· τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρὸς τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν μόγις καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας παραγίγνεται ὅς ἂν καὶ παραγίγνηται.—Plato, *Theatetus*.

Sir William Hamilton says :—"From the schoolmen, indeed, Locke seems to have adopted the fundamental principle of his philosophy, the derivation of our knowledge through the double medium of Sense and Reflection."—Lectures on Metaphysics, Lect. XIII. I agree with Mr. St. John (Preliminary Discourse to Locke's Essay, p. 15) in his opinion that, in the above quotation, Plato clearly contemplated Sensation and Reflection as the Sources of all our Ideas. Cf. Stirling's Translation of Schwegler's History of Philosophy, p. 72.

NOTE H.

Twice in the course of the Second Book of the Essay, we find arguments brought forward in refutation of the Cartesian Thesis that "The Soul thinks always." *Vide* chap. i., sect. 10, *et seq.*; chap. xix., sect. 4. For the reasons assigned in my note, page 17, I have omitted the full discussion of the former of these passages. In case, however, the student should desire more complete information concerning the Doctrine in question, and should wish to become acquainted

with the opinions of modern philosophers respecting Locke's criticisms thereupon, the annexed references, etc., may prove useful.

In connexion with the entire subject, Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Lects. xvii.-xviii. may be consulted with advantage.

In the former of these Lectures, Sir William Hamilton points out that Locke's assumption, that consciousness and the recollection of consciousness are convertible, is disproved by the phenomena of Somnambulism. In the latter, he asserts that Locke is wrong (chap. i., sects. 18 and 19) in attributing to the Cartesians the doctrine of unconscious mental modifications; an opinion, however, which was afterwards advanced by Leibnitz.

[I may notice in passing that Sir William himself seems to be in error here, and to misrepresent Locke in one particular. The latter does not, I think, directly attribute the doctrine of unconscious mental modifications to his opponents. He merely alludes to it as a possible alternative they might employ in order to escape from a difficulty:—"They who tell us that the soul always thinks, do never, that I remember, say that a man always thinks. Can the soul think, and not the man? or a man think, and not be conscious of it? This, perhaps, would be suspected of jargon in others. *If they say the man thinks always, but is not always conscious of it*, they may as well say his body is extended without having parts," etc. (Sect. 19.)]

Mr. Mill writes as follows:—"The words 'Nature' and 'Essence' are grand instruments of this mode of begging the question. [Viz., presenting the proposition itself in abstract terms, as a proof of the same proposition expressed in concrete language.] As in the well-known argument of the Scholastic theologians, that the mind thinks always,

because the *essence* of the mind is to think. Locke had to point out, that if by essence is here meant some property which must manifest itself by actual exercise at all times, the premise is a direct assumption of the conclusion; while if it only means that to think is the distinctive property of a mind, there is no connexion between the premise and the conclusion, since it is not necessary that a distinctive property should be perpetually in action." *Logic*, Vol. II., p. 400, Seventh Edition.

For Dean Mansel's remarks, *vide* *Metaphysics*, p. 355, *et seq.*, Second Edition.

NOTE I.

Locke declares that "In the reception of simple ideas the mind is merely passive." (Book II., chap. i., sect. 25; *cf.* chap. xii., sect. 1; chap. xxii., sect. 2.) The opinion of Sir William Hamilton on this question is worthy of consideration:—"There is no pure activity, no pure passivity, in creation. . . . Activity and passivity are not, in the manifestations of mind, distinct and independent phenomena. This is a great, though a common, error. They are always conjoined. There is no operation of mind which is purely active; no affection which is purely passive. In every mental modification, action and passion are the two necessary elements or factors of which it is composed. But though both are always present, each is not, however, always present in equal quantity." *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Lect. xvii., Vol. I., p. 310, Fifth Edition.

NOTE J.

THE ORDER IN WHICH THE MIND ACQUIRES ITS IDEAS.

Locke asserts that "Though the qualities that affect our senses are, in the things themselves, so united and blended, that there is no separation, no distance between them; yet it is plain the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the senses, simple and unmixed." (Book II., chap. ii., sect. 1; cf. chap. xii., sect. 1.) Dr. Reid denies this, and maintains that the ideas are taken from the objects in a complex state, and are afterwards decomposed by the mind. Archbishop King coincides with Reid's opinion, and expresses himself thus;—"Representationes rerum quas a sensibus habemus minime simplices sunt, sed involutæ et complicatæ quam maximæ. Intellectus vero ea quæ cumulativè sensus ad mentem detulerant secum revolvendo separat."—*De Origine Mali*, Sect. 1.

On this subject M. Cousin remarks:—"It is not true that we begin by simple ideas, and then proceed to complex ideas. On the contrary, we begin with complex ideas, and then proceed to more simple; and the process of the mind in the acquisition of ideas is precisely the inverse of that which Locke assigns. All our primary ideas are complex, and for the evident reason that all our faculties, or at least a great number of our faculties, enter into exercise at the same time; and their simultaneous action gives us at the same time a number of ideas bound and blended together, which form a whole." *Elements of Psychology*, Henry's Translation, p. 221.

NOTE K.

It has been an interesting question amongst philosophers to decide at what portions of our body the sense of Touch is most perfect. The first opinion I shall notice on this subject is that of Locke himself—"The fifth and last of our senses is touch; a sense spread over the whole body, though it be most eminently placed in the ends of the fingers." *Elements of Natural Philosophy*. Sir William Hamilton says—"The sense of touch has its seat at the extremities of the nerves which terminate in the skin; its principal organs are the finger-points, the toes, the lips, and the tongue. Of these, the first is the most perfect." *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Lect. xxvii., Vol. II., p. 158, Fifth Edition. Professor Murphy observes—"The organ of touch is the whole surface of the body, but especially the hand." *The Human Mind*, p. 58. Notwithstanding these authorities, I think it can be easily proved from experience that the sense of touch is most perfect at the tip of the tongue.

NOTE L.

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES. SEE PAGE 32,
AND NOTE.

On Locke's Division of the Qualities of Body into Primary Qualities, Secondary Qualities, and Powers (Book II., chap. viii.,) Professor Murphy thus comments—"The third class are what we call Experimental Qualities. They are quite as original as any of the former classes. Moreover, the principle of division here is fallacious. Locke describes

P

the second and third classes of Qualities as merely Powers to affect the senses either directly or indirectly. But the Primary Qualities, so many of them as are really Qualities, are likewise nothing but Powers to affect the senses ; and in this respect all the classes are on a common footing." The Human Mind, pp. 328, 329.

NOTE M.

MOLYNEUX'S PROBLEM. *Vide* BOOK II., CHAP. IX., SECT. 8.

Mr. William Molyneux, an Irishman, and an intimate friend of Locke's, was born near Dublin in the year 1656; and was educated at Trinity College. It was at his instance that the "Essay Concerning Human Understanding" was made a text-book in the University of Dublin, somewhere about the year 1692, while Dr. St. George Ashe was Provost. *Vide* Fox Bourne, Life of John Locke, Vol. II.

NOTE N.


Other similitudes illustrative of the Faculty of Retention, besides that given by Cicero (*vide* page 42), have been suggested. It has been compared by Plato, Aristotle, and Boethius, to a *tablet* on which characters were written or impressed. Gassendi compared it to *the folds in a piece of paper or cloth* :—"Concipi charta valeat plicarum innumerabilium, inconfusarumque, et juxta suos ordines, suasque series repetendarum capax. Scilicet ubi unam seriem subtilissimarum induxerimus, superinducere licet alias, quæ primam quidem refringant transversum, et in omnem obli-

quitatem ; sed ita tamen, ut dum novæ plicæ, plicarumque series superinducuntur, priores omnes non modo remaneant, verum etiam possint facili negotio excitari, redire, apparere, quatenus una plica arrepta cæteræ, quæ in eadem serie quadam, quasi sponte sequuntur." *Vide* Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Vol. II., pp. 210, 211, Fifth Edition.

NOTE O.

DIVISION OF IDEAS.

The following Table will show concisely Locke's Division and Sub-division of Ideas :—



The above appears to form Locke's Enumeration of "Nameable Things." *Cf.* Book III., chaps. iv., v., vi.

NOTE P.

ST. AUGUSTINE'S REPLY.

I have already given (note, page 59) the remarks of Sir William Hamilton, Dr. Lardner, and Dr. Murray, with reference to St. Augustine's reply. The following passage contains

Dugald Stewart's allusion to the same subject :—"To speak of classifying what has nothing in common with anything else, is a contradiction in terms. It was thus that St. Augustine felt when he said, 'Quid sit tempus, si nemo quærat a me, scio ; si quis interroget, nescio.' His idea evidently was, that although he annexed as clear and precise a notion to the word *time* as he could do to any object of human thought, he was unable to find any term more general under which it could be comprehended ; and, consequently, unable to give any definition by which it might be explained." *Dissertation, Part I., Note I. (Cf. Locke, Essay, Book III., chap. iv., sect. 16.).*

NOTE Q.

LOCKE'S CATEGORIES.

Three other enumerations of LOCKE'S CATEGORIES have been given besides those already mentioned in page 92. They are :—

I. 1°. MODES. 2°. SUBSTANCES. 3°. RELATIONS. (Book II., chap. xii., sect. 3.)

II. 1°. EXTENSION. 2°. SOLIDITY. 3°. MOBILITY.

III. 1°. MOTION. 2°. THINKING. 3°. POWER. (Book II., chap. xxii., sect. 10.)

NOTE R.

M. Cousin questions the accuracy of Locke's statements respecting the ultimate derivation of words, as set forth Book III., chap. i., sect. 5. (*Vide* pages 113-117.) In

the first place, he denies the absolute truth of the proposition that all the roots of language are, in the last analysis, signs of sensible ideas. The words *I* or *me*, and *being*, for instance, are primitive, altogether intellectual, and unsusceptible of any reduction. Further, even if this proposition were absolutely true, the conclusion which Locke draws from it is not legitimate. "Man," says Cousin, "is led at first by the action of all his faculties out of himself and toward the external world. The phenomena of the external world first strike his notice; these phenomena of course receive the first names; the first signs are drawn from sensible objects; and they are tinged in some sort with their colours. Then when man, subsequently, in falling back upon himself, apprehends more or less distinctly those intellectual phenomena of which he had only confused glimpses; and when he wishes to express these new phenomena of the mind and of thought, analogy leads him to connect the signs he is seeking for, with those he already possesses; for analogy is the law of all language forming or developed. Hence the metaphors into which analysis resolves the greater part of the signs of the most abstract moral ideas. But it does not follow at all, that the mind of man has hereby intended to mark the genesis of its ideas. Because the signs of certain ideas are analogous to the signs of certain other ideas, the conclusion does indeed follow that the former were formed after the others, and upon the others; but not that the ideas of all these signs are in themselves identical or analogous." *Elements of Psychology*, Henry's Translation, pp. 228, 229.

NOTE S.

In various parts of his Essay, Locke alludes to the extent of our knowledge respecting Finite Spirits, and makes several conjectures as to their nature and constitution. The following are some of the principal passages in which such reference is made:—Book II., chap. x., sect. 9; chap. xv., sect. 11; chap. xxi., sects. 2 and 49; chap. xxiii., sects. 13, 19, 20, 21, 28, and 36; Book III., chap. vi., sects. 3, 11, and 12; Book IV., chap. iii., sects. 6, 17, 23, and 27; chap. xi., sect. 12; chap. xvi., sect. 12; chap. xviii., sect. 7.

NOTE T.

“Locke, as we have seen, repeatedly asserts that Morality is capable of demonstration. (Book I., chap. iii., sect. 1; Book III., chap. xi., sect. 16; Book IV., chap. iii., sect. 18; chap. iv., sect. 7; chap. xii., sect. 8.) When requested, however, by Mr. Molyneux to publish a Treatise of Morals, drawn up according to the “hints,” given in the Essay, “of their being demonstrable according to the mathematical method,” our Author replied in the following terms:—“Though by the view I had of moral ideas, when I was considering that subject, I thought I saw that Morality might be demonstratively made out; yet whether I am able so to make it out is another question.” In a subsequent letter to his friend he wrote thus:—“I so far incline to comply with your desires that I every now and then lay by some materials for it [a Treatise of Morals,] as they occasionally occur in the roving of my mind. But

when I consider that a book of offices, as you call it, ought not to be slightly done, especially by me, I am in doubt whether it would be prudent, in one of my age and health, not to mention other disabilities in me, to set about it."

NOTE U.

Locke's Theory of Knowledge may be expressed in a form slightly different from that laid down in Book IV., chap. i., sects. 1-3 : thus—"The affirmations or negations we make concerning the ideas we have, may be reduced to these four sorts, viz., identity, co-existence, relation, and real existence." (Book IV., chap. iii., sect. 7.)

QUESTIONS.

The following Questions have been proposed at the Ordinary Undergraduate Examinations :—

1. On what grounds does Locke conclude that it is impossible to imagine any qualities in bodies, whereby they can be taken notice of, besides sounds, tastes, smells, visible and tangible qualities?
2. Of what nature, according to Locke, is our idea of *place*?
3. How does Locke show that the essences of species are abstract ideas?
4. On what grounds does Locke conclude that the signification of the name of an idea is least doubtful when the idea is simple?
5. Enumerate the primary and secondary qualities, as well as the powers, of an inkstand?
6. What answer does Locke make to the sceptic who denies the external reality of our perceptions?
7. What proof does Locke give of the existence of God?
8. By what marks may purely verbal propositions be known? What is Locke's "infallible rule" respecting them?
9. Whence do we derive our idea of duration?
10. What distinctions does Locke draw between the idea of *space* and of body?

11. What is it that words properly and immediately signify? and to what other things are they secretly referred in men's thoughts, according to Locke?

12. What examples does Locke give of the various kinds of agreement and disagreement between our ideas?

13. What is the general idea of substance, how do we obtain it, and how can we define it?

14. Discuss the uses of language apart from communication.

15. How, according to Locke, is the clearest possible idea of an infinite magnitude obtained?

16. How does Locke endeavour to show that there is a conformity between simple ideas and the reality of things?

17. How does Locke show that our idea of body is as obscure and perplexed as that of spirit?

18. Why are the names of mixed modes most liable to doubtfulness?

19. Whence is it that men use words instead of ideas in their thinking and reasoning within themselves?

20. What reason does Locke give for his "odd conjecture" that the train of our ideas has a certain degree of quickness, and how does he illustrate it?

21. What does Locke mean by the real and nominal essences? How far are they the same, and how far different?

22. What condition, according to Locke, must be fulfilled by those ideas in which we are capable of certain and universal knowledge?

23. How does Locke prove that the perception of duration is derived from the train of our ideas?

24. In what four cases, according to Locke, is the accurate signification of words difficult to be ascertained?

25. What incident does Locke narrate in order to show

the imperfection of the ordinary names of substances for philosophical inquiry? Why does he charge this as an imperfection upon our words rather than upon our understandings?

26. How is the idea of active power best obtained? and why?

27. There are three ways whereby we get the complex idea of mixed modes. Give an example of each.

28. What is Locke's argument in favour of his theory as to the origin of our ideas, from the nature of our conception of other beings?

29. To what class of ideas does Locke reduce "cause" and "effect"? what is his definition of "action" and "passion"? to what does he reduce it in intellectual and in corporeal agents?

30. According to Locke, certainty is two-fold?

31. Enumerate the seven abuses of words specified by Locke, and give examples of each.

32. "The dominion of man in the little world of his own understanding is much-what the same as it is in the great world of visible things"?

33. How does Locke account for the fact that a privative cause may produce a positive idea?

34. Mention any of Locke's conjectures as to the nature of finite spirits. (*Vide* Appendix, Note S.)

35. Why, according to Locke, does Morality admit of demonstration?

36. In proving that Morality is capable of demonstration, what two ideas does Locke propose to compare? What two moral propositions does he select as examples?

37. Locke suspects that Natural Philosophy is not capable of being made a Science; on what grounds? what important inference does he deduce?

38. How does Locke answer the question—Why do we not attribute infinity to other ideas as well as those of space and duration?

39. “There are some that put so much difference between infinite duration and infinite space, that they persuade themselves that they have a positive idea of eternity, but that they have not, nor can have, any idea of infinite space”—what reason does Locke assign for this mistake, and how does he reply?

40. Locke mentions four important considerations with respect to relations? By what words does he express the connexion between relations and simple ideas derived from sensation and reflection?

41. How does Locke prove that brutes have memory?

42. The fifth abuse of words contains two false suppositions?

43. Locke refers to what he calls “a pleasant argument” by which some have endeavoured to prove their idea of infinite to be positive. State this argument. How does Locke refute it?

44. How do secondary qualities of bodies differ from powers? Give examples of each.

45. Enumerate the principle defects and abuses of language, according to Locke.

46. Enumerate the five remedies for the abuses and imperfections of words, according to Locke.

47. In what respect is our idea of power a relation, and how far is it a simple idea? State in a logical form the argument by which Locke proves that the clearest idea of active power is from spirit.

48. What are the *causes*, and what the *remedies*, of the imperfection of words?

49. What is the origin of the idea of solidity? How is

this idea distinguished from pure space, and from the ordinary idea of hardness? How does Locke answer the question, "What this solidity is?" and why does he give no definition of it?

50. How does Locke prove that Succession is necessary to Duration?

51. What is the story of the contest between the painter and the statuary? and for what purpose is it quoted by Locke?

52. For what purpose does Locke narrate the Florentine Experiment?

53. Locke assigns three reasons why the names of simple ideas are indefinable?

54. Why has it been thought that Mathematics alone are capable of demonstration; and what reason does Locke give for rejecting this view?

55. Discuss the character and origin of our idea of Duration.

56. What difference exists between demonstrations in numbers and in extension?

57. Whence do we get the ideas of Cause and Effect?

58. Show that the idea of spirit has no more difficulty than that of body.

59. How is Locke led aside from his original design to consider the nature, use, and signification of language?

60. What is the third abuse of words? and what has led to it, according to Locke?

61. Ideas of Sensation are altered by the Judgment. State, in full, Locke's proof.

62. What is it that leads men to substitute for the real essences of species their names? In this way of using the names of substances, there are two false suppositions contained?

63. According to Locke, there are "Four Concurrent Reasons" by which we are assured of the existence of an External World ?

64. What are the two degrees of Habitual Knowledge ? What consequence would ensue if we had no Habitual Knowledge ? What are Locke's observations on the extent of human knowledge ?

65. What class of ideas are those which are generally changed by the judgment, according to Locke, and why ?

66. When ideas are said to be "laid up in our memory," what is necessarily the meaning, and why ?

67. In what sense are the power, wisdom, and goodness of God called *infinite* ?

68. What ideas come from Sensation only, from Reflection only, and from all the ways of Sensation and Reflection ?

69. What does Locke mean by mental and verbal propositions, respectively, and in what does their truth consist ?

70. What ideas are derived by Locke from touch alone, and what from touch in combination with sight ?

71. By what method does Locke prove that all our original ideas come from Sensation and Reflection ? Define Reflection.

72. Of what three elements, according to Locke, is the idea of infinity made up ? How does he illustrate the character of this idea as partly positive, and partly negative ?

73. To what classes of ideas does the system of Locke refer the ideas of power, cause, vacuum, sin, space, and headache, respectively ? What distinction does he make between the first two ?

74. What examples are given by Locke to show that our knowledge can never reach all we might desire to know concerning those ideas we have ?

75. What are the peculiarities of the ideas of mixed modes, distinguishing them, on the one hand, from simple ideas, and, on the other, from substances ?

76. "Moral ideas are commonly more complex than those of figures ordinarily considered in Mathematics." Hence two inconveniences follow ?

77. Powers make a great part of our complex ideas of substances ; what is the reason of this ?

78. What are the several kinds of complex ideas, and how are they made ?

79. What is the cause of making mixed modes ?

80. What is the greatest assurance we can have, according to Locke, of the external existence of particular objects ; and by what considerations is this assurance confirmed ?

81. Whence does the abuse arise of taking words for things ? Give instances of it.

82. How, according to Locke, do we get the idea of space ?

83. How does Locke define Primary and Secondary Qualities ?

84. Why are the names of mixed modes apt to be taken for their ideas ?

85. How, according to Locke, do we get the idea of power ?

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
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